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ABSTRACT
Increasingly many systems are being conceptualised, designed and implemented as mar-
ketplaces in which autonomous software entities (agents) trade services. These services
can be commodities in e-commerce applications or data and knowledge services in in-
formation economies. In such systems, dynamic pricing through some form of negoti-
ation or auction protocol is becoming the norm for many goods and customers. Thus, ne-
gotiation capabilities for software agents are a central concern. Specifically, agents need
to be able to prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the parties they represent
with the aim of obtaining the maximum benefit for their users. They do this according to
some negotiation strategies. However, in many cases, determining which strategy to em-
ploy is a complex decision making task because of the inherent uncertainty and dynamics
of the situation. To this end, this thesis is concerned with developing bidding strategies
for a range of auction contexts.
In this thesis, we focus on a number of agent mediated e-commerce settings. In partic-
ular, we design novel strategies for the continuous double auctions, for the international
trading agent competition that involves multiple interrelated auctions, and for multiple
overlapping English auctions. All these strategies have been empirically benchmarked
against the main other models that have been proposed in the literature and, in all cases,
our strategies have been shown to be superior in a wide range of circumstances. Moreover
all our models exploit soft computing methods, in particular fuzzy logic and neuro-fuzzy
techniques. Such methods are used to cope with the significant degrees of uncertainty that
exist in on-line auctions and we show they are a practical solution method for this class of
applications. In developing such strategies we believe this work represents an important
step towards realising the full potential of bidding agents in e-commerce scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) is increasingly assuming a pivotal role in many or-
ganisations. It offers opportunities to significantly improve (make faster, cheaper, more
personalised and/or more agile) the way that businesses interact with both their custom-
ers and their suppliers. However, in order to harness the full potential of this new mode
of commerce it is important to increase both the degree and the sophistication of the auto-
mation. To achieve this, we believe that a new model of software is needed. This model
is based upon the notion of software agents—software entities that act on behalf of their
owner in an autonomous fashion in order to achieve their objectives [Jennings, 2001].
A key aspect of such agents is that they need to interact with one another in order to
effect trades (i.e., to buy and sell goods or services). In this context, on-line auctions—
institutions where goods are sold on the Internet by the process of making bids and alloc-
ating goods according to competition—are the most widely studied and employed means
of interaction. Indeed, it is estimated that there are currently some 2,500 on-line auc-
tions (http://www.internetauctionlist.com) for almost all types of goods imaginable. Such
auctions are so prevalent because they are an extremely efficient and effective method of
allocating goods or services [Wurman, 2001]. Now these auctions come in many differ-
ent forms, each with their own rules and ensuing properties. English auctions (in which
the auctioneer starts with the reserve price and solicits successively higher public bids
from the bidders until no one will increase the bid and the last bidder is the winner)
are used to sell books, laptops, cars, and almost everything. First-price sealed bid and
second-price sealed bid auctions (in which bidders submit sealed bids to the auctioneer
and the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pays their bid (in the former case)
or the second highest bid (in the latter case)) are used for a variety of procurement situ-
ations. Dutch auctions (in which the auctioneer starts with a high price and decreases it
until a bidder accepts the current price) are used for selling gold and jewellery. Continu-
ous double auctions (in which both buyers and sellers submit bids at any moment during
a trading period) are used to trade stocks, agricultural commodities and currencies.
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Given this variety of protocols, it is perhaps not surprising that the bidding strategies
of the participants cover a similarly broad spectrum of behaviours. However to be effect-
ive, bidding strategies need to be tailored to the type of the auction in which they are to
be used. In short, there is no optimal strategy that can be used in all cases.
In such environments, agents can perform a variety of different roles: (i) monitoring
auctions in order to keep the user informed of the latest progress of the various auctions,
(ii) analysing the market situation and history record in order to build a profile of potential
other bidders and estimate the trend of the price, (iii) determining what auctions to place
bids in, and (iv) deciding when, how many and how much to bid in order to get the best
deal. Now the more of these activities that can be automated, the more time that can be
saved by the users. Moreover, in more complex settings we believe agents are likely to be
more effective than human bidders. This is partly a matter of speed (agents can process
information more quickly than humans), but also because agents can more easily and
more systematically perform the complex decision making required to operate effectively
in many auction settings. Preliminary evidence for this is contained in [Das et al., 2001]
which shows that software agents outperformed their human counterparters in continuous
double auctions.
However, such automation is complex. In particular, perhaps the key challenge in
this area is to design effective and efficient strategies that agents can use to guide their
bidding behaviour. Although challenging, such developments are necessary if trading
agents are to realise their full potential. Moreover, we believe that the existence of ef-
fective strategies will mean that on-line auctions can be more readily deployed as the
marketplace protocol. In the absence of such strategies, there is still some reluctance to
adopt on-line auctions even though they are the most obvious solution in many cases.
Given this background, the research reported in this thesis addresses exactly this chal-
lenge for a range of e-commerce auction scenarios.
1.1 Trading Agents for On-line Auctions
This section briefly introduces the basic terms and concepts that underpin this thesis. In
particular we discuss agents, e-commerce, with a particular focus on on-line auctions, and
trading agents. A more comprehensive review of auctions and their associated strategies
is given in Sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.3, and a more detailed analysis of the potential roles of
agents in e-commerce is provided in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
1.1.1 Interacting Agents
To act flexibly on behalf of its owner in order to achieve particular objectives, an agent
must exhibit the following properties [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]:
• it needs to be autonomous: capable of making decisions about what actions to take
without constantly referring back to its user;
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• it needs to be reactive: able to respond appropriately to the prevailing circum-
stances in dynamic and unpredictable environments; and
• it needs to be proactive: able to act in anticipation of future goals so that its owner’s
objectives are met.
Thus, for example, a buyer may instruct their agent to: (i) find a reasonably cheap
notebook computer, with the latest technical specification, that can be delivered within a
week and that has a two year guarrantee or (ii) to find a flight that takes her from London
to San Francisco with a weekend stop over in New York. Similarly, a seller may instruct
an agent to: (i) monitor the prices of all its known competitors and automatically adjust
its offerings (either up or down) so that they remain attractive to their target audience
or (ii) to offer a reasonable discount scheme and better credit facilities to highly valued
customers.1
Whilst pursuing their objectives, the agents will invariably need to interact with other
similarly autonomous agents. This interaction can vary from simple communication (e.g.,
a buyer agent asks a seller agent how much a particular computer costs), to more elaborate
forms of social interaction (e.g., cooperation, coordination and negotiation). In the latter
case, for example, an agent may be required to:
• participate in an on-line auction, e.g., monitoring bids, making bids, and withdraw-
ing from the auction;
• negotiate on behalf of its owner, e.g., to ensure the desired good will be delivered
in time or to make the price acceptable;
• cooperate with other agents, e.g., two sellers of the same product may need to pool
their resources in order to meet a large customer order or two sellers may bundle
their distinct (complementary) offerings to make a single more desirable product.
In the context of this thesis, buyer and seller agents interact in some form of market-
place. Such marketplaces are controlled by an owner—an individual or organisation that
sets the rules of the environment in which the trade occurs. In first generation systems, the
market owner is usually synonymous with the seller. However, this need not always be the
case; examples of other possibilities are the numerous third party auction sites that now
exist (e.g., eBay (http://www.ebay.com), Fastparts (http://www.fastparts.com) and Free-
markets (http://www.freemarkets.com) and situations where buyers put out requests for
tender (e.g., Labx (http://www.labx.com) and General Electric (http://www.ge.com)). Gen-
erally speaking, there will be multiple e-markets trading in different types of goods (e.g.,
e-markets for purchasing holidays, e-markets for buying computer equipment, e-markets
for finding plumbers). Moreover, there will, in many cases, be multiple e-markets for the
1Agents are not just used in the domain of e-commerce, although this is arguably their most pop-
ular domain. Rather, agent technology should be viewed as a general solution paradigm for devel-
oping complex systems [Jennings, 2000]. Overviews of the application of agents in other domains
can be found in [Chaib-draa, 1995, Jennings et al., 2000a, Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998, Parunak, 1998,
Luck et al., 2003]
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same (or similar) goods (i.e., there will not be a single market for dealing with holidays).
Both within and between different vertical market segments, there will be a significant
variety in the way that e-markets are organised. These will vary from simple, fixed-price
catalogues, through various forms of on-line auction (the case we focus on in this thesis),
to sites where buyers and sellers can negotiate directly with one another (discussed in
Section 2.2.5).
1.1.2 E-Commerce and On-Line Auctions
According to the Electronic Commerce Association: “electronic commerce covers any
form of business or administrative transaction or information exchange that is executed
using any information and communications technology” [Till, 1998]. However we be-
lieve this definition is too broad and so we limit this thesis to cover commercial activities
conducted on the Internet [Hake, 1999]. Therefore, other forms of remote transactions
(e.g., ordering an air ticket over the telephone or buying a computer by credit card) are
not considered.
Within this context, e-commerce systems provide both commercial information (such
as products’ prices and available quantities) and facilitate various commercial actions
(e.g., buying, selling and negotiation). Moreover, the increasing use of information tech-
nology in this area has led to fundamental changes in the way these commercial activities
are undertaken (e.g., the rise of dynamic pricing, the ability to easily compare many
goods and the ability to negotiate contracts much more frequently) [Shaw, 2000].
Central to much of this improvement is the increasing use of on-line auctions as the
fundamental means of trade. Specifically, an auction is initiated by an auctioneer, and
involves several bidders making bids according to the imposed protocol (which may per-
mit one or multiple rounds). The outcome of the auction is then usually a deal between
the auctioneer and the successful bidder. Such auctions are central because they bring
a number of benefits to e-commerce. Firstly, auctions are a very efficient and effective
method of allocating goods or services, in dynamic situations, to the entities that value
them most highly [Wurman, 2001]. Secondly, in contrast to many human negotiations,
auctions can be very fast since decisions and exchanges can occur rapidly. Thirdly, on-
line auctions make the physical limitations of traditional auctions disappear (e.g., time,
space and presence). This means they can provide millions of globally dispersed cus-
tomers with more varieties of goods than can be selected through a traditional auction
[Bapna et al., 2001].
1.1.3 Trading Agents
An auction scenario consists of two clearly distinct components: a protocol and a strategy
[Binmore, 1992]. The former defines the valid behaviour of the agents during the inter-
action. For example in an English auction, an agent needs to bid the current price plus
the bid increment. The later is the method an agent employs to achieve its negotiation
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objectives within the specified protocol. For example, in an English auction a strategy
that could be adopted is to bid a small amount more than the current highest bid and stop
bidding when the user’s valuation is reached. Generally speaking, the protocol is set at
design time, by the marketplace owner, and is publicly known to all the participants. In
contrast, the strategy is determined by each individual participant and is typically private
(divulging it may leave them open to exploitation). Nevertheless, protocol and strategy
are inextricadly linked because the effectiveness of a strategy is very much determined by
the protocol. Thus a strategy that is effective for one protocol may perform very poorly
for other protocols. Moreover for some protocols, the optimal bidding strategy is easy
to determine and simple to compute. For example, the strategy proposed above for an
English auction is in fact optimal in the case that all the agents bid based on their real
valuation. However in most cases there is no such simple solution and developing the
strategy is a significant research challenge.
Against this background, we first consider a particular form of auction that is common
in e-commerce, in which there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers that want to trade
simultaneously. Such auctions are called double auctions [Friedman and Rust, 1992] and
they allow sellers to indicate the services they offer at various prices (called asks) and
buyers to indicate the services they desire and the price they are willing to pay (called
bids). The most common variety of double auction is the continuous double auction
(CDA) which permits trade at any time in a trading period (cf. trades only being allowed
at discrete time points) and which allows buyers and sellers to continuously update their
bids and asks at any time throughout the trading period [Kagel and Vogt, 1991]. The
CDA is a powerful market mechanism because of its speed and efficiency, and is the
mechanism underlying the organization of open-outcry trading pits at major international
derivatives markets [Cliff, 2001]. As well as being important for e-commerce, CDAs are
widely used in the non-online world to trade stocks, agricultural commodities, metals,
currencies and derivative instruments [Friedman, 1993]. To date, a number of bidding
strategies have been developed for the CDA (see Section 3.3.3 for details), however they
all have shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness. Given this, we will develop a new
more effective strategy.
The second case we consider is that where an agent has multiple potential auctions in
which it could bid in order to obtain the desired good or service. We believe this multiple
auction context is likely to become ever more important as ever more on-line auctions are
created. For example, on eBay alone there are typically over 13,000 auctions for digital
cameras at any one time. This expansion in the number of auctions, coupled with greater
reliance on trading in them, means agents will increasingly need to buy multiple goods
from these multiple auctions. For example, an agent may need to buy a flight from one
auction and book a corresponding hotel from another or buy different components from
different auctions in order to construct a new computer system. Moreover the possibility
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of exploiting multiple auctions in this manner is something that is not really possible
without software agents. Given such huge and complex search spaces, the agent has a
number of interrelated tasks to perform: (i) monitor relevant auctions, (ii) compare and
make trade-offs between the offerings, (iii) decide in which auction to bid, (iv) when
to bid, (v) how many items to bid for and (vi) at what price to bid. However, to date
comparatively little work has been done in this area (see Sections 3.5, 4.4 and 5.6) and
so we also seek to develop new strategies for this case.
1.2 Research Aims
In designing bidding strategies for the auction scenarios we consider in this thesis, and
in many others besides, there are a number of common issues that need to be dealt with.
Moreover, we believe it is possible to identify a range of concepts and technologies that
form a solid foundation for tackling such problems in a broad range of situations. We
now consider each of these in turn.
First, an agent often needs to predict the closing price of an auction in order to de-
termine what bids or asks to make [Wellman et al., 2004]. In the multiple auction con-
text, such predictions are needed in order to determine which of the available auctions is
likely to be the best one to bid in. This procedure is usually based on some form of utility
analysis so that the auctions selected will maximise the likely return of the bidder (as
discussed in [Byde et al., 2002]). However, in order to calculate such returns, the likely
clearing price of each auction must be estimated first.
Second, an agent needs to be adaptive so that it can tailor its bidding strategy to
reflect the environment in which it is situated. Being adaptive is particularly important
in cases where the environment is subject to significant changes. These could happen,
for example, when the agent is trading with the same (or similar) partners or opponents
repeatedly. In such cases, the agent can adapt its behaviour according to the behaviour of
other agents so that it can obtain a better outcome for its owner. However, when things
change, perhaps because the agent needs to trade with new partners, the parameters which
characterise the strategy need to be adapted again. This is hard to achieve by manually
adjusting the parameters since this is a slow and error-prone process and so it is desirable
if the agent can adapt itself on-line and automatically.
Third, the agent needs to be flexible in generating and responding to bids. Specific-
ally, we mean that in many cases it is important for the agent to have a soft constraint
in bidding or matching a bid. For example, in a CDA, if a buyer agent is going to bid
1000, but the lowest ask in the market is 1001 then the agent may benefit by relaxing its
constraint (slightly) and bidding the 0.1% higher that is necessary to make the trade.
Fourth, different users will have different attitudes to risk and these can, in turn, have
a significant impact on the performance of the agent. Individual attitudes to risk can be
characterised according to how an agent approaches a fair gamble [Schotter, 1994]. A
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risk-seeking agent will prefer fair gambles to sure results, a risk-averse agent will take
minimal risks with its actions and so rejects fair gambles, and a risk-neutral agent is
indifferent if the sure result and the gamble have the same expected utilities. Even when
using the same strategy, the adoption of different risk attitudes can make a significant
difference to the outcomes obtained. Specifically, in auction contexts we believe such
attitudes to risk should be influenced by the supply and demand within the market. The
more the demand, the more the competition, and a risk-averse attitude is more effective.
In contrast, the more the supply, the less the competition, and thus a risk-seeking attitude
will bring more profit.
Fifth, an agent needs to be able to make trade-offs when participating in auctions
with multi-attribute goods or services [Luo et al., 2003b, Luo et al., 2003a]. This is be-
cause there will often be some form of conflict between the attributes of the goods. For
example, in a flight auction where goods are described in terms of their price and travel
date, if a user wants to buy a cheap ticket, he needs to travel in the weekdays; however,
the ticket is much more expensive at weekends. Given this, the agent needs some method
to make trade-offs between the different attributes.
Given these aims, this thesis uses a range of fuzzy techniques to cope with the in-
herent uncertainty present in all of these activities. This uncertainty can come from a
number of sources including the sellers, the bidders, the supply and demand quantity in
the market or even the time of bidding. Such factors are usually highly ambiguous and
fuzzy theory has proved itself to be effective in a range of applications with these charac-
teristics [Fraichard and Garnier, 2001, Yao and Yao, 2001, Mohammadi et al., 2000]. In
particular, we exploit fuzzy logic because of its intuitive nature and its embodiment in
fuzzy rules means that it should be readily comprehensible to the agent’s designers.
Against this background, this work is concerned with the design of bidding strategies
for a number of particular auction contexts. To start, we choose a single auction pro-
tocol, CDA, since it is a complex auction type that has no dominant strategy (the best
thing to do, irrespective of what the others do [Sandholm, 1999b]). This aspect of our
work involves developing a strategy that both a buyer agent and a seller agent can use.
Specifically, as a buyer, an agent needs to decide when to place a bid and at what price
and as a seller, an agent needs to decide when to place an ask and at what price. To
do these things effectively, an agent needs to (i) predict the likely transaction price at
which trades will occur; (ii) adapt itself to suit the prevailing market context because the
demand and supply in the market and other bidders’ strategies are changing; (iii) vary
its risk attitude in response to changes in the supply and demand so that it can deal with
different situations; and (iv) relax its constraints on price in order not to miss out on deals
by insignificant amounts.
Having developed a bidding strategy for a single auction, we turn to the more com-
plex problem of developing an agent that can bid across multiple auctions that may be
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operating different protocols. This is a sufficiently challenging and important problem
that an international competition was established in the area. In this Trading Agent Com-
petition (TAC), software agents compete against one another in 28 simultaneous auctions
in order to procure travel packages (flights, hotels and entertainment) for a number of
customers. In this context, the failure to obtain some goods in one auction may lead to
the failure of a whole travel package. Thus, there is a strong need to co-ordinate bidding
across a range of interrelated auctions. In tackling this problem, we believe an effective
trading agent needs to: (i) estimate the likely closing prices of the various auctions; (ii)
adjust its bidding behaviour to suit environments in which the competition is more or
less strong; (iii) vary its risk attitude to achieve effective outcomes; (iv) make trade-offs
between buying flights early at low prices, but before the corresponding hotels can be
guaranteed and buying flight late with guaranteed hotels but at high flight prices.
After dealing with the bidding issues in TAC, we wanted to generalise the multiple
auction context to consider the most common type of auction in e-commerce (the stand-
ard English auction). A bidding strategy for this scenario needs to be highly adaptive
because the market is very dynamic and uncertain due to the random number of auctions,
agents and goods. Specifically, it is important to adapt the parameters involved in the bid-
ding strategy so that the agent can adjust itself to suit the environment. Beside the feature
of adaptivity, the following features need to be considered when designing a strategy for
this context: (i) price prediction is important because the expected auction closing prices
are needed to select the auctions to bid in; (ii) the risk attitudes of the agent need to be
varied because the demand and supply are changing in the market; (iii) the agent needs
to have soft constraints when selecting the auctions to bid in because this will increase
the chances of obtaining the good in a good price; and (iv) trade-offs between the various
attributes need to be made because it is very unlikely to maximise each attribute value
when competing with other agents in the market.
1.3 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis makes a number of important contributions to the state
of the art in the area of bidding strategies that autonomous trading agents can use in a
number of auction contexts. Specifically:
• We develop a novel fuzzy logic based bidding strategy that agents can use to parti-
cipate in CDAs [He et al., 2003]. The effectiveness of the strategy is demonstrated
by empirically benchmarking it against the main other strategies that have been
proposed in the literature and this evaluation shows our strategy is superior in a
wide range of situations.
• We develop novel fuzzy based bidding strategies that an agent can use to bid
across multiple simultaneous auctions and purchase a number of interrelated goods
[He and Jennings, 2003, He and Jennings, 2004]. In both cases, the agents can
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vary their bidding behaviour according to their perception of the marketplace in
which they are currently operating. The effectiveness of these strategies is demon-
strated by our participation in the International Trading Agent Competition (in
2001 and 2002) in which our agent was the most successful participant over both
competitions.
• We develop and implement, for the first time, a strategy that an agent can use to
buy multiple independent goods from multiple English auctions [He et al., 2004].
This strategy uses fuzzy set theory to find the closest auctions to the optimal set to
bid in and neuro-fuzzy techniques that can adapt the parameters in its fuzzy neural
network through off-line and on-line learning. The effectiveness of the strategy is
empirically demonstrated in a flight auction scenario and again we show our agent
obtains a higher overall satisfaction degree than the related strategies available in
the literature.
In addition to making advances in bidding strategies, this work is also one of the first
to employ fuzzy theory (especially fuzzy logic and neuro-fuzzy techniques) in the area
of agent-mediated e-commerce (see Section 2.2.5 for a discussion of other work in this
area). In so doing, we further advance the claim that fuzzy techniques are a suitable tool
to address the uncertainty that is inherent in many aspects of agent mediated e-commerce.
In more detail:
• Fuzzy reasoning is successfully used in predicting the closing prices of the auc-
tions. This can be observed from our work in predicting the closing prices of the
hotel and flight auctions in the TAC and the various English auctions in the multi-
auction scenario. In the former case, the auctions are interrelated, and the factors
that are mainly related to the change of the hotel auction’s closing prices are used
in the fuzzy rules (Section 4.2.7). In the latter case, fuzzy reasoning rules are real-
ised through a neuro-fuzzy network, however, the principle of the reasoning is the
same. The main factors are expressed as fuzzy sets which correspond to neurons
of the lowest layer of the network (Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2).
• Fuzzy techniques are used to enable our agents to adapt their bidding behaviour
and strategy to better fit their prevailing circumstances. In our work, there is a
progress from somewhat limited adaptation to highly flexible adaptation. In our
work on CDAs, the adaptation is based on the frequency of transactions made by
the agent and its aim is to change the risk attitude of the agent. Specifically, if the
agent waits too long to conduct a deal, it will adapt its risk attitude to take less
risk because it means its price constraint is far away from the market transaction
price; on the other hand, if the agent transacts very frequently, it will adapt its risk
attitude toward being more risky because it means the agent can make more profit
by raising its threshold. This adaptation is somewhat limited because an agent
can only vary its learning rate (Section 3.4). In the TAC, the agent has a number
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of predefined parameters for each trading environment it encounters (competitive,
semi-competitive and non-competitive). When the agent senses significant changes
in the prices of the auction, it shifts its parameters involved in the fuzzy rules
between these environments. However, the drawback of this adaptation is that
the parameters are fixed in a specific environment. Having all of these in mind,
the adaptation for the FNN agent is flexible. It uses a fuzzy neuro-fuzzy network
to propagate the errors from the top level down to the lowest level, and all the
parameters can change flexibly through learning of the real data.
• Fuzzy set theory is good for generating a flexible solution to bidding. It has been
used in both TAC and the multiple auction context in order to find the closest
solution to the optimal one. This solution covers what bid/ask to submit and which
auction should be chosen to bid in for the multiple auction context. For example,
the strategy used in the CDA of the TAC is applicable to any other type of CDA. In
a CDA where an agent submits both asks and bids, most agents calculate an optimal
bid price that can maximise its utility, and wait for the bid to be matched by other
agents (e.g., [Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998]). However, the strategy employed by
our agent uses the similarity in fuzzy sets which accepts bids and asks if they
are close enough to the optimal bid. In the multiple English auction scenario,
the agent first evaluates the available auctions and then chooses the ones with the
highest satisfaction degree. However, it also monitors all the other auctions which
close earlier than this auction and it will bid in any auction that has a very close
satisfaction degree to the optimal one.
• The risk attitude of the agent has an important influence on its performance and
so it is usually adjusted by one or more parameters of the strategy. In particular, a
key reason for this adjustment is often caused by the relationship of demand and
supply and the kind of opponents in the market. To this end, in all of the agents we
designed, risk attitudes are considered. In the CDA, the risk attitude parameters
are the parameters in the fuzzy rules. At first, these values are pre-defined by the
user, however subsequently they are adapted through the transaction rate of the
agent. In the TAC, we vary the agent’s behaviour from risk-seeking to risk-averse
to suit the kind of environment. This is realised through the flight ticket numbers
to buy at the beginning of the game and what price to bid in the hotel auction. In
the multiple English auction case, this risk attitude parameter is the threshold by
which the agent chooses the auctions that are close to the optimal set.
1.4 Published Papers
The following papers have been published based on this thesis:
• M. He, N. R. Jennings and A. Pru¨gel-Bennett (2004) “A Neuro-Fuzzy Bidding
Strategy for Buying Multiple Goods in Multiple English”, submitted.
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• M. He, N. R. Jennings and A. Pru¨gel-Bennett (2004) “An adaptive bidding agent
for multiple English auctions: A neuro-fuzzy approach”, Proc. IEEE Conf. on
Fuzzy Systems 1519-1524.
• M. He and N. R. Jennings (2003), “Designing a successful trading agent using
fuzzy techniques”, IEEE Trans on Fuzzy Systems 12 (3) 389-410.
• M. He and N. R. Jennings (2003), “SouthamptonTAC: An adaptive autonomous
trading agent”, ACM Trans on Internet Technology 3 (3) 218-235.
• M. He, H. Leung and N. R. Jennings (2003), “A fuzzy logic based bidding strategy
for autonomous agents in continuous double auctions”, IEEE Trans on Knowledge
and Data Engineering 15 (6) 1345-1363.
• M. He, N. R. Jennings and H. Leung (2003), “On agent-mediated electronic com-
merce”, IEEE Trans on Knowledge and Data Engineering 15 (4) 985-1003.
• M. He and N. R. Jennings (2002) “SouthamptonTAC: Designing a successful trad-
ing agent”, Proc 15th European Conf. on AI (ECAI-2002), 8-12.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured in the following manner:
Chapter 2 surveys and analyses the general state of the art of agent-mediated e-
commerce. Specifically, our analysis concentrates on business-to-consumer (B2C) and
business-to-business (B2B) contexts because we believe these are the most relevant for
agent technology. In the former case, we discuss the roles of agents in terms of: need
identification (what is the need), product brokering (what to buy), buyer coalition forma-
tion (find other buyers), merchant brokering (who to buy from) and negotiation (find the
terms and conditions of transaction). In the latter case, the roles of agents are discussed
through the business-to-business transaction model and particular attention is paid to
partnership formation (find partners to collaborate), brokering (match buyers and suppli-
ers) and negotiation. In both cases, however, auctions are identified as a central concern
and so particular attention is focused on them and the roles that agents can play in them.
Chapter 3 concentrates on CDAs; developing new algorithms for buyer and seller
agents. These algorithms employ heuristic fuzzy rules and fuzzy reasoning mechanisms
in order to determine the best bid to make given the state of the marketplace. Moreover,
we show how an agent can dynamically adjust its bidding behaviour to respond effect-
ively to changes in the supply and demand in the marketplace. We then show, by em-
pirical evaluations, how our agents outperform four of the most prominent algorithms
previously developed for CDAs.
Chapter 4 describes the design, implementation and evaluation of SouthamptonTAC,
one of the most successful participants in both the Second and the Third International
Trading Agent Competitions. Our agent uses fuzzy techniques at the heart of its decision
making: to make bidding decisions in the face of uncertainty, to make predictions about
11
the likely outcomes of auctions, and to alter the agent’s bidding strategy in response to
the prevailing market conditions.
Chapter 5 presents the design, implementation and evaluation of a novel bidding al-
gorithm that a software agent can use to obtain multiple goods from multiple overlapping
English auctions. Specifically, an Earliest Closest First algorithm is proposed that uses
neuro-fuzzy techniques to predict the expected closing prices of the auctions and to adapt
the agent’s bidding strategy to reflect the type of environment in which it is situated. This
algorithm first identifies the set of auctions that are most likely to give the agent the best
return and then according to its attitude to risk it bids in some other auctions that have ap-
proximately similar expected returns, but which finish earlier than those in the best return
set. We show, through empirical evaluation against a number of methods proposed in the
multiple auction literature, that our bidding strategy performs effectively and robustly in
a wide range of scenarios.
Chapter 6 recaps the main contributions of this thesis and highlights the key open
problems that need to be addressed if trading agents are to reach their full potential in
agent-mediated electronic commerce.
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Chapter 2
Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce
Given the aims and objectives of this research (as outlined in Section 1.2), this chapter
places our work on bidding strategies for trading agents in on-line auctions into the wider
context of agent-mediated e-commerce. In reviewing the state of the art in this area, this
chapter builds upon a number of previous reviews of agent-mediated e-commerce. Partic-
ularly prominent amongst these are Guttman et al.’s review of agents in B2C e-commerce
[Guttman et al., 1998] and Sierra and Dignum’s roadmap of agent mediated e-commerce
in Europe [Sierra and Dignum, 2001]. Other important sources include [Liu and Ye, 2001,
Ye et al., 2001, Sandholm, 1999a, Beam and Segev, 1996, Brenner et al., 1998, Ma, 1999,
Kalakota and Whinston, 1996, Liang and Huang, 2000, Murch and Johnson, 1999]. Nev-
erthelsss, this chapter both extends and updates this previous material and also tries to
present a more integrated and coherent view on the field. For example, in contrast to the
aforementioned work, we categorise and systematically analyse applications of agent-
based e-commerce in the B2C and B2B domains (using the consumer buying behaviour
(CBB) model and the business-to-business transaction (BBT) model respectively). We
extend the traditional CBB model so that it covers more B2C behaviours (such as buyer
coalition formation), and we identify more uses for agents in the BBT model.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the roles
of agents in e-commerce. Section 2.2 describes the basic roles and techniques of agents in
B2C e-commerce. Section 2.3 performs a similar analysis for B2B e-commerce. Finally,
Section 2.4 concludes this chapter.
2.1 Agents for E-Commerce
Agent-mediated electronic commerce involves software agents acting on behalf of some
or all the parties in e-commerce transactions. The rationale for introducing such agents
in e-commerce scenarios is to offer faster, cheaper, more convenient, and more agile
ways for both customers and suppliers to trade. To realise this, a broad range of social,
legal and technical issues need to be addressed. These issues relate to things such as
security, trust, payment mechanisms, advertising, logistics and back office management
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[Turban et al., 1999, Singh, 1999, Garfinkel et al., 2001, Zacharia et al., 2000]. In partic-
ular, trust has both a social and a technological facet and both of these need to be further
addressed if users are to be happy to delegate increased autonomy to a software agent
that acts on their behalf. From a social perspective, people will need to become happier
to let a piece of software make decisions for them. This is something that is likely to
take time and will only occur as agents show what they are capable of. From a technical
perspective, agents need to clearly understand the limit of their responsibility and to act
efficiently and safely within these bounds.
Even more fundamental than these issues, however, is the very nature of the various
actors that are involved in e-commerce transactions. In most current (first generation) e-
commerce applications, the buyers are generally humans who typically browse through
a catalogue of well defined commodities (e.g., flights, books, compact discs, computer
components) and make (fixed price) purchases (often by means of a credit card transac-
tion). However, this modus operandi is only scratching the surface of what is possible.
By increasing the degree and the sophistication of the automation, on both the buyer’s
and the seller’s side, commerce becomes much more dynamic, personalised and context
sensitive. Moreover, these changes can be of benefit to both the buyers and the sellers.
From the buyer’s perspective, it is desirable to have software that could crawl all the
available outlets to find the most suitable one for purchasing the chosen good (e.g., the
one that offers the cheapest price, the highest quality, or the fastest delivery time) and
that could then go through the process of actually purchasing the good, paying for it and
arranging delivery at an appropriate time. From a seller’s perspective, it is desirable to
have software that could vary its offering (in terms of price, quality, warranty, and so on)
depending on: the customer it is dealing with (e.g., offering discounts or special offers
to particular target groups), what its competitors are doing (e.g., continuously monitor-
ing their prices and making sure its own price is competitive), and the current state of its
business (e.g., if it has plenty of a particular item in stock, it may be appropriate to reduce
the price in order to try and increase demand).
Auctions are the most widely used kind of e-commerce today and agents have an act-
ive role in this area. In such online auctions, agents act on behalf of their users to monitor
the auctions, analyse the market situations and decides when and how much to bid for the
desired items. Agents can do this much faster, quicker and efficient than human bidders.
For example, [Das et al., 2001] shows that agents outperform their human counterparters
in a particular auction setting. Furthermore, a new possibility afforded by an agent-
based approach is that a user can compete in multiple auctions simultaneously. Such a
strategy has several advantages over participating in single auctions; for example, it can
increase the chance of getting the good for customers; bring greater profit to customers by
comparing multiple auctions and transacting at the cheapest price; and make the auction
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markets themselves more efficient by ensuring the transaction price is close to the equilib-
rium price [Preist et al., 2001]. Some good examples of auction websites are AuctionBot
(http://www.auctionbot.com), Yahoo Auctions (http://auctions.shopping.yahoo.com) and
eBay and more information on auctions can be found in [Milgrom, 1989, Wolfstetter, 1999,
Milgrom and Robert, 1982, Vickrey, 1961, McAfee and McMillan, 1987].
To achieve this degree of automation, and move to second generation e-commerce1
applications, we believe software agents have a key role to play. IDC (http://www.idc.com)
estimates that the global market for software agents grew from $7.2 million in 1997 to
$51.5 million in 1999 and that it will reach $873.2 million in 2004, with a compound
annual growth rate of 76.2% between 1999 and 2004. They also assume that the dramatic
growth in B2B e-commerce will accelerate the demand for agents. To this end, and in
order to motivate the potential of agent mediated e-commerce, we consider the following
medium term scenarios2 as examples of what will be possible [Jennings et al., 2000b].
Scenario 1: Finding closest match to buyer’s requirements. A buyer decides that they
would like a holiday in one of the Greek islands, they would like to go next Friday, they
would like to fly from London, and that the total cost should be less than £300. Their
software agent is instructed to go and find out what is available and to report the options
back to the user who will make the ultimate choice. In order to fulfil this objective, the
buyer agent determines those e-markets that deal with leisure activities. From those, it
tries to find out holidays that meet the specified requirements. However, it finds no ap-
propriate fixed price offerings and after observing the outcome of several online auctions
it decides that it will be very unlikely that it will be able to meet all of these requirements.
It therefore decides to relax some of the user’s constraints and tries to find holidays that
are similar. The agent decides to relax the user’s stated requirements in the following
way: it looks for holidays to the Greek islands that leave any day next week, that leave
from non-London airports in the UK next Friday and that cost up to £400. With these new
requirements in place, the buyer agent returns to the relevant e-markets, collects the offer-
ings that satisfy these new requirements and returns them to its user with an explanation
of why it acted in this way.
1Second generation systems are here characterised as having a greater degree of automation on both
the buyer’s and the seller’s side. Like many classifications, however, this distinction is not absolute and
there are areas of uncertainty between the generations. Moreover, the same is also true of agent-mediated
e-commerce in general. While there are some systems that are clearly agent-mediated and some that are
not all agent-based, there is a degree of uncertainty in some cases. This is caused by the fact that in such
systems agents are rarely the only technology that is used. Often an e-commerce system will be composed
of a variety of technologies, only a fraction of which will be agent-based.
2We do not focus on current applications because they do not adequately highlight the full potential of
agent-mediated e-commerce. Current applications tend to use agents in reasonably straightforward ways.
Also organisations that have adopted agent-based techniques often do not disclose this fact for reasons of
retaining competitive advantage. Focusing on medium-term scenarios overcomes both of these concerns
without having to gaze too far into the future (which is notoriously unpredictable).
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Scenario 2: Acting across multiple e-markets. A buyer decides that they would like to
purchase a new laptop computer; they want a reasonably high specification, are prepared
to pay for a good quality brand name, but it must be delivered within a week. Their soft-
ware agent is instructed that they are prepared for the agent to find the most appropriate
model, negotiate the best potential deal available, but that the user would like to make the
final choice about purchase. In order to fulfil this objective, the buyer agent determines
those e-markets that deal with selling computer equipment. From these, it selects those
e-markets that offer products that meet the user’s specification. In order to determine
those machines that fit the specification, the buyer agent examines the sites of a num-
ber of computer manufacturers to determine the latest specification information and to
determine an approximate price to pay. Armed with this information, the agent formu-
lates a strategy for making a deal. The agent knows the maximum price it needs to pay
(this will be the minimum of the cheapest fixed price offerings that are available in the
catalogues). From this baseline, the agent tries to negotiate directly with several of the
suppliers to see if they are willing to reduce the price (or bring forward the delivery time).
In parallel to this, the agent tracks a number of online auctions to see if the same good
can be purchased more cheaply (it will not actually bid in the auctions, since submitting
a bid would constitute a commitment on behalf of its buyer). When it has completed its
negotiations (or before if a very good deal appears in an auction), the buyer agent reports
back a ranked list of purchasing options to its owner. The owner then makes their choice
and instructs their agent to complete the deal (including arranging payment and setting
the delivery time and place).
Scenario 3: Coalition formation. A bakery agent receives a request for tender from a
supermarket agent who wishes to purchase 500 iced buns a day throughout the summer
period. The bakery agent has sufficient capacity to make 300 buns per day. However,
the bakery would like to set up links with the supermarket and so is keen to see if it can
fulfil the order. Thus, rather than simply turning the order away, the bakery instructs its
agent to search for a partner who will produce the remaining 200 buns for the rest of the
summer period. In order to achieve this, the bakery agent contacts all the other sellers
present in e-markets that offer iced buns. The bakery agent indicates it has a demand for
200 buns per day for the summer period and asks whether any of the other bakeries would
like to join in a partnership with it to meet the supermarket’s need. A number of potential
collaborators come forward. The bakery agent then conducts a series of negotiations with
these agents in order to set up the terms and conditions of the partnership. Eventually
a deal is reached and the bakery agent reports details of the arrangements back to the
bakery.
In terms of the nomenclature outlined in Section 1.1 scenarios 1 and 2 fall into the
B2C domain. The former shows that agents can, on behalf of their owners, locate and re-
trieve information and make reasonable decisions (relaxing the constraints of the search)
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• Find e-markets where desired good can be purchased.
• Find relevant purchasing information from identified e-
markets.
• Rank identified goods and e-markets.
• Select e-market(s) where will attempt to purchase good.
• Determine precise conditions for purchasing the good in
chosen e-market (this may range from obtaining the fixed
price, through participating in an auction, to direct negoti-
ation).
• Decide to purchase the good.
• Pay for the good.
• Arrange delivery.
No automation: all activ-
ities are manual
||| Increasing| automation|↓
Complete automation: all
activities performed by a
software agent
Figure 2.1: Varying degree of agent automation.
based on the owner’s profile. The latter scenario demonstrates how agents negotiate with
multiple suppliers, monitor multiple auctions, and use intelligent strategies to find the
best deal for the users. The agents in the third scenario represent companies/organisations
in a B2B context. This example not only shows how agents can collaborate with one an-
other to achieve a common goal, but also shows how an agent selects the best partners
through negotiation.
Although agents can be used in a closed loop fashion (i.e., without human interven-
tion), in many cases users will simply not be willing to delegate complete autonomy to
them. Moreover, the degree of automation that user’s find acceptable is likely to vary
between individuals and between tasks for the same individual. For example, some users
will not want any automated support—they will directly enact all phases of the trade
themselves. Others may be willing to use agents to collate information and present them
with options from which they make the subsequent purchasing decision, while yet others
will be happy to delegate all trading activities to their software agents. To reflect this situ-
ation, Figure 2.1 shows the range of the automation that a software agent may be given.
2.2 Agents in B2C E-Commerce
According to the nature of the transactions, the following types of e-commerce are distin-
guished [Turban et al., 1999]: business-to-business (B2B), business-to-consumer (B2C),
consumer-to-consumer (C2C), consumer-to-business (C2B), nonbusiness e-commerce
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(use of the Internet by nonbusiness organisations such as academic institutions or govern-
ment agencies to reduce expenses or improve services), and intra-business e-commerce.
Currently, however, most applications are either B2C or B2B and, therefore, these are
the two areas that we focus on here. In more detail, B2C mainly refers to online re-
tailing transactions with individual customers, where shoppers can conduct transactions
through a company’s homepage. B2B refers to the transactions where both sellers and
buyers are business corporations. Although most of the initial web-based e-commerce
was in the B2C domain, B2C now constitutes a smaller portion of the overall landscape.
For example, B2B transactions are expected to be in the range of $800 billion by 2003,
which is five times as much as B2C [Sharma, 2002]. Moreover it is widely believed
that B2B will be the predominant means of doing business within the next five years
[Subramani and Walden, 2000, Shaw, 2000].
B2C e-commerce is becoming more widespread as more people come to recog-
nise its convenience and its ability to offer a quick response to requests and as more
products/services become available [Murch and Johnson, 1999]. As this adoption spreads,
the impetus for employing software agents increases in order to enhance and improve the
trading experience. In order to systematically analyse the tasks that agents can assist
with, we employ the CBB model (based on [Guttman et al., 1998]) to capture consumer
behaviour (see Figure 2.2). From the CBB model perspective, we believe agents can act
as mediators in five of the stages: need identification, product brokering, buyer coalition
formation, merchant brokering and negotiation.3 Sometimes, the boundary between mer-
chant brokering and negotiation is not always clear cut (because negotiation is sometimes
also involved in brokering). For example, [Jung and Jo, 2000] introduce a brokering tech-
nique that uses a negotiation protocol to match seller and buyer agents; in the brokering
service of [Bichler and Kaukal, 1999], a multi-attribute auction is proposed to find a suit-
able supplier for a buyer; and in [Easwaran and Pitt, 2000] the brokering service involves
finding the optimal winner through a combinatorial auction. Against this background,
each of the five above-mentioned agent mediated stages is explored in more detail in the
remainder of this section.
2.2.1 Need Identification
In this stage, the customer recognises a need for some product or service. This need can
be stimulated in many different ways (e.g., by advertisement, through friends, and so on).
However in the agent mediated e-commerce world it can also be stimulated by the user’s
3The sixth stage (purchase and delivery) involves paying for the transaction and arranging delivery
of the goods/services. Here the key problems are to ensure safe payment and delivery, problems that
are common to e-commerce in general. The last stage involves product services (e.g., repair and up-
grade services) and evaluation (measuring the degree of satisfaction of the user about the goods and the
buying procedure). Generally speaking, however, these two stages have little that is specific to agent
mediated e-commerce and thus they are not discussed in detail here (interested readers can refer to
[Garfinkel et al., 2001, Turban et al., 1999, McDermott, 2000, Standifird, 2001] for more information on
these topics).
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Figure 2.2: Consumer behaviour buying model.
agent. Such an agent is typically called a notification agent.4 To do this, the notification
agent needs to have a profile for the user. This profile can be obtained in many different
ways: through observing the user’s behaviour [Billsus and Pazzani, 1998], through direct
elicitation techniques [Ribeiro, 1996] or through inductive logic programming techniques
[Dastani et al., 2001]. Once the profile is installed in the agent, it can notify the user
whenever an appropriate good/service becomes available (i.e., the user’s profile matches
a good/service catalogue). For example, in Amazon Delivers (http://www.amazon.com),
the latest reviews of exceptional new titles in categories that interest the user are sent
automatically and Fastparts uses “AutoWatch” to allow users to list parts they need and
notify them if those parts become available for sale.
2.2.2 Product Brokering
Having ascertained a need, the product brokering stage involves an agent determining
what product to buy to satisfy this need. The main techniques used by the brokers in this
stage are: feature-based filtering, collaborative filtering, and constraint-based filtering.
Table 2.1 shows a number of exemplar e-commerce systems that exploit these techniques.
Feature-based filtering involves selecting products based on feature keywords. For ex-
ample, suppose a customer wants to buy a Sony notebook computer through Amazon.
His agent selects the “Computers” category first, then indicates “Sony” in the brands
field, and the notebook computers with these features are returned. Collaborative fil-
tering [Shardanand and Maes, 1995] involves giving an agent personalised recommend-
ations based on the similarities between different users’ preference profiles. Here the
product rating of shopper A is first compared with that of all the other shoppers in the
system. Then, the “nearest neighbour” of A (i.e., the shopper whose profile is closest to
that of A) is identified. Since shoppers with similar tastes and preferences are likely to
4This is a reasonably simple type of agent. It acts autonomously to inform the user of relevant inform-
ation, it responds to changes in the environment and occasionally it is proactive in that it may inform the
user of information that is not exactly what had been asked for but is judged to be sufficiently interesting
to warrant informing the user.
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Table 2.1: Filtering techniques for product brokering in e-commerce systems.
Feature-based Collaborative Constraint-based
Amazon
√ √
eBay
√ √
CDNOW
√ √
Yahoo shopping
√ √
Net Perceptions
√
Table 2.2: Comparisons of different product brokering techniques.
Feature-based Collaborative Constraint-based
When to use User’s needs User’s needs Some idea of
the technique known unknown user’s needs
Feature keywords Conditions that
Requirements for goods Profiles of users goods satisfy
Interaction with
user Medium Few Medium
Goods satisfying Suggestions of Goods satisfying
Results returned required features goods to buy particular constraints
Goods suitable for Most goods Books, CDs, etc. Most goods
buy similar products, the profile of the identified shopper is used to pass recommenda-
tions onto A’s agent. For example, in Net Perceptions (http://www.netperceptions.com),
users are recommended the documents that their “knowledge neighbours” find valuable.
In CDNOW (http://www.cdnow.com), users are notified about the CDs or movies that are
popular with other users with similar preferences. Constraint-based filtering involves an
agent specifying constraints (e.g., the price range and date limit) to narrow down the
products. In this way, customers’ agents are guided through a large feature space of
the product [Guttman et al., 1998]. For example, eBay guides a user agent to select the
products by narrowing down the range of the possibilities based on the constraints the
user gives (e.g., price range, item location, and so on). In the end, a list of the desired
products that satisfy the user’s constraints is returned. Some e-commerce systems use
more than one kind of filtering technique (since sometimes users do not know exactly
the constraints of the goods they are looking for in advance). For example, eBay and Ya-
hoo Shopping (http://shopping.yahoo.com) use both feature-based and constraint-based
techniques. The differences among these techniques are summarised in Table 2.2.5
5Most of the dimensions in Table 2.2 are self explanatory. However, for “Interaction with user”, few
interactions are needed in collaborative filtering, since what the user agents need to do is just provide their
user’s profile and they can then get recommendations from the system. For feature-based and constraint-
based systems, some keywords or constraints need to be input until the user can find the exact product they
want. The last dimension in the table is “Goods suitable for”. Collaborative filtering is more specialised
than the other techniques because it works based on perceived quality and people’s tastes rather than ob-
jective properties [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. Thus, it is more suited to goods such as novels, CDs and
DVDs because it is subjective judgements that act as the differentiator in these cases.
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2.2.3 Buyer Coalition Formation
Having determined the product to buy, customers may move directly to the merchant
brokering phase (see below) or they may interact with other similar buyers to try and
form a coalition before moving to the merchant brokering phase. Here a coalition is
viewed as a group of agents cooperating with each other in order to achieve a com-
mon task [Shehory and Kraus, 1998]. In these “buyer coalitions”, each buyer is rep-
resented by their own agent and together these agents try and form a grouping in or-
der to approach the merchant with a larger order (in order to obtain leverage by buy-
ing in bulk). In [Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001], for example, a buyer coalition form-
ation scheme is proposed in which buyer agents specify multiple items in a category
and their valuation of these items and the group leader agent is then responsible for di-
viding the group into coalitions and calculating the surplus division among the buyers.
Similarly, [Tsvetovat and Sycara, 2000] views a buyer coalition model as being com-
posed of five stages: negotiation, leader election, coalition formation, payment collec-
tion and execution stages. They test their algorithms in a collective book purchasing
setting in the university and show how the supplier agent gives a volume discount ac-
cording to the size of the coalitions. In both of the above systems, it is essential to
have a trustworthy and reliable agent that will collect the buyer’s information, divide the
agents into coalitions, and negotiate with sellers (refer to [Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001,
Tsvetovat and Sycara, 2000] for a full discussion of these issues).
2.2.4 Merchant Brokering
Having selected the desired product, and perhaps after having formed a buyer coalition,
merchant brokering involves the agent finding an appropriate merchant to purchase the
item from. Initial work in this area focused on finding the merchant that offered the good
at the cheapest price. BargainFinder [Krulwich, 1996] was the first system of this kind to
employ agents and it operated in the following way. If a customer wants to buy a music
CD, BargainFinder will launch its agent to collect the prices from a pre-defined set of
CD shops, and then it will select the CD with the lowest price for the customer. Another
similar example is Priceline (http://www.priceline.com) which carries out the same set of
tasks for airline tickets, hotel rooms and cars.
However, in many cases price is not the only determinant for the user. Other relev-
ant issues, for example, might include delivery time, warranty and gift services. Also
many merchants prefer their offerings not be judged on price alone. Thus there is a
move to extend these agents to consider multiple attributes. Naturally the importance
of the different attributes will vary between consumers and so there needs to be a way
for this information to be easily conveyed to the agent. In the Frictionless Sourcing
(http://www.frictionless.com) platform, “Vendor Scorecards” (multi-attribute comparis-
ons) are used to measure the performance of suppliers. For example, when evaluating
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the performance of different laptop computer suppliers, the key factors considered in-
clude reliability, responsiveness (e.g., reacting quickly), environmental friendliness (e.g.,
minimal pollution of the environment), and business efficiency (e.g., support for elec-
tronic purchasing over Internet). A total score is then calculated for each supplier based
on the weighted score of these individual constituent components. These weights are
obtained by the customer identifying themselves with a particular stereotype profile in
which the weights are given.
2.2.5 Negotiation
Having selected a merchant (or set of merchants), the next step is to negotiate the terms
and conditions under which the desired product will be delivered. To this end, we believe
that one of the major changes that will be brought about by agent mediated e-commerce
is that dynamic pricing and personalisation of offers will become the norm for many
goods and customers. Thus, negotiation capabilities are essential for e-commerce sys-
tems [Beam and Segev, 1996]. In human negotiations, two or more parties bargain with
one another to determine the price or other transaction terms [Fisher and Ury, 1981]. In
an automated negotiation, software agents engage in broadly similar processes to achieve
the same end [Jennings et al., 2001]. In contrast to many human negotiations, automated
negotiation can be very fast since decisions and exchanges can occur rapidly. In some
cases, negotiation is very complicated (e.g., when it involves many interrelated goods)
and can become too difficult for consumers to handle manually. In such cases, auto-
mated negotiation systems can help ordinary users perform like professional negotiators.
Moreover, automated negotiation can also remove the human sensibilities that are often
associated with negotiating.
In more detail, the agents prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the parties
they represent with the aim of obtaining the maximum benefit for their users. They do
so according to some negotiation strategy. As discussed in Section 1.1.3, such strategies
are determined by the negotiation protocol that is in place. Given the wide variety of
possibilities (as will be shown below), there is no universally best approach or technique
for automated negotiations [Jennings et al., 2001], rather protocols and strategies need
to be set according to the prevailing situation [Friedman, 1993]. Given this, our ana-
lysis of automated negotiation models as used in B2C e-commerce is divided into two
categories:6 auctions and bilateral negotiations.
Auctions
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, there are many types of auctions. However, most e-
commerce scenarios concentrate on the basic four types of single sided auctions (English,
6There are other types of negotiation protocol such as multi-lateral negotiation (in which the negoti-
ation involves bargaining between multiple non-cooperative parties [Adams et al., 1996]) and n-bilateral
negotiations (in which the negotiation involves multiple bilateral bargaining encounters [Faratin, 2000]).
However since these protocols are not as widely used in e-commerce we do not consider them here.
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Table 2.3: Values of each dimension in Table 2.4.
Auction
mode
one-sided (O) only bids or asks are permitted
two-sided (T) both bids and asks are permitted
Duration
time
single-round (S) the auction only lasts one round
multi-round (M) the auction lasts multiple rounds
Unit of
goods
one (O) only one good is auctioned during the auction
many (M) multiple goods are auctioned
Ratio of B-S many to one (MO) there are multiple buyers and only one seller
one to many (OM) there are multiple sellers and only one buyer
many to many (MM) there are multiple buyers and multiple sellers
Information
revealed
yes (Y) there is intermediate information revealed
no (N) a bidder has no information about others
Closing
price
first price (F) highest price among all the bidders
second price (S) second highest price among all the bidders
different prices (D) trades take place any time at different prices
Closing
rules
time (T) when a time is reached
inactivity (I) when there are no more bids for a time period
budget (B) when a reserve price is reached
Table 2.4: Comparison of different types of auctions.
Auction
auction duration unit ratio of information closing closing
mode time goods B-S revealed price rules
O T S M O M MO OM MM Y N
English
√ √ √ √ √ √
F I
FPSB
√ √ √ √ √ √
F T
Vickrey
√ √ √ √ √ √
S T
Dutch
√ √ √ √ √ √
F B
CDA
√ √ √ √ √
D I
FPSB, Vickrey and Dutch) or the continuous double auctions (CDA). Thus, we compare
these auction protocols according to the auction mode, duration time, unit of goods auc-
tioned, ratio of buyer to seller, how much information is revealed during the auction,
how the closing price is determined, and when the auction closes. See Table 2.4 for the
detailed comparison and Table 2.3.7 for the explanation of the dimensions in the table.
Given these protocols, we now turn to the strategies the agents need to employ in order
to be successful.
• English auction. The agent’s dominant strategy (the best thing to do, irrespective
of what the others do [Sandholm, 1999b]) is to bid a small amount more than the
current highest bid and stop when the user’s valuation is reached. For example,
in Yahoo auctions, “automatic bidding” allows buyers to input their maximum bid
7Here we only consider the popular forms of the auctions on same type, non-divisible goods and the
quantity is a single unit (see [Wurman, 2001] for a fuller description of the bidding rules). Also, many
different types of information can be revealed in the course of the auction (e.g., the identity of the bidders,
the settlement price, the ask-bid spread and so on [Friedman, 1993]) here, however, we only consider
whether any intermediate information is revealed (see [Wurman et al., 1998] for a detailed discussion of
the impact of information revelation).
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(i.e., valuation of the item) and an agent will bid incrementally when it is necessary
to win the auction.
• First-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In general, there is no dominant bidding
strategy in this auction. Here the price of the bid and the time to stop bidding
are functions of the agent’s own valuation of the item and its beliefs about the
valuation of others’ bidders. A good strategy is to bid less than the user’s true
valuation, but how much less depends on the user’s attitude toward risk, the user’s
private valuation, as well as the prior beliefs about the valuations of other bidders.
An analysis of such strategies can be found in [McAfee and McMillan, 1987].
• Vickrey auction. In a private value8 Vickrey auction, the dominant strategy is to
bid the user’s true valuation [Sandholm, 1999b]. In this context, agents truthfully
reveal their preferences which allows efficient decisions to be made.
• Dutch auction. The Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to the first-price
sealed-bid auction. This is because in both games an agent’s bid matters only if
it is the highest, and no relevant information is revealed during the auction process
[Sandholm, 1999b]. Klik-Klok (http://www.klik-klok.com) is an example of a Dutch
auction website for gold and jewellery sale where auction prices decline until a
buyer makes a bid. The analysis of strategies in Dutch auctions can be found in
[Milgrom, 1989].
• Continuous Double Auction (CDA) (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). A
variety of different CDA models have been constructed [Easley and Ledyard, 1993,
Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998, Sadrieh, 1998] and these vary in terms of whether
bids/asks are for multiple or single units, whether unaccepted offers are queued
or replaced by better offers, and so on [Friedman, 1993]. Nevertheless all these
protocols allow traders to make offers to buy or sell and to accept other traders’
offers at any moment during a trading period [Friedman, 1993]. The messages ex-
changed generally consist of bids (offers to buy) and asks (offers to sell) for single
units of the commodity, and acceptances of the current best bid or ask. Several
bidding strategies have been proposed in the literature and these are discussed in
more detail in Section 3.5.
In addition to the aforementioned auction type, and as argued in Section 1.1.3, we
believe that the multiple auction context will become increasingly important in the do-
main of e-commerce. In this type of auction, the agent needs to monitor all the relevant
auctions, decide which one to bid in and determine what to bid in order to get the goods
at the best deal. This is an aspect of e-commerce that is only really made possible by the
8Private value means that the bidder only knows its own valuation of the item, but it does not know the
value to other bidders [McAfee and McMillan, 1987]. For example, auctioning a cake (that the winner will
eat) is a private value auction, whereas auctioning treasury bills (where the value of the bills comes from
reselling) is a public value auction.
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use of agents in a timely manner would be beyond most humans. See Section 4.4 for a
more detailed analysis of the state of the art in this area.
Bilateral Negotiations
Bilateral negotiation involves two parties, a service/good supplier and a consumer, com-
ing to a mutually acceptable agreement over the terms and conditions of a potential trans-
action [Sierra et al., 1997a]. In contrast to most of the auction work (which is a form of
one to many, many to many, or many to one negotiation), bilateral negotiation is usu-
ally concerned with multi-attribute contracts (covering price, quality, delivery date, and
so on). As with the auction work, there is no dominant negotiation model or strategy
that is suitable for all occasions. Rather, it is a case of different models having different
strategies that are suitable in different contexts. Given this situation, we classify extant
work on bilateral negotiation into three groups.
• Decision making by explicitly reasoning about the opponent’s behaviour. Agents
using the strategies in this group explicitly reason about their opponent’s object-
ives and behaviours and then decide what is the appropriate response to their likely
behaviour. In this respect, non-cooperative game theory (which is particularly con-
cerned with providing equilibrium strategies in which no agent wants to change its
strategy whatever its opponents do) is an important approach for analysing stra-
tegic interactions among agents [Kreps, 1990, Tirole, 1998]. The recursive mod-
elling method [Vidal and Durfee, 1996, Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee, 1995] is em-
ployed by an agent to reason about its opponent so that it can generate its own
strategy in response. In [Zeng and Sycara, 1998], a Bayesian network is used to
update the knowledge and belief that each agent has about the environment and
other agents; and offers and counter-offers between agents are generated based on
Bayesian probabilities. More discussion about these strategies can be found in
Section 3.5.
• Decision making by finding the current best solution. Algorithms in this group
focus on finding the offer/counter-offer that maximises the agent’s profit given
the agent’s constraints, preferences, current negotiation situation, and the oppon-
ent’s last offer. In Teˆte-a`-Teˆte [Guttman and Maes, 1998], constraints on product
features and constraints on merchant features are used to influence the decision
of what and whom to buy from. [Luo et al., 2003c] developed a fuzzy constraint
based framework for multi-issue negotiations in competitive trading environments
and demonstrated it in a negotiation between a real estate agency and a customer.
[Kowalczyk and Bui, 2000, Kowalczyk, 2000] also use fuzzy constraints to model
multi-issue negotiation, but their approach performs negotiation on individual solu-
tions one at a time. Matos and Sierra [Matos et al., 1998] employ fuzzy logic, case-
based reasoning and evolutionary computing to deal with the bilateral negotiation
25
[Jennings et al., 2000a]. Faratin et al. develop a suite of algorithms for multi-
issue negotiation that covers both concessionary behaviour [Faratin et al., 1998]
and trade-offs that aim to find a win-win solution for both parties [Faratin et al., 2002].
• Argumentation. In this approach, agents exchange additional information over and
above the basic terms and conditions of the contract [Jennings et al., 2001]. This
information can be of a number of different forms, nevertheless, it is always some
form of argument which explains/justifies the position of the agent making the
argument. Thus, in addition to rejecting a proposal, an agent can offer a critique
of the proposal, explaining why it is unacceptable (e.g., the price is too high). The
way in which argumentation fits into the general negotiation process was defined
in [Sierra et al., 1997b] where a simple negotiation protocol for trading proposals
was augmented with a series of illocutionary moves which allow for the passing of
arguments.
2.3 Agents in B2B E-Commerce
Compared with B2C e-commerce, B2B deals with transactions among organisations (see
Table 2.5 for a more detailed comparison). Generally speaking, relationships between or-
ganisations are more complex than those between businesses and consumers, since they
involve the adoption of similar standards with respect to communications and collabora-
tion, as well as joint information technology investment [Subramani and Walden, 2000].
In particular, one of the main aims of B2B e-commerce is to significantly improve the
supply chain by facilitating more efficient and agile procurement [Dou and Chou, 2002].
Moreover the exchanges in B2B are increasingly tending to be private [Young, 2001].
Such exchanges enable companies to trade with their existing partners in a well defined
environment without having to go through some of the early stages of the B2B lifecycle
(see Figure 2.3).
Here we create a BBT model (see Figure 2.3) to explore the roles of agents be-
cause other models (e.g., [Barnes-Vieyra and Claycomb, 2001, Turban et al., 1999]) can-
not cover all the phases involved in the Internet based B2B e-commerce taking place
today. Specifically, we believe agents are most useful in the partnership formation,
brokering and negotiation stages because these stages all involve complex issues related
to decision making, searching and matchmaking that agents are well suited to. Thus we
will explore these roles in more detail in the rest of this section. Currently, agents are
not used in the contract formation stage, but we believe they have the potential to be
involved in this activity. Contract formation marks the termination of negotiation and
involves the agreed terms being put into a legally binding contract. Traditionally contract
formation involves two or more people, meeting face-to-face. However as e-commerce
systems evolve this situation is starting to change. In the U.S., for example, Section 206
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Table 2.5: Dimensions of B2C and B2B e-commerce.
Dimension Business-to-customer e-commerce
Features
• Individual customer oriented
• No collaboration between customer and company required
• Brings convenience for buying in globally competitive markets
• Quick response to the transaction
• Convenient to use
Roles of
agents
 Need identification
• e.g., Amazon (Delivers) and Fastparts (Auto Watch)
 Product brokering
• Feature-based, collaborative and constraint-based filtering
• e.g., Amazon, eBay, and Net Perceptions
 Buyer coalition formation
• e.g., Collective book purchasing and GroupBuyAuction
 Merchant brokering
• Price comparison and multi-attribute comparison
• e.g., BargainFinder and Frictionless Commerce
 Negotiation
• Auctions and multi-attribute bilateral negotiation
• e.g., eBay, Yahoo Auctions and AuctionBot
Dimension Business-to-business e-commerce
Features
• Organisation oriented
• Close collaboration between organisations required
• Facilitates both direct and indirect procurement and supply chain
• Larger and global markets
• Real-time and low cost transaction
• Less inventory and dynamic pricing
Roles of
agents
 Partnership formation
• Virtual enterprises
• Supply chain management
 Brokering
• Information retrieval & processing, negotiation,
Profiling of users, notification, collaboration with other brokers
•e.g., OFFER, MULTIMEDIATOR, and Abrose
 Negotiation
• Auctions (sell-side, buy-side and combinatorial auction)
• e.g., Fastparts.com, GE.com, Ariba.com and labx.com
• Contracting
• e.g., Contract net, marginal cost-based contract, OCSM
levelled commitment contract and MAGNET
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Figure 2.3: Business-to-business lifecycle model.
in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was proposed by reformers as a way of deal-
ing with automated contract formation and clearly states that contracts can be formed
by the interaction of electronic agents.9 This proposal is motivated by the fact that it
is a challenging task for the courts to determine where the communication system ends
and when the legal agent begins.10 The fifth stage, contract fulfilment, means the parties
carry out the agreed transaction according to the terms specified in the contract. This
stage usually includes: a detailed description of the good/service provided; the means of
delivery (electronic or physical); how it will be paid for (e.g. partial payments up-front,
with the balance paid on completion); which law governs the contract; how to resolve
any disputes, how to deal with claims arising, how a contract can be monitored, and so
on. We believe agents are not likely to be involved in this stage for some time, because
it involves many complex legal issues and subjective judgements. The last stage, service
evaluation, is the post-transaction stage, where traders evaluate their satisfaction with the
transaction. Many e-commerce systems allow users to provide feedback on the transac-
tions experienced. For example, eBay uses “Feedback Forum” to check the reputation or
business practices of anyone at eBay. This feedback, representing the reputation of the
trader, can then be made accessible to subsequent agents that wish to interact with the
trader. Again because of its subjective nature, we do not believe there is a significant role
for agents in this phase of the lifecycle.
2.3.1 Partnership Formation
The information technology available today makes it possible for a company to search for
its partners worldwide [Kumar, 2001]. Given this fact, partnerships can be much more
agile and fluid. Thus this step may include the forming of a new virtual organisation as
well as finding the partners that provide products or services in a supply chain.
9The official draft of Article 2B of the U.C.C. is from 2002 and can be found at
http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b.
10See http://www.jurisdiction.com/ecom3.htm for more details of this debate.
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Virtual Enterprises
A virtual enterprise11 (VE) is composed of a number of cooperating companies that share
their resources and skills to support a particular product or project effort (for as long
as it is viable to do so) [O’Leary et al., 1997]. The idea is that by collaborating the
constituent companies can more effectively utilise their resources than if they acted in
isolation [Goldman et al., 1995]. For example, an individual company may collaborate
with several partner companies that provide related products so that each of them need
only provide the services/products in which they specialise, but, when taken together, the
VE can provide a broader range of offerings. Such VEs offer several potential advant-
ages [Martinez et al., 2001]: maximising flexibility and adaptability to respond to envir-
onmental changes; developing a pool of competencies and resources by combining its
members’ resources; adjusting itself according to the market constraints; and managing
the global supply chain optimally.
Given the fact that a VE is composed of a number of autonomous entities that need
to interact with one another in flexible ways, agent technology is a natural underpin-
ning model [O’Leary et al., 1997, Norman et al., 2004]. In more detail, the formation
of a VE involves a selection process based on a number of variables such as organisa-
tional fit, technological capabilities, relationship development, quality, price and speed
[Sarkis and Sundarraj, 2002]. Thus, a broker may assist in identifying the best partners
from the set of potential collaborators [Meade et al., 1996] (see also Section 2.3.2). Hav-
ing identified the partners, the agents need to negotiate with one another in order to set the
terms and conditions of their partnership [Tuma, 1998] (and Section 2.3.3). Then, once
the VE is established, the agents need to coordinate their actions so that they deliver their
services in an effective manner. Here the VE might require a number of agents to man-
age its ongoing operations [Massotte, 1993]. For example, [Martinez et al., 2001] pro-
pose a multi-agent control system that consists of three kinds of controller agent: product
agents (which manage the activity associated with each product), activity agents (which
autonomously manage an entire manufacturing activity) and resource agents (which man-
age their own operative functions and propose service offers to activity agents). Together
these agents use and control the other entities in the system in order to achieve the VE’s
overall aims. The MASSYVE (multi-agent agile manufacturing scheduling systems for
virtual enterprises) project focuses on the use of multi-agent systems in agile schedul-
ing in a VE environment [Rabelo et al., 1999]. The factors considered here range from
distribution logistics scheduling in supply chains to negotiation in the VE using mobile
agents. The AIMS (agile infrastructure for manufacturing systems) project enables com-
panies to share resources and skills to facilitate the operations of VEs and agents function
as a bridge between clients and servers [O’Leary et al., 1997]. Specifically, the agents act
11Coalition formation by buyer companies is similar to buyer coalition in the B2C domain (Section
2.2.3). Thus here we focus on virtual enterprises of supplier agents.
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as: facilitators (routing requests to appropriate databases); aggregator agents (combining
multiple orders); user programmable agents (automating routine tasks) and engineering
databases agents (notifying users of design changes).
Supply Chain Management
A supply chain is formed by business units or facilities that purchase raw materials,
convert them into intermediate goods and final products, and delivers these final products
to customers [Tan et al., 2000]. A supply chain is used to coordinate the activities of
the organisations involved in order to ensure that products pass through the chain in the
shortest time and at the lowest cost [Lee and Billington, 1995]. Because of the business
trend towards outsourcing services and resources, supply chain networks have become
more complex [Kumar, 2001]. Given this, the software solutions being developed need
to be more sophisticated than the current generation of workflow tools. In particular,
the various components of the supply chain can be viewed as autonomous stakeholders
and these various stakeholders need to interact in flexible ways. Thus an agent-based
approach is well suited to this domain [Huhns et al., 2002, Jennings et al., 2000a]. In
particular, agents can be used to execute the scheduling [Fox et al., 2000], negotiate about
product prices [Sun et al., 1999] and share data between companies [Zeng, 2001].
To this end, a number of models for agent-based supply chain management have been
reported. For example, Walsh and Wellman developed a market system, based on a task
dependency network, for allocating tasks among agents that compete for scare resources
[Walsh and Wellman, 1999]. [Sun et al., 1999] model and implement the order selection
and negotiation process in a supply chain as a multi-agent system. Here a negotiating
agent represents each company along the supply chain and agents generate a purchase
plan, negotiate and generate counter proposals using constraint satisfaction techniques.
Moreover, Zeng proposed the Leadtime-Cost Tradeoff Supply Chain Model [Zeng, 2001]
in which each agent represents a business entity and the agents coordinate with each
other to control activity in the supply chain. An agent-based approach for streamlining
the business decision process is proposed in [Keskinocak et al., 2001]; here agents assist
the decision maker by discovering matches between supply and demand.
2.3.2 Brokering
Brokering is the process that matches sellers who supply goods/services to the buyers
who need them [Foss, 1998]. From the seller’s side, it is how they can propagate their
products and locate potential buyers. From the buyer’s side, the problem is how to find the
most appropriate seller to provide the good/services [Khosla and Kitjongthawonkul, 2001]
(e.g., lowest price or best quality). In contrast to merchant brokering in the B2C domain
(Section 2.2.4), brokering in a B2B context typically involves repeated transactions and
large volumes (in the B2C context brokering requests often tend to be one-off transac-
tions, since individual customers tend not to buy the same product often).
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Table 2.6: Brokers’ functions and services.
The projects in the table are Abrose [Gleizes et al., 1999], OFFER
[Bichler and Segev, 1999], MULTIMEDIATOR [Gallego et al., 1998] and Schmid et al.
[Schmid and Lindemann, 1998].
Information Maintenance
Project/ retrieval and self-learning Profiling Nego- Collabo- Notifi-
Papers processing about user of users tiation ration cation
Abrose
√ √ √ √
OFFER
√ √ √ √
MULTIMEDIATOR
√ √ √
Schmid et al.
√ √
As the Internet expands, it is becoming more expensive and more difficult to navigate
in order to find the necessary information on companies and their offerings (this is espe-
cially true for small and medium size enterprises [Turban et al., 1999]). For example, it
is estimated that about $5 trillion dollars is spent on the procurement of industrial parts
each year [Tully, 2000]. Given the difficulty and value of this exercise, a common way of
obtaining this information for companies in B2B e-commerce is through some form of
information broker (they can also be called matchmakers [Ha and Park, 2001] or broker-
age centres [Gamvroulas et al., 2000]) that acts as an intermediary between the buyers
and sellers. Here a broker can be an agent or a multi-agent system. The functions offered
by a broker may include the following [Foss, 1998]: information retrieval and processing;
maintenance of a self-learning information repository about the user; profiling of users;
monitoring for items of interest to the user; filtering of information; intelligent predic-
tion of user requirements; commercial negotiation between customers and the providers;
collaboration with other brokers; and protecting the user from intrusive access.
To summarise, Table 2.6 details the services provided by a number of agent-based
broker systems. As shown in the table, most brokerage services today mainly focus on
information search and matchmaking buyer’s and seller’s profiles, as well as comparing
the products in the catalogues of different suppliers. We believe more advanced services
(e.g., collaboration with other brokers and protecting the user from intrusive access) will
now start to emerge in order to provide more support to the buyers and sellers involved
in the transactions.
2.3.3 Negotiation
After the appropriate providers and consumers have been brokered, the negotiation stage
is where the traders aim to reach an agreement about what actions should be performed
under what conditions. By establishing contracts on an as-needed, just-in-time basis,
sellers can tailor their offerings both to their individual and the prevailing market situ-
ation at any given moment in time. Buyers can reduce their supply chain cost, benefit
from dynamic pricing mechanisms, broaden their supplier database, and streamline the
procurement process. Compared with negotiation in the B2C context, B2B negotiation is
31
more complex. Typically, for example, it involves larger volumes, repeated transactions
and more complex contracts. The negotiation methods discussed in the B2C context can
also apply here, however, the two most popular means of conducting B2B negotiation are
through auctions and contracting.
Auctions in B2B E-commerce
There are now many B2B marketplaces on the web that provide auction services and al-
low organisations to trade with one another on a global basis, for example, FreeMarkets
(http://www.freemarkets.com) and Ariba (http://www.ariba.com). Indeed, industry ana-
lysts estimate that 25% of e-commerce now consists of exchanges through such mech-
anisms [Sashi and O’Leary, 2002]. These auctions offer many advances over traditional
exchange methods (e.g., fixed suppliers), such as a larger market, less inventory, reduced
transaction costs, global expansion, and efficient pricing [Sashi and O’Leary, 2002]. We
classify the commonly used auctions into three kinds: buy-side auctions (one buyer and
multiple sellers); sell-side auctions (one seller and multiple buyers) and combinatorial
auctions [Fujishima et al., 1999, Karp, 1972, Rassenti et al., 1982] (where bidders bid for
a combination of related items). An agent can be either a buyer who submits bids or a
seller who provides some products or services in these auctions. The sell-side auction is
similar to the auctions discussed in the B2C context; the buy-side auction is the opposite
of the sell-side auction (however, it can also be an English, Vickrey, FPSB, or Dutch
auction). Combinatorial auctions only take place in B2B environments because of their
inherent complexities.
Buy-side Auctions
Buy-side auctions, also called reverse auctions [Teich et al., 1999] or procurement auc-
tions [Che, 1993], occur when buyers negotiate with multiple sellers in order to procure
a particular good/service.12 In this case, the negotiation usually involves multiple attrib-
utes, since buyers invariably have their particular requirements on the goods they need.
Here the buyer sends out his requirements and the sellers who can meet them make bids.
To make this process cost effective, some companies have built their own markets in
which they can invite bids from potential sellers. Examples of this kind include General
Electric (http://www.ge.com) and Boeing Inc. (http://www.boeing.com). The idea is that
the cost spent in searching and comparing suppliers can be significantly reduced, because
the companies repeatedly buy large volumes of many such products. In contrast, some
companies conduct buy-side auctions through a third party website (e.g., labx and Ariba).
12There is another form of buy side auction called a Request for Quote (RFQ) [Turban et al., 1999]. In
a RFQ, the buyer requests quotes that can include the price, delivery dates and description of the goods or
services being provided. The buyer uses this as a way to begin negotiation. However, since there is not
an automatic criteria (e.g., a scoring function to evaluate the bids) for selecting the winner, the strategy for
the bidder is not obvious. Thus, we only discuss the reverse auction in this context because it has a clear
selection criteria which means it is amenable to an agent-based solution.
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More specifically, [Che, 1993] investigates government procurement using a two-
dimensional auction (price and quality). A buyer solicits bids from multiple sellers.
Each bidder submits a sealed bid specifying the price and quality and the bidder with
the highest score wins. Based on the different ways in which the winner offers the
goods/services, three auction schemes are proposed: first score (winner offers the price
and quality it bids), second score (winner offers the goods/services matching the score
of the second highest scored bidder), and second preferred offer (winner offers the goods
or services at the same price and quality as the second highest scored bidder). In this
model, the buyer evaluates the bids by a scoring function which converts a bid into a
single number.
[Bichler et al., 1999] also defines a bidding procedure for multi-attribute auctions: a
buyer first specifies a request for bids and defines his requirements and preferences for
the goods/services in a scoring function. Then sellers submit their bids. After the auction
closes, the wining bid is the one that has the highest score as computed by the buyer (i.e.,
the seller who satisfies the buyer the most). This basic mechanism was applied to Eng-
lish, Vickrey, and FPSB auction protocols. Moreover, Bichler empirically analysed these
multi-attribute auctions and found that the utility scores achieved by the buyer are signi-
ficantly higher than those of the corresponding single-attribute auctions [Bichler, 2000].
In this setting, the scoring function is revealed to the bidders, thus the bidders know how
to improve their bids in a way that makes them most attractive to the buyer, and least
costly for them.
[Teich et al., 1999] developed multiple-attribute algorithms and heuristics for auc-
tions. In the case where the “quantity” is not an attribute in the auction, the preference of
the auctioneer is represented by the preference path that is the ordering of all the levels of
each attribute. The preference path here acts as a scoring function that the bidders would
follow. In the case where “quantity” is an attribute in the auction, a discriminative auction
algorithm is proposed. The auctioneer can specify multiple reservation prices for differ-
ent quantities and the bidders can accept the suggested bid or bid above the suggested bid
price. The authors argue that the algorithm can make the market more efficient.
[Vulkan and Jennings, 2000] proposed a multi-attribute auction protocol for service
allocation in the ADEPT [Jennings et al., 2000a] scenario. The ADEPT technology was
used to develop a system for managing the British Telecom (BT) business process of
providing a quotation for designing a network to provide particular network services to a
customer. They show that the protocol is guaranteed to choose the service provider that
makes the best offer from the buyer’s utility respective and that this offer is better than
any offer that would have been forthcoming using any other negotiation protocol.
Sell-side Auctions
In this kind of auction, there is a seller who wants to sell goods/services and many buy-
ers join the auction. The mechanism is usually one of the common single sided types
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described in Section 2.2.5 and the strategies described in that section also apply here.
These sorts of auctions are often used by companies that hold excess inventory or that
buy out-of-date inventory [Sashi and O’Leary, 2002]. Fastparts which sells electronic
manufacturing products and Staples (http://www.staples.com) which sells business sup-
plies and services are two of the most prominent examples of this genre.
Combinatorial Auctions
These are a special form of auction in which there are multiple kinds of goods to sell and
bidders can bid on combinations of items. For example, a seller may want to sell several
kinds of related goods (e.g., licenses in spectrum auctions (http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions))
and many bidders may have preferences over a combination of items (e.g., bidding on
license A and B for $ 300). After the seller receives all the bids, it will decide a non-
conflicting allocation among these goods that maximises its revenue. These sorts of auc-
tion are involved in many situations in the real world. For example, in the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) spectrum auction (http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions/), bid-
ders placed bids on different combinations of spectrum licences. Between 1994 and
January 2002, 38,829 licenses have been auctioned and 21,849 of them have been won
through such combinatorial mechanisms. Other examples of combinatorial auctions are
for airport time slots [Rassenti et al., 1982], railroad segments [Brewer, 1999], and deliv-
ery routes [Caplice, 1996].
These auctions are especially prevalent in a B2B context because companies of-
ten want to trade in a variety of interrelated assets. Moreover as different compan-
ies value the items or bundles of items differently, allowing them to bid on combina-
tions provides greater flexibility in expressing their needs and enhances the economic
efficiency of the market [Vries and Vohra, 2001]. From an agent perspective, the key
challenge is that of winner determination (auctioneer selects a set of non-conflicting
bids that maximise its revenue and this problem has been shown to be NP-complete
[Fujishima et al., 1999]) and a number of algorithms have been developed to achieve this
according to various criteria (e.g., anytime algorithms [Fujishima et al., 1999], polyno-
mial algorithms [Dang and Jennings, 2002] and optimal solutions [Sandholm, 2002]). In
this context, the bidding agent has to express its preferences on every bundle it is in-
terested in. However, transmitting these preferences to the auctioneer is a difficult task
since the bundles in the bids are likely to be very large. To overcome this, some research-
ers have developed an “oracle” (a program that can compute the bid for each bidder)
[Vries and Vohra, 2001] and others have developed a bidding language to encode the
preferences of the bidders (e.g., XOR-bids and OR-of-XORs [Sandholm, 2002]).
Contracting
Contracting covers the negotiation involved in reallocating work among agents; it in-
volves one agent trying to contract out some of its tasks to another agent by promising
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some rewards [Kraus, 2001]. Contracts have been applied in fields such as electricity
markets, bandwidth allocation, manufacturing planning and scheduling, and electronic
trading of financial instruments [Sandholm, 1999a].
Smith’s Contract Net Protocol [Smith, 1980] was the first multi-agent contracting
protocol. In this protocol, a manager agent announces a task, receives and evaluates bids
from potential contractors, and then awards the task to one of them and finally receives
the result from this contractor. Sandholm extends this work to consider marginal cost-
based contracts (an agent contracts in/out a task only if it can make a profit doing so)
[Sandholm, 1993]. Sandholm’s protocol was used as the basis of the TRACONET sys-
tem which is an automated system for task reallocation among freight companies. Here
each agent, representing a company, can take delivery tasks from or give out tasks to other
agents. In the original contract only one task can be moved between agents at any one
time. However this sometimes led to local optima. To overcome this, several new types
of contract were added [Sandholm, 1993]: cluster contracts (exchanging multiple tasks),
swap contracts (swapping a task for another task), and multi-agent contracts (more than
two agents in the same contract). When taken together, contracts that combine all of the
above can be shown to guarantee the optimal allocation through a finite number of con-
tracts. [Andersson and Sandholm, 1998] also devised levelled commitment contracting
in which an agent can decommit from contracts by means of paying a monetary penalty to
the contracting partner as a way of releasing itself from the contract. [Collins et al., 1998]
developed the MAGNET (Multi AGent NEgotiation Testbed) system which takes advant-
age of an independent market infrastructure and uses it as an intermediary to facilitate the
interactions between agents. Compared with other negotiation approaches (e.g., contract
net), the fact that there is an explicit intermediary reduces counter speculation by enfor-
cing negotiation rules and verifying the identity of the agents.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has surveyed and analysed the state of the art in agent mediated e-commerce,
focusing particularly on the B2C and the B2B context. While agent mediated e-commerce
is still very much in its infancy, a number of agent based deployments have already been
made. In highlighting these endeavours, we have also tried to outline medium and longer
term aspirations for this area. The key observation from this review is the importance
of various forms of automated negotiation. Such negotiation enables trades to occur in
more open and dynamic environments and enables trading to be significantly more agile
than it is at present. Within this space, auctions are a key means of achieving its aim.
However, a key impediment to the degrees of automation discussed in this chapter is the
lack of effective and efficient bidding strategies for the agents that are to participate in
these auctions. To this end, the remainder of this thesis concentrates on developing such
strategies for several auction contexts that are important to e-commerce scenarios.
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Given this analysis of the state of the art, we decided to concentrate on the strategy
design highlighted in Section 2.2.5. As already discussed, this is a key aspect of agent-
mediated e-commerce and one that has many different facets. Thus the remainder of
this thesis focuses on the issue of designing effective and practical strategies for agents
that participate in a variety of different auction settings. In more detail, this thesis first
concentrates on developing a strategy for a particular auction setting. To demonstrate the
power of the agent-based approach the CDA is chosen (Chapter 3). This is a reasonably
common type of auction (see Section 2.2.5), but is sufficiently complex that it has no
optimal strategy that can be pre-computed. Having successfully developed an agent for
this scenario, we then focus on the more complex multiple auction setting where an agent
tries to bid across multiple simultaneous auctions in order to procure a number of goods
(Chapters 4 and 5).
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Chapter 3
Bidding Strategies for Continuous
Double Auctions
In the previous chapter, we surveyed the field of agent mediated e-commerce from the
B2C and B2B perspectives, highlighted the importance of auctions and of developing
effective bidding strategies for agents that operate in such contexts. Against this back-
ground, this chapter focuses on the strategy design for a particular auction protocol—the
continuous double auction (see Section 2.2.5 for a detailed definition of a CDA). Our
agent design addresses the following common issues discussed in Section 1.2: price pre-
diction (the reference price defined in Section 3.2.1), adaptation (see Section 3.4 ), risk
attitude (see Section 3.3.2) and flexible bidding (see Section 3.2.2).
In more detail, the bidding algorithms we develop are heuristic methods that exploit
fuzzy logic techniques [Zadeh, 1965], especially fuzzy rules, to undertake their reason-
ing. The reason for this choice is that in CDAs there is no optimal bidding strategy
[Friedman and Rust, 1992]. This is because an agent’s decision making about bidding
involves uncertainty, multiple factors and non-determinism that are affected by the atti-
tudes towards risk of its opponents, the nature of the market supply (demand), and the
preferences of the other bidders. Since no agent can have all this information in advance
(it is, after all, a competitive environment) the best that can be achieved is a satisficing
strategy [Simon, 1997]. Given this, we adopt a fuzzy logic based approach because fuzzy
techniques have proven to be successful in a wide range of domains with these character-
istics (see Section 1.2 for a detailed justification for using fuzzy techniques). The other
alternatives we considered in this specific case are discussed in Section 3.5.
The specific contributions of this chapter are as follows. Firstly, we develop a novel
fuzzy logic based bidding strategy—the FL strategy—for agents that participate in CDAs.
Secondly, we present the design, implementation and evaluation of this strategy for buyer
and seller agents. This strategy is shown, via empirical studies, to outperform the main
strategies that have previously been proposed for CDAs. Thirdly, we enhance the basic
strategy so that it can adapt its behaviour to the supply (demand) in the market (this
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revised strategy is called the adaptive FL -strategy). We then show how this revised
strategy leads to a further improvement in the performance of both the individual agents
(buyers and sellers) and of the overall marketplace.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 formalises a CDA
and outlines the basics of our fuzzy reasoning mechanism. Section 3.2 presents the FL-
strategy. In Section 3.3, the behaviours of our FL-agents are analysed in a range of
experiments. Section 3.4 discusses the adaptive FL-agents and their evaluation. Section
3.5 discusses the related work. Finally, Section 3.6 summaries this chapter.
3.1 Preliminaries
This section outlines the basis of our FL-strategy - presenting a formal account of our
CDA protocol and describing the fuzzy reasoning mechanism we employ.
3.1.1 Continuous Double Auctions
According to the parameterisation of CDAs given in [Friedman, 1993], we deal with the
situation in which there are multi-unit goods in the market; there are two-way traders
(buyers and serllers) and the numbers of buyers and sellers are 6 (3 buyers and 3 sellers);
single indivisible units are to be traded (thus at any one time there is 1 outstanding bid
and 1 outstanding ask); the preferences of the traders are the reservation prices of the
goods; and traders have incomplete information of the market. The CDA terminates after
a specified period of inactivity.
In more detail, there are agents that are willing to sell goods (s-agents) and agents
that are willing to buy goods (b-agents). A given agent can be either a buyer or a seller
in a given context. Specifically, an ask a is the amount submitted by an s-agent willing
to sell a unit of good. The lowest ask in the market is called the outstanding ask, denoted
ao. Similarly, a bid b is the amount submitted by a b-agent willing to buy a unit of good.
The highest bid in the market is called the outstanding bid, denoted bo. A CDA can
thus be described as a place where s-agents submit asks to decrease ao, while b-agents
submit bids to increase bo, until bo is not less than ao [Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998]. At
this moment, the s-agent that submits ao and the b-agent that submits bo can make a
transaction, and the price of the transaction is called the transaction price. Formally, we
have:
Definition 1 The descriptor of a CDA is
PCDA =< g,B,S ,Vb,Cs,∆price, tround >,
where:
1. g is the good to be auctioned.
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2. B = {b1, · · · ,bn} is the finite set of identifiers of b-agents, where n is the number
of b-agents.
3. S = {s1, · · · ,sm} is the finite set of identifiers of s-agents, where m is the number of
s-agents.
4. Vb = (
→
V 1, · · · ,
→
V n), where
→
V i (vi1,vi2, · · · ,vini) is a vector of unit valuations of b-
agent bi. Here ni is the number of units of g that bi requires, and vi j is the valuation
value for the jth unit acquired.
5. Cs = (
→
C1, · · · ,
→
Cm), where
→
C i (ci1, · · · ,cimi) is a vector of unit costs of s-agent si.
Here mi is the number of units that si wants to sell, and ci j is the cost of the jth
unit.
6. ∆price is the minimum price step required in the auction. That is, a b-agent (s-
agent) must increase (decrease) its bid (ask) at n×∆price, where n is a non-negative
integer.
7. tround is used for defining the condition for terminating the CDA; that is, if there
are no new asks or bids during a time period tround , the CDA terminates.1 
Definition 2 A round in a CDA is the time period between two successive deals or the
period from the beginning of the CDA to the time when the first deal takes place. If a
round is the rth (r ∈ IN+) round of the CDA, then r is called the round number. A CDA
usually consists of multiple rounds. 
Definition 3 For a CDA that has lasted r (r > 0) rounds, let pi (1 ≤ i ≤ r) denote the
price of the ith transaction. A history Hl in a CDA is the set of transaction prices during
the last l rounds,
Hl = {pr−l+1, · · · , pi, · · · , pr},
where pi (r− l +1 ≤ i ≤ r) is the transaction price of round i, and l (l ≤ r) is called the
history length.2 
The following is the formal definition of the valid behaviours of agents during a CDA.
Definition 4 A CDA protocol with the descriptor PCDA consists of the following steps:
0. r=0.
1. A new round of the CDA starts, r=r+1, ao = ∞ and bo=0.
1Note that by this definition we exclude from this chapter CDAs that last infinite periods of time (such
as stock markets). To model this, tround can be set to infinity.
2Through experiments where both the history length (l) and the value (cost) of the goods that the agents
trade varied, the performance of the agents with different history lengths was investigated. The results
showed that the behaviour of FL-agents with a long history length (l > 20) was similar to or worse than
that of an agent with a history length ranging from 3 to 20. This result shows that agents with short or
intermediate history lengths can react more rapidly to changes in a CDA market. When the history length
varied from 3 to 20, we found that 10 was a reasonable history length where almost all the agents achieve
their highest profit. Thus this is the value selected for all the experiments in the rest of this chapter.
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2. Several situations might arise during a round:
(a) When an s-agent submits an ask a,
(i) if a≥ ao then a is an invalid ask;
(ii) if bo <a< ao then ao is updated to a;
(iii) if a≤ bo then this s-agent makes a deal at bo; goto 1.
(b) When a b-agent submits a bid of b,
(i) if b≤ bo then b is an invalid bid;
(ii) if bo < b< ao then bo is updated to b;
(iii) if b≥ ao then this b-agent makes a deal at ao; goto 1.
3. Step 2 repeats until no new bids (asks) are submitted during a time period tround .
As can be seen, the outstanding ask and outstanding bid define the bid-ask spread
[bo,ao] [Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998] and only bids and asks that fall within this region
are considered valid.
3.1.2 Fuzzy Reasoning Mechanisms
The fuzzy reasoning inference mechanism employed in this chapter is based on the Su-
geno controllers [Sugeno, 1985, Zimmermann, 1996]. Consider the following block of
fuzzy IF-THEN rules:
R1 : if x is A1 and y is B1 then z1 = c1
also
R2 : if x is A2 and y is B2 then z2 = c2
also
.
.
.
also
Rn : if x is An and y is Bn then zn = cn
fact: x is x0 and y is y0
consequence: z0
where A1, · · · , An and B1, · · · , Bn are fuzzy sets, z1, · · · , zn are variables and c1, · · · , cn are
constants. The firing level αi of the rules Ri is computed by the Min operator. That is,
αi = min{Ai(x0),Bi(y0)}, (3.1)
where Ai(x) and Bi(y) are the membership functions of the corresponding fuzzy sets Ai
and Bi, respectively. If the output of the individual rule is denoted as zi, then according to
the Sugeno controller definition, the crisp control action of the rule base is obtained by:
z0 =
∑ni=1 αizi
∑ni=1 αi
. (3.2)
The extension principle [Zadeh, 1965] is one of the main means of fuzzifying a for-
mula with crisply defined numbers. In particular, we extend (3.2) to the situation where
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Figure 3.1: Triangular fuzzy number a˜ = (m,θ,χ).
m is the centre, θ is left spread and χ is right spread.
these real numbers zi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are changed to triangular fuzzy numbers. We made this
change because in developing our rules it is difficult to estimate the action using a single
real value chosen from within a predefined range. Instead it is easier to estimate a para-
meter with fuzzy values, and this led us to use triangular fuzzy numbers (the user’s pref-
erence is also presented by fuzzy numbers in Section 5.4.1) [Dubois and Prade, 1978].
Also, by the extension principle, arithmetic operations on trapezoidal fuzzy numbers have
already been obtained [Bonissone and Decker, 1986, Luo et al., 1994] and fuzzy triangu-
lar numbers are special cases of fuzzy trapezoidal numbers [Bandemer and Gottwald, 1995].
Thus the arithmetic operations on fuzzy triangle numbers can be obtained from the arith-
metic operations on fuzzy trapezoidal numbers. Given all this, in our inference mech-
anism, the output of each rule is a triangular fuzzy number defined with the following
triple:
a˜ = (m,θ,χ),
where m is called the centre, and θ and χ are called the left and right spreads, re-
spectively [Yager and Filev, 1994] (Figure 3.1). For two triangular fuzzy numbers a˜1 =
(m1,θ1,χ1), and a˜2 = (m2,θ2,χ2) (a˜1, a˜2 > 0) and k ∈ IR, the following formulae hold
[Bonissone and Decker, 1986, Luo et al., 1994]:
a˜1 + a˜2 = (m1 +m2,θ1 +θ2,χ1 +χ2),
a˜1− a˜2 = (m1−m2,θ1 +χ2,θ2 +χ1),
a˜1× a˜2=(m1m2,m1θ2+m2θ1−θ1θ2,m1χ2+m2χ1+χ1χ2),
k× a˜1 = (km1,kθ1,kχ1).
From the above formulae, (3.2) can be extended to the following in the situation where
z˜i = (mi,θi,χi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
z˜0 =
∑ni=1(αi× z˜i)
∑ni=1 αi
=
∑ni=1(αi× (mi,θi,χi))
∑ni=1 αi
=
(∑ni=1(αi×mi)
∑ni=1 αi
,
∑ni=1(αi×θi)
∑ni=1 αi
,
∑ni=1(αi×χi)
∑ni=1 αi
)
. (3.3)
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Thus, the reasoning mechanism becomes:
R1 : if x is A1 and y is B1 then z˜1 is c˜1
also
R2 : if x is A2 and y is B2 then z˜2 is c˜2
also
.
.
.
also
Rn : if x is An and y is Bn then z˜n is c˜n
fact: x is x0 and y is y0
consequence: z˜0
Having defined the protocol and the reasoning mechanism, we can now turn to the
FL-strategy itself.
3.2 The FL-Strategy
Building on the foundations of the previous section, this section describes our FL-strategy
and demonstrates how it works in an exemplar scenario.
3.2.1 Basic Notation and Concepts
In order to detail the FL-strategy, we first need to introduce a number of underpinning
notations and concepts.
Definition 5 A situation s∗ during the course of a CDA is a 6−tuple,
s∗ =< r,B,S ,ao,bo,Hl >,
where r is the current round number; B and S are the sets of b-agents and s-agents; ao
and bo are the outstanding ask and the outstanding bid, respectively; and Hl is the history
of the last l rounds.3 
Definition 6 Given a situation s∗, the valid bids set (Db) is the set of the valid bids that
a b-agent could submit:
Db(vi j) = {b | bo < b≤min(ao,vi j)}, (3.4)
where b is the price at which a b-agent submits a bid; and vi j is the valuation of the jth
unit of the good by buyer i. 
Definition 7 Given a situation s∗, the valid asks set (Ds) is the set of valid asks that an
s-agent could submit:
Ds(ci j) = {a | max(bo,ci j)≤ a< ao}, (3.5)
3Recall that l is the remembered history length of an agent, and thus l is not necessarily equal to r−1.
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where a is the price at which an s-agent submits an ask; and ci j is the cost of the jth unit
of the good for seller i. 
The prices of previous transactions are stored as history and may be referred to by
the agents in the subsequent rounds. Generally speaking, CDA markets produce very
efficient allocations and prices [Easley and Ledyard, 1993], and the transaction prices
often converge to a competitive equilibrium price4 while the CDA is in progress. Thus,
the transaction prices in a CDA provide an important point for reference. To reflect
this fact, we define the reference price PR (this can be regarded as the prediction of
the transaction price) in the situation s∗ as the median of the ordered price history.5 A
reference price, as its name suggests, provides a reference point that an agent can use to
guide its subsequent bidding behaviour. Formally, we have:
Definition 8 Let r be the current round number (r > 0). Suppose the price history is a
series of prices
Hl = {pr−l, · · · , pi, · · · , pr−1},
where pi (r− l ≤ i≤ r−1) is the price in round i. Let their ordered series be denoted as
p(1) ≤ ·· · ≤ p(i) ≤ ·· · ≤ p(l). (3.6)
Then the reference price, PR, is given by
PR = p(⌊ l+12 ⌋). (3.7)

To summarise, when an agent submits its next ask (bid), it will consider the out-
standing ask, the outstanding bid, the cost (valuation) of the current unit of good, and
the reference price. The way in which these values are used is described in the next
subsection.
3.2.2 Fuzzy Reasoning in the FL-strategy
The FL-strategy is based on a number of heuristic rules and the fuzzy reasoning mechan-
ism outlined in Section 3.1.2. The relation of PR, ao, and bo during a round in a CDA falls
into one of the cases below: (i) PR ≤ bo < ao, (ii) bo < ao ≤ PR, and (iii) bo ≤ PR ≤ ao.
In the first two cases, we use some heuristic rules (given below); the bidding issue in the
4The equilibrium price is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves of the market,
and it is the point where the quantity supplied is equal to the quantity demanded [Perloff, 1998].
5Originally, both the mean and the median of the ordered price history were used, however experimental
results showed that the median is more effective in providing a reference price. This is because the mean
price can be overly influenced by a too high (low) price offered by an irrational agent. In contrast, the
median of the ordered price history is less susceptible to such bias.
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Figure 3.2: Fuzzy sets in heuristic rules.
third case, which is more complicated, is handled through the fuzzy reasoning mechan-
ism on a rule base (described at the end of this subsection). Figure 3.2 describes all the
fuzzy sets used in the heuristic rules. The heuristic rules applied in the first two cases for
s-agents are:
• When PR ≤ bo < ao, the heuristic rule is:
(SR1) IF bo is much bigger than PR
THEN accept bo
ELSE ask is (ao−βs,1,θ,χ).
• When bo < ao ≤ PR, the heuristic rule is:
(SR2) IF ao is much smaller than PR
THEN no new ask
ELSE ask is (ao−βs,2,θ,χ).
Intuitively, SR1 states that when the outstanding bid bo is much bigger than the refer-
ence price PR, it is already very profitable for an s-agent to accept the current outstanding
bid. The relation ‘bo is much bigger than PR’ can be expressed as fuzzy set A1. Let the
threshold be γs,1, that is, if A1(bo) ≥ γs,1, the s-agent will accept bo. At this point, a
transaction takes place between the s-agent and the b-agent which submits the outstand-
ing bid. Otherwise, the s-agent will decrease the outstanding ask ao to a fuzzy number
(ao−βs,1,θ,χ) (see Section 3.1.2), where ao−βs,1 is the centre of the new ask, and θ and
χ are the left and right spread. βs,1 shows how much the agent would like to decrease its
ask and this is decided by the agents’ attitude to risk (to be discussed in Section 3.3.2).
SR2 is applied when ao is much smaller than PR. At this moment, an s-agent is in an
unfavourable position and it should be reluctant to decrease ao. Thus the s-agent only
decreases ao by a small step. The relationship ‘ao is much smaller than PR’ is expressed
as a fuzzy set A2. Let γs,2 be the threshold, that is, if A2(ao)≥ γs,2, the agent believes the
current ask is much smaller than PR. In this case, the s-agent will not submit a new ask.
Similar heuristic rules also apply to b-agents:
44
• When bo < ao ≤ PR, the heuristic rule is:
(BR1) IF ao is much smaller than PR
THEN accept ao
ELSE bid is (bo +βb,1,θ,χ).
• When PR ≤ bo < ao, the heuristic rule is:
(BR2) IF bo is much bigger than PR
THEN no new bid
ELSE bid is (bo +βb,2,θ,χ).
The relationship ‘ao is much smaller than PR’ can be expressed as a fuzzy set A3. Let
γb,1 be the threshold, that is, if A3(ao)≥ γb,1, ao is regarded as being much smaller than
PR, and a b-agent will accept ao; otherwise, a b-agent will increase bo to a fuzzy number
(bo +βb,1,θ,χ). The fuzzy set A4 defines the relationship ‘bo is much bigger than PR’.
Let γb,2 be the threshold for this rule, that is, if A4(bo) ≥ γb,2, a b-agent will not submit
a new bid because bo is already high enough and no profit can be made according to
its preference; otherwise, it will increase bo to a fuzzy number (bo +βb,2,θ,χ). In the
above, P1, P2, P3, and P4 are the parameters of the fuzzy sets (see Figure 3.2) and they
are decided by human intuition and experience according to the range of the cost and
valuation of the goods. The fuzzy number produced by these heuristic rules is dealt with
in the same way as the fuzzy number produced by the reasoning mechanism (which we
will discuss below).
Now for the third case (bo ≤ PR ≤ ao), the fuzzy reasoning on a rule base is required.
First, the rule bases for the s-agents and b-agents are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively. Again the fuzzy numbers are all triangular fuzzy numbers as described in
Section 3.1.2; the distance between ao (or bo) and PR is expressed using the fuzzy lin-
guistic terms: f ar f rom, medium to, and close to, which are defined in Figure 3.3, and
or corresponds to operator Max. λs,1, · · · ,λs,4 and λb,1, · · · ,λb,4 are parameters decided
by the risk attitude of the agent (see Section 3.3.2). Based on these rule bases, we can
perform inference through the fuzzy reasoning mechanism presented in Section 3.1.2.
The overall output of our fuzzy reasoning is a fuzzy number, i.e., a set of asks (bids) with
membership degrees. For example, z˜ may equal (2.0,0.02,0.04), where 2.0 is the centre,
0.02 is the left spread, and 0.04 is the right spread and its membership degree might be
given by:
z˜(x) =
{
50x-99 if 1.98≤ x ≤ 2.0,
-25x+51 if 2.0 < x ≤ 2.04.
Now the decision sets DSs (acceptable asks for s-agents) and DSb (acceptable bids for
b-agents) can be determined. Suppose zs = (ms,θs,χs) is the output fuzzy number of the
fuzzy reasoning or the heuristic rules for an s-agent, zb = (mb,θb,χb) is the output fuzzy
number of the fuzzy reasoning or the heuristic rules for a b-agent, and the parameter pis,
for the s-agent, and pib, for the b-agent, are the thresholds to decide to which degree the
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Table 3.1: Fuzzy rule base for s-agents.
IF (bo is far from or medium to PR) and
(ao is far from PR)
THEN ask is (ao−λs,1,θ,χ).
IF (bo is far from or medium to PR) and
(ao is medium to PR)
THEN ask is (ao−λs,2,θ,χ).
IF (bo is far from or medium to PR) and
(ao is close to PR)
THEN ask is (ao−λs,3,θ,χ).
IF bo is close to PR
THEN ask is (PR +λs,4,θ,χ).
Table 3.2: Fuzzy rule base for b-agents.
IF (ao is far from or medium to PR) and
(bo is far from PR)
THEN bid is (bo +λb,1,θ,χ).
IF (ao is far from or medium to PR) and
(bo is medium to PR)
THEN bid is (bo +λb,2,θ,χ).
IF (ao is far from or medium to PR) and
(bo is close to PR)
THEN bid is (bo +λb,3,θ,χ).
IF ao is close to PR
THEN bid is (PR−λb,4,θ,χ).
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Figure 3.3: Fuzzy sets used in fuzzy reasoning.
ask (bid) could be accepted. Again, pis and pib can be decided by the risk attitudes of the
agents. The asks that the s-agent could submit are in the decision set:
DSs = {a | a ∈ Ds∩{a | zs(a)≥ pis}}, (3.8)
where Ds is the valid asks set (see Definition 7). Similarly, the bids that the b-agent could
submit are in the decision set:
DSb = {b | b ∈ Db∩{b | zb(b)≥ pib}}, (3.9)
where Db is the valid bids set (see Definition 6).
Finally, the agent can decide whether to accept an ask (bid) or submit an ask (bid),
or submit nothing. For an FL-agent, if the decision set, DSs (DSb), is empty, it shows
that there is no acceptable asks (bids) at which this agent can make any profit, thus it will
not submit an ask or a bid. Otherwise, the ask (bid) to be submitted is decided by the
following formulae:
• for FL s-agents:
ask =


bo if bo ∈ DSs,
arg max
a∈DSs
{zs(a)} otherwise; (3.10)
• for FL b-agents:
bid =


ao if ao ∈ DSb,
arg max
b∈DSb
{zb(b)} otherwise. (3.11)
For an FL s-agent (b-agent), if the outstanding bid (ask) falls into DSs (DSb), it is a sign
that bo (ao) is acceptable (Here the decision set is a fuzzy number and it realises the
flexible bidding we discussed in Section 1.2). The FL s-agent (b-agent) will submit bo
(ao) in order to make a transaction at bo (ao). Otherwise, it will select the ask (bid) which
corresponds to the maximum similarity degree among those asks (bids) constrained by
DSs (DSb).
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This completes the description of our FL-strategy for both buyer and seller agents in
a CDA. We now illustrate its use in an exemplar scenario.
3.2.3 The FL-strategy in Operation
Assume there are three valuation vectors for b-agents b1, b2, and b3:
→
V 1= {3.3,2.7,2.4},
→
V 2= {2.8,2.5,2.2},
→
V 3= {2.7,2.4,2.1},
and three cost vectors for s-agents s1, s2, and s3:
→
C1= {1.6,2.2,2.4},
→
C2= {1.75,2.0,2.3},
→
C3= {1.6,1.9,2.1}.
Furthermore, suppose the CDA market is as follows (see Definition 1):
PCDA =< g,{b1,b2,b3},{s1,s2,s3},(
→
V 1,
→
V 2,
→
V 3),(
→
C1,
→
C2,
→
C3),0.01,30> .
In this market, there are 3 b-agents, each with valuations for three units, and 3 s-agents
each with costs for three units. Consider the following situation (see Definition 5):
s∗ =< 6,{b1,b2,b3},{s1,s2,s3},ao,bo,Hl > .
The fuzzy sets employed in the FL-strategy are shown in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3. Based on
the ranges of asks and bids, a difference below 0.01 in the ask (bid) value is here assumed
to be indifferent to the users. Thus, we choose 0.01 as the price step, i.e., ∆price = 0.01.
Also, for simplicity, the thresholds for all the fuzzy sets used in the rules are set to 0.5,
i.e., γs,1 = γs,2 = γb,1 = γb,2 = 0.5. For all the fuzzy numbers involved, suppose their left
spread θ = 0.02 and their right spread χ = 0.02, which ensures a reasonable degree of
flexibility in this context.
Example 1 This example shows how to use the heuristic rules to submit a bid. For ease
of explanation, let the history length l = 3 (however it does not affect the rationale of the
strategy). Let Hl = {2.3,2.2,2.1} , bo = 2.4, ao = 2.5, P1 = 2.5, and an s-agent be about
to submit its next ask. First from s∗, r = 6. Then, by Definition 8, we have
PR = p(⌊ l+12 ⌋) = p(⌊ 3+12 ⌋) = p(2) = 2.2.
From Figure 3.2(a), we can find that A1(bo) = A1(2.4) = 0.667 > γs,1 = 0.5. That is,
bo = 2.4 is considered to be much bigger than PR = 2.2. Therefore according to rule
SR1, the s-agent will accept bo, i.e., ask = bo = 2.4.
Example 2 This example shows how to use the fuzzy reasoning mechanism to submit a
bid. For ease of explanation, we set the history length to be 5. Let Hl = {2.0,2.4,2.3,2.2,2.1}
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(l = 5), ao = 2.85, bo = 1.2, and the FL b-agent b1 (with valuation
→
V 1) be about to submit
a new bid for its second unit of good, that is, the valuation of the second unit of good is
v12 = 2.7. By Definition 8,
PR = p(⌊ l+12 ⌋) = p(⌊ 5+12 ⌋) = p(3) = 2.2.
Since bo ≤ PR ≤ ao, the fuzzy reasoning on the rule base is employed. Let λb,1 = 0.05,
λb,2 = 0.04, λb,3 = 0.01, and λb,4 = 0.02. From Figure 3.3, we can find close to(ao) =
0.7, medium to(ao) = 0.5, f ar f rom(ao) = 0, close to(bo) = 0, medium to(bo) = 1, and
f ar f rom(bo) = 0. By formula (1), the four rules’ firing levels in Table 3.2 are:
α1 = min{max{ f ar f rom(ao),medium to(ao)}, f ar f rom(bo)}
= min{max{0,0.5},0}= 0,
α2 = min{max{ f ar f rom(ao),medium to(ao)},medium to(bo)}
= min{max{0,0.5},1}= 0.5,
α3 = min{max{ f ar f rom(ao),medium to(ao)},close to(bo)}
= min{max{0,0.5},0}= 0,
α4 = close to(ao) = 0.7.
Thus, according to Table 3.2, the four rules’ outputs are:
z˜1 = (bo +λb,1,θ,χ) = (1.20+0.05,0.02,0.02)= (1.25,0.02,0.02),
z˜2 = (bo +λb,2,θ,χ) = (1.20+0.04,0.02,0.02)= (1.24,0.02,0.02),
z˜3 = (bo +λb,3,θ,χ) = (1.20+0.01,0.02,0.02)= (1.21,0.02,0.02),
z˜4 = (PR−λb,4,θ,χ) = (2.2−0.02,0.02,0.02)= (2.18,0.02,0.02).
Finally, by formula (3.3), the overall output fuzzy number is calculated as follows:
z˜0 =
α1× z˜1 +α2× z˜2 +α3× z˜3 +α4× z˜4
α1 +α2 +α3 +α4
=
0× z˜1 +0.5× z˜2 +0× z˜3 +0.7× z˜4
0+0.5+0+0.7
=
0.5× z˜2 +0.7× z˜4
1.2
=
0.5× (1.24,0.02,0.02)
1.2
+
0.7× (2.18,0.02,0.02)
1.2
=
(0.5×1.24,0.5×0.02,0.5×0.02)
1.2
+
(0.7×2.18,0.7×0.02,0.7×0.02)
1.2
=
(0.62,0.01,0.01)+(1.526,0.014,0.014)
1.2
= (1.79,0.02,0.02).
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Then, by Definition 6, the valid bids set is:
Db = {b | bo < b≤min(ao,vi j)}= {b | 1.2 < b≤ min(2.85,2.7)}= {b | 1.2 < b≤ 2.7}.
And then, by formula (3.9), the bids that this b-agent can accept are in the decision
set:
DSb = {b | b ∈ Db∩{b | zb(b)≥ pib}}= {1.78,1.79,1.80},
where pib = 0.5. Finally, by formula (3.11), we have
arg max
b∈DSb
{zb(1.78),zb(1.79),zb(1.80)}= 1.79.
Thus, the bid that the b-agent will submit is bid = 1.79.
3.3 Evaluation of FL-agents
This section investigates, in an empirical fashion, the influence of the key parameters of
the FL-strategy, the selection of these parameters, and the comparison of the FL-strategy
with a number of other prominent strategies that have been proposed in the literature.
3.3.1 The Experimental Setting
This subsection describes the settings for the experiments conducted in the rest of this
chapter. First, the time period that an agent can allow to elapse before sending a message
about asks or bids is specified as an exponentially distributed random variable. This is
chosen because: (i) each agent’s timing decision is independent of domain characteristics
such as costs or valuations, and (ii) exponential distribution is often a good approximation
of the actual distribution [Ross, 1989]. Second, to measure how well an agent performs
in a CDA, we evaluate its profit (the monetary gain for the agent). For an s-agent, the
gain on its ith unit sold is the difference between the price, pi, received from a b-agent
for that unit, and the cost, ci, at which the unit is produced, i.e., pi−ci. If the s-agent sells
m units at prices p1, · · · , pm, then its profit is ∑1≤i≤m(pi− ci). Similarly, for a b-agent, if
this agent trades n units of goods, its profit is ∑1≤i≤n(vi− pi), where vi is the valuation
value for the ith unit and pi is the price of buying the ith unit of good. For the rest of this
chapter, an agent’s profit is calculated as the sum of the profit in 1,000 simulations.6
Based on the above settings, each experiment is composed of many sessions and then
each session consists of 1,000 runs.7 In each run of the session, an s-agent is endowed
6This number is chosen because it is sufficient to produce statistically significant results. By a t-test, the
p value of 0.007 is reported from the sample of 900 runs and that of 1,000 runs. Thus the profit variance
for the two samples are virtually the same and the results are therefore statistically significant at the 99.3%
level of confidence.
7From the beginning of the CDA to its termination is called a run. 1,000 runs with the same s-agents
and b-agents make up a session.
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with a number of units of goods whose costs are independently drawn randomly from
a uniform distribution with support [1.00, 3.00]. A b-agent is endowed with a number
of units of goods whose valuations are independently drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [2.00, 4.00]. These values were chosen because the cost values are generally
smaller than the valuation values [Cason and Friedman, 1991]. Thus, this is consistent
with reality. The supply of the market is calculated by the total number of units of goods
that all the s-agents want to sell; and the demand is calculated by the total number of
units of goods that all the b-agents desire to buy. For example, if there are 5 s-agents and
5 b-agents in the market, each s-agent is endowed with 5 units of goods, and each b-agent
is endowed with 6 units of goods to buy. The supply is 25 and the demand is 30.
3.3.2 Agents with Attitudes Towards Risk
This subsection first defines the different attitudes towards risk that an agent can adopt
and then analyses the influences of these attitudes through experiments based on the set-
tings described above. As discussed in Section 1.2, an agent’s attitude towards risk is an
important factor to consider when designing a trading agent. Due to the complexity and
uncertainty of the CDA bidding problem, it is not possible to analytically determine the
optimal configuration of parameter values for a given context [Friedman, 1993]. The best
that can be achieved is to know the likely range of parameters such that the agent will
perform effectively. To this end, the concept of attitude towards risk is introduced. Indi-
vidual attitudes to risk can be characterised according to how an agent approaches a fair
gamble [Schotter, 1994]; they can be: risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking. Take the
utility functions of an s-agent as an example. In Figure 3.4, the price of the outstanding
bid (bo) appears on the horizontal axis and the utility generated by accepting the current
bo is shown on the vertical axis. For the same value of p, agents with different risk atti-
tudes have different utilities; that is, U (A)(p) ≥U (N)(p) ≥U (S)(p). The agent with the
utility function U (A) represents the risk-averse agent which takes minimal risks with its
actions. Suppose the cost of the current unit of the good is c, as a result, it is unwilling to
sacrifice a sure profit of (bo− c) although there may be a greater chance of gaining more
profit. In short, risk-averse agents reject fair gambles. In contrast, there are agents that
actually prefer fair gambles to sure results. These agents are called risk-seeking and are
represented by the utility function U (S). The agents with the attitude between these two
extremes are called risk-neutral agents and their utility function is always represented as
a straight line. This kind of agent will be indifferent if the sure result and the gamble
have the same expected utilities.
Thus, in the FL-strategy, given the same fuzzy sets, different parameters will corres-
pond to different agent attitudes.
Definition 9 Given the same situation, suppose the utilities of an ask a that two s-agents
s and s′ submit are Us(a) and U
′
s(a), respectively. For all a ∈ Ds, agent s is said to be
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Figure 3.4: Utility functions of agents with different attitudes.
more averse towards risk than agent s′ if Us(a)≥U ′s(a). This we denote as ssa s′ . 
The following propositions are a straightforward result of Definition 9.
Proposition 1 Given the same situation, suppose the utilities of submitting an ask a for
three agents s(A), s(N) and s(S) are U (A)s (a), U (N)s (a) and U (S)s (a), respectively. For all
a ∈ Ds, s(A) sa s(N) sa s(S) if and only if U (A)s (a)≥U (N)s (a)≥U (S)s (a). 
Proposition 2 For three s-agents s(A), s(N) and s(S), represented by (β(A)s,1 ,β(A)s,2 ,γ(A)s,1 ,γ(A)s,2 ,λ(A)s,1 ,
· · · , λ(A)s,4 ), (β(N)s,1 , β(N)s,2 ,γ(N)s,1 ,γ(N)s,2 ,λ(N)s,1 , · · · , λ(N)s,4 ) and (β(S)s,1 ,β(S)s,2 ,γ(S)s,1 ,γ(S)s,2 , λ(S)s,1 , · · · ,λ(S)s,4 ),
respectively. If all the following conditions hold:
(i)β(A)s,i > β(N)s,i > β(S)s,i ( f or i = 1 and 2)
(ii) γ(A)s,1 < γ
(N)
s,1 < γ
(S)
s,1 ,
(iii) γ(A)s,2 > γ
(N)
s,2 > γ
(S)
s,2 ,
(iv)λ(A)s, j > λ
(N)
s, j > λ
(S)
s, j ( f or j = 1,2 and 3) and λ(A)s,4 < λ(N)s,4 < λ(S)s,4 ,
then, s(A) sa s(N) sa s(S). 
Proof. For an s-agent, for all a ∈ Ds, Us(a) is a non-decreasing function. That is, the
bigger the ask, the more utility the agent obtains. Let the ask submitted by each s-agent
be a(A), a(N), and a(S). From (i) to (iv), we can always get a(A) < a(N) < a(S). That
is, s(A) always submits a lower ask compared with s(N) and s(S), and that s(N) is always
lower than s(S). Thus U (A)s (a) ≥U (N)s (a) ≥U (S)s (a). Based on Proposition 1, we have:
s(A) sa s(N) sa s(S).
Similarly, ba can be defined as follows.
Definition 10 Given the same situation, suppose the utilities of a bid b for two b-agents
b and b′ submit are Ub(b) and U
′
b(b), respectively. For all b ∈ Db, agent b is said to be
more averse towards risk than agent b′ if Ub(b)≥U ′b(b). This we denote as b ba b
′
. 
The following propositions are a straightforward result of Definition 10.
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Figure 3.5: Performance of FL-agents with different risk attitudes.
In each group of bars, the five bars represent, from left to right, the agents with different
attitudes: averse, weakly averse, neutral, weakly risky and risky. The horizontal axis
shows the supply (demand) quantity of the session. The vertical axis represents the
profit of the various FL-agents in the session.
Proposition 3 Given the same situation, suppose the utilities of submitting a bid b for
the b-agents b(A), b(N), and b(S) are U (A)b (b), U
(N)
b (b), and U
(S)
b (b) respectively. For all
b ∈ Db, b(A) ba b(N) ba b(S) if and only if U (A)b (b)≥U (N)b (b)≥U (S)b (b). 
Proposition 4 For three agents b(A), b(N), and b(S) represented by (β(A)b,1 ,β(A)b,2 ,γ(A)b,1 ,γ(A)b,2 ,λ(A)b,1 ,
· · · , λ(A)b,4 ), (β(N)b,1 ,β(N)b,2 , γ(N)b,1 ,γ(N)b,2 ,λ(N)b,1 , · · · ,λ(N)b,4 ) and (β(S)b,1,β(S)b,2,γ(S)b,1,γ(S)b,2,λ(S)b,1, · · · ,λ(S)b,4), re-
spectively. If all the following conditions hold:
(i)β(A)b,i > β(N)b,i > β(S)b,i ( f or i = 1 and 2)
(ii) γ(A)b,1 < γ
(N)
b,1 < γ
(S)
b,1
(iii) γ(A)b,2 > γ
(N)
b,2 > γ
(S)
b,2
(iv)λ(A)b, j > λ
(N)
b, j > λ
(S)
b, j ( f or j = 1,2 and 3) and λ(A)b,4 < λ(N)b,4 < λ(S)b,4
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then, b(A) ba b(N) ba b(S). 
Proof. For a b-agent, for all b ∈ Db, Ub(b) is a non-increasing function. That is, the
smaller the bid, the more utility the agent obtains. Let the bid submitted by each b-agent
be b(A), b(N), and b(S). From (i) to (iv), we can always get b(A) > b(N) > b(S). That is,
b(S) always submits a lower bid compared with b(N) and b(A), and that b(N) is always
lower than b(A). Thus U (A)b (b) ≤U
(N)
b (b) ≤U
(S)
b (a). Based on Proposition 3, we have:
b(A) ba b(N) ba b(S).
Now given the fact that different parameters correspond to different attitudes towards
risk, the key question is how to choose the appropriate risk attitudes of agents given a
particular environment? The rest of this subsection is devoted to answering this ques-
tion. In particular, the influence of the relation of supply and demand quantity (a key
environmental factor) is considered.
Conjecture: The relation of supply and demand quantity influences the performance
of agents with different attitudes. If the supply (demand) quantity is greater than the
demand (supply) quantity, an s-agent (b-agent) with an averse attitude towards risk can
make more profit. 
To test our conjecture, a series of six experiments were conducted. Beside the three
aforementioned kinds of agents (risk-averse, risk-seeking, and risk-neutral) two extra
kinds of agents are considered: agents between the neutral and averse attitude (weakly
averse), and agents between the neutral and risk attitude (weakly risky). These are added
in order to make the trend of influence of the risk attitudes to the market supply (demand)
more clear. In each session, only one agent uses the FL-strategy, and from session to
session, the attitude of the FL-agent varies from risk-averse to risk-seeking. All the other
agents utilise one of our benchmark strategies.8
Figure 3.5 shows the profit of FL-agents in different sessions. Figure 3.5(a)&(b) show
the profit of agents when supply is equal to demand. In these cases, the left-hand bars in
each group are always taller than the other bars in the same group. These bars represent
the profits of the averse agents. A risk-averse agent is easily satisfied, so it can make
transactions quickly and with a high volume. As a result, its profit is high. Thus, in
this environmental setting, an averse agent can make more profit, whether it is an s-agent
or a b-agent. In Figure 3.5(c), supply is greater than demand, thus an s-agent is in an
unfavourable position. The chances of selling a good are small, because there are very
few b-agents. So an averse agent makes more profit. This explanation also holds for the
b-agents in Figure 3.5(f). Figure 3.5(d) shows the behaviour of agents when supply is
less than demand. Here the attitude with which an s-agent performs best varies with the
8In fact they use the ZI-strategy which will be described in Section 3.3.3 (this is the earliest and simplest
of our benchmark strategies). Thus, if there is one FL s-agent in the market, there are 4 s-agents and 5 b-
agents using the ZI-strategy; if there is one FL b-agent, there are 5 s-agents and 4 b-agents using the
ZI-strategy.
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change of the difference between supply and demand quantity. At the beginning, when
the difference is small, the weakly averse agents always make more profit. However with
the increase in supply, the trend is that an s-agent with a risk-seeking attitude can make
more profit. This is caused by the fact that the market is not very competitive when the
difference between supply and demand is small. This also explains the bars for b-agents
in the situation when supply is less than demand (Figure 3.5(e)).
In summary, this experiment clearly shows how to choose the suitable attitude for an
agent in different situations if we have knowledge about the real-time supply and demand.
As indicated by our conjecture, an s-agent should be averse when supply is greater than
or equal to demand; and the attitude should change from risk-averse to risk-seeking with
the increase of demand when the supply is less than demand. For a b-agent, it should be
averse when supply is less than or equal to demand; and the attitude should change from
risk-averse to risk-seeking with the increase of supply when the supply is greater than
demand.
3.3.3 Benchmarking the FL Strategy
Having determined the best parameter configuration with respect to risk in a given en-
vironment, this section compares our strategy (with the risk attitude tailored to the envir-
onment) with a number of others that have been proposed in the literature. These other
strategies represent the most widely cited strategies for agents participating in CDAs. In
more detail, the benchmark strategies are:
• Zero Intelligence (ZI) strategy [Gode and Sunder, 1993b]. A ZI b-agent sub-
mits a bid drawn randomly between outstanding bid (bo) and the valuation of its
current unit. Similarly, a ZI s-agent submits an ask drawn randomly between
the cost of its current unit and outstanding ask (ao). This strategy is an exten-
sion of the “budget-constraint zero intelligence” trader in the economics literature9
[Gode and Sunder, 1993b]. In [Gode and Sunder, 1993b], the lower limit that a b-
agent submits as a bid is 0 and the upper limit that an s-agent submits as an ask
is 1. We believe our extension is appropriate because we are dealing with single
unit trades and because the ask (bid) bounding conditions increase the possibility
of matching an outstanding bid (ask).
• Fixed Mark-up (FM) strategy. An FM b-agent (s-agent) submits the outstand-
ing bid (ask) plus (minus) some predefined mark-up (this is a specialisation of
[Preist and van Tol, 1998]). This is a simple strategy because the agent does not
need to model other agents and it tries to reduce the ask-bid spread until its cost or
valuation is met.
9Actually, the ZI-strategy is equivalent to the ZI-C strategy proposed by Gode and Sunder
[Gode and Sunder, 1993a].
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• Chris Preist (CP) strategy. The CP-strategy consists of a small number of heur-
istics and a learning rule [Preist, 1999]. The heuristics first determine the target
profit margin based on the current outstanding bid (ask) and an independent ran-
dom variable distributed in the range [0,0.2]. Then, given the target, a CP agent
does not jump straight to that value, but moves towards the target at a learning rate
which determines the speed of the adjustment.
• Gjerstad-Dickhaut (GD) strategy. The GD-strategy [Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998]
is a more sophisticated strategy. A GD agent records all the asks (bids) made in the
history H occurring in the last several transactions. From the history, an agent can
compute the probability of a bid or ask being accepted. For example, for a buyer,
qˆ(b) =
T BL(b)+AL(b)
T BL(b)+AL(b)+RBG(b) , (3.12)
where qˆ(b) is the probability of b being accepted, T BL(b) is the number of accep-
ted bids not greater than b in H, AL(b) is the number of asks not greater than b in
H, and RBG(b) is the number of rejected bids not less than b in H. Then, cubic
spline interpolation is used to compute the probability of a given bid being accep-
ted given the history. A GD b-agent submits a bid, b, which maximises pib(v−b),
where pib is the belief function of a bid that is accepted, and v is the valuation of the
good. Similarly, a GD s-agent submits an ask a which maximises pis(a−c), where
pis is the belief function of an ask that is accepted, and c is the cost of the good to
sell.
To evaluate the behaviour of each agent, we compare their profits in three situations:
(i) supply equals demand (Figure 3.6(a)&(b)); (ii) supply is less than demand (Figure
3.6(c)&(d)); and (iii) supply is greater than demand (Figure 3.6(e)&(f)). In each sub-
figure of Figure 3.6, the horizontal axis shows the supply (demand) quantity and the
vertical axis represents the profit of agents using various strategies. There are five curves
in each sub-figure and each one represents the profit of one kind of strategy. Given the
same supply (demand), the bigger the profit, the better the strategy.
From Figure 3.6, we can see that the FL-agents often obtain higher profits than all
the other corresponding agents. The exception is that FL-agents perform slightly worse
than the GD-strategy when (i) for the b-agent, supply= 25 and demand=40, 45, and 50,
respectively; and (ii) for the s-agent, supply= 25 and demand=30 and 35, respectively.
The reason for this inferiority is that our agent cannot adjust its risk attitude during the
course of the CDA and the value that is used is based on the experimental results in
Section 3.3.2 which is for the general case. However, in most situations, FL-agents can
outperform agents using other strategies. We attribute this success to two factors. Firstly,
when making a decision in a given situation, an FL-agent considers the outstanding ask,
outstanding bid, and reference price (inferred from history) in deciding its next ask (bid).
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Figure 3.6: Performance of agents with different strategies.
The horizontal axis represents the demand (or supply) configuration of the
corresponding market and the vertical axis represents the total profit of the
corresponding agent using a specific strategy in one session. There are 5 s-agents and 5
b-agents in each experiment. In (a)&(b), supply is equal to demand, the unit of good
that each agent is endowed with to buy (sell) increases from session to session in the
range [5,15], the total supply (demand) is shown in the horizontal axis. In (c)&(d),
supply is less than demand, the unit of good that each s-agent is endowed with is fixed
to 5, and the unit of good for b-agents increases from session to session in the range
[6,14]. In (e)&(f), supply is greater than demand, the unit of good that each b-agent is
endowed with is fixed to 5, and the unit of good for s-agents increases from session to
session in the range [6,14].
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We believe reference price is a very important factor in bidding, and our strategy is the
only one to exploit this information. Secondly, the FL-strategy can dynamically vary the
rate of increase (decrease) in bid (ask) according to the prevailing context. Sometimes,
for example, an FL-agent can jump from a very low price to a transaction price. This
is markedly different from the other strategies which only increase (decrease) their bids
gradually.
The performance of the other strategies is statistically worse than our FL-agents. GD-
agents behave worse than the FL-strategy although they do maintain a history. However,
these agents ignore the outstanding ask (bid), which we believe is one of the most im-
portant factors in deciding an agent’s next bid (ask). The other three strategies ignore
the transaction history. ZI-agents have no knowledge about the auction, they submit their
bids (asks) randomly. However, ZI-agents can sometimes deal at a very low bid or high
ask. FM-agents and CP-agents can only increase (decrease) their bids (asks) in a fixed
step or small varied steps without caring about the outstanding bid (ask). Thus, they miss
out on some deals which they should have made.
3.4 Adaptive FL-agents
In the above experiments, the risk attitude of the FL-agent is selected manually based on
design time knowledge of the relation between supply and demand. However, in many
environments this information is a priori unknown. Also, in an open CDA, the number of
agents can be changing continuously as new agents enter the market and the existing ones
drop out. Further, the parameters that are suitable in one CDA market may not behave
well in others because success is inextricably linked to the strategies of the competitor
agents. For all these reasons, we believe it is desirable for an FL-agent to have the ability
to automatically adapt itself to its market context (this realises the adaptivity feature we
discussed in Section 1.2). Thus this section reports on a number of extensions in this
direction that we made to the basic FL-strategy.
3.4.1 Learning Principle for FL-agents
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, each FL-agent has a reference price (PR) to decide whether
it sells (buys) a good at a profitable price. Given this price, an agent can submit an ask
(bid) based on its risk attitude (parameters). However, different attitudes can lead to
different asks (bids) (Section 3.3.2). Furthermore, even the same asks (bids) have dif-
ferent effects in different environments. Thus an agent needs another measure to decide
whether it submits too high a bid or too low an ask. To this end, an agent can observe
how frequently it can make transactions. If an s-agent (b-agent) waits too long to con-
duct a deal, it shows that it should be more averse in the next round if it is to make more
transactions. On the other hand, if an s-agent (b-agent) can transact very frequently, it is
a sign that its bids (asks) are too high (low). Thus, during the next round of the CDA, the
agent should change its attitude in the direction of risk-seeking (hoping it can still make
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a transaction while increasing its profit). We call this kind of hill-climbing behaviour the
adaptive FL-agent (denoted A-FL-agent).
  
most averse                  neutral                    most risky
-1                                 0                                +1
Figure 3.7: Risk Attitude of an agent.
Suppose agent i’s attitude is expressed by A(i)attitude which corresponds to a value in
[−1,+1] as shown in Figure 3.7. Each value of A(i)attitude corresponds to a group of para-
meters which define its attitudes towards risk that satisfy Proposition 2 or Proposition
4. Formally, the learning principles for A-FL-agents can be expressed as the rules in
Table 3.3 (where δ is the minimum step and r (r > 0) is the learning rate). The terms
“waits long” and “transacts frequently” are expressed as two fuzzy sets shown in Figure
3.8.
Table 3.3: Learning rules for A-FL-agents.
A(i)attitude denotes the attitude of agent i, r is the learning rate, and δ is the minimum step.
IF agent i waits long to transact
THEN A(i)attitude = A
(i)
attitude− rδ
IF agent i transacts frequently
THEN A(i)attitude = A
(i)
attitude + rδ
In this context, the learning rate r determines the speed with which the adjustment
takes place. Some agents may adapt themselves slowly but steadily, while others may
change their attitudes quickly. Thus, we compare three different representative adjust-
ment methods: (i) an agent increases (decreases) at the constant rate minimum step δ,
that is, r= 1; (ii) r= mδ, where m > 1; that is, the agent increases (decreases) at a bigger
wait_long  1 transacts_frequently  
 0
0.1       0.2        0.3         0.4        0.5         0.6       
De
gre
e
Transaction rate
Figure 3.8: Two fuzzy sets for transaction rate.
This rate is calculated by the number of transactions made by an agent divided by the
total transaction numbers in the market after the latest change of the agent’s attitude
towards risk.
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Figure 3.9: Performance of A-FL-agents with different adaptive speeds.
Initially, all the adaptive agents are risk-neutral. In each sub-figure, the bars in each
group represent the agents (from left to right): FL-agents (without adaptivity), A-FL 1
agents (r= 1), A-FL 2 agents (r= 5), and A-FL 3 agents (r is drawn randomly from
[1,10]).
step than δ; (iii) r is an independent random number uniformly distributed in the range
[1,τ], where τ is the maximum adjustment number.
In these experiments we assume there is no abrupt increase or decrease in the sup-
ply and demand quantity. That is, over any period the CDA market in each session is
relatively stable (i.e., there is a fixed supply and demand quantity). Further, to compare
the performance of different learning rates, we compare the three adaptive FL-agents and
the FL-agents with the parameters shown by the selection principle in Section 3.3.2. The
experiments are conducted in different situations (see Figure 3.9).
Generally, the agents whose learning rate is 1 (the agent which increases (decreases)
the attitude value at a small and constant rate) perform best. This is because this kind
of agent can fine tune its parameters which avoids over-response to supply (demand)
changes in the market. Thus, we choose this kind of learning rate to adjust the attitude
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Figure 3.10: Competition of A-FL-agents with other strategy agents.
for the adaptive FL-agents. Also, the adaptive FL-agents with a small learning rate do
better than other FL-agents. From Figure 3.9, it can be seen that the A-FL 1 agents
obtain a higher profit than the FL-agents. This means that even without the knowledge of
supply and demand, the adaptive agent can effectively tailor its strategy to its prevailing
circumstances. While this result is promising, there is the caveat assumption that there is
no abrupt change in supply or demand. In such circumstances, a learning rate that takes
small steps may not be able to respond quickly enough to be effective. However, the best
means of dealing with abrupt change is left for future work.
3.4.2 Comparison with the Other Strategies
In this experiment, we compare the adaptive FL-agents with the four benchmark strategies
of the previous section (ZI, FM, CP and GD).10 Figure 3.10 clearly shows that the ad-
aptive strategy is effective. A-FL-agents behave better, sometimes much better, than all
10The set-up of this experiment is the same as that of Section 3.3.3.
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the other strategies. This is because an A-FL-agent can tailor its bidding behaviour to the
prevailing market context.
Besides the profit of the agents, we also investigated the transaction price distribution
of each agent. We did this because this metric is a good indication of how consistently
an agent performs in a CDA. Table 3.4 shows the transaction price distributions in 1,000
runs of two agents11 when supply is equal to demand (Table 3.4 (a)), supply is less than
demand (Table 3.4 (b)), and supply is greater than demand (Table 3.4 (c)). In Table 3.4,
P0 is the average equilibrium price of 1,000 runs, obtained from the supply and demand
curves. Accordingly, Q0 is the average quantities at the equilibrium prices. P is the
average price for each agent and the Change Rate (CR) shows the percentage of (P−P0)
to the equilibrium price P0. This is a key measure of how well the agent behaves and is
calculated in the following way:
CR (P,P0) =
P−P0
P0
×100%.
Generally, for a b-agent, the lower the average price, the better the strategy; for an
s-agent, the higher the average price, the better the strategy. In Table 3.4, the average
prices of A-FL b-agents are always the lowest among all the b-agents. This means that
A-FL b-agents always pay low prices to acquire goods. Also, the average prices of A-FL
s-agents are always the highest among all the s-agents. This means that A-FL s-agents
always sell goods at high prices. An agent’s Change Rate also gives an indication of how
high or low the average transaction price is compared with the equilibrium price of the
CDA. For an s-agent, the higher the CR, the higher the price at which it sells its goods; for
a b-agent, the lower the CR, the lower the price at which it buys the goods. Our A-FL s-
agents always get the maximum CR value and A-FL b-agents always obtain the minimum
CR value. This means that our adaptive FL-agents buy goods at the lowest average price
and sell goods at the highest average price among all the agents using various strategies.
Thus, the adaptive FL-agents outperform all the other strategies.
3.4.3 Collective Behaviour of A-FL-agents
Since the A-FL strategy is effective in making good profits in a CDA, we expect many
A-FL-agents may appear in a given CDA market. Thus, we need to test the efficiency
of a CDA market that is populated with multiple A-FL-agents. In particular, we would
like to investigate how the performance of an A-FL-agent changes as the percentage of
A-FL-agents in the population increases, and to what extent the efficiency of the CDA
market is affected by this change in population.
11Here we show the transaction price distribution of two agents. In total, in the experiment shown in
Figure 3.10, there are 28 configurations of different market situations. Two agents (one s-agent and one
b-agent) from 6 sessions are shown in Table 3.4. To distinguish these two agents, we use strategy s/b 1
and strategy s/b 2 respectively. For example, A−FL b 1 means b-agent 1 utilises A-FL strategy.
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Table 3.4: Transaction price distributions of each agent.
P0 = 2.50, Q0 = 37 P0 = 2.50, Q0 = 55
Agent P CR Agent P CR
ZI s 1 2.46 -1.54% ZI s 2 2.39 -4.39%
FM s 1 2.49 -0.55% FM s 2 2.43 -2.65%
CP s 1 2.47 -1.22% CP s 2 2.42 -3.03%
GD s 1 2.58 3.33% GD s 2 2.53 1.31%
A-FL s 1 2.59 3.47% A-FL s 2 2.55 2.09%
ZI b 1 2.58 3.36% ZI b 2 2.54 1.69%
FM b 1 2.59 3.66% FM b 2 2.55 2.08%
CP b 1 2.59 3.77% CP b 2 2.56 2.37%
GD b 1 2.46 -1.46% GD b 2 2.42 -3.11%
A-FL b 1 2.44 -2.38% A-FL b 2 2.39 -4.53%
(a) Transaction prices of each agent when supply=demand.
P0 = 2.64, Q0 = 25 P0 = 2.92, Q0 = 29
Agent P CR Agent P CR
ZI s 1 2.60 -1.63% ZI s 2 2.81 -3.91%
FM s 1 2.62 -0.60% FM s 2 2.85 -2.24%
CP s 1 2.62 -0.94% CP s 2 2.84 -2.75%
GD s 1 2.70 2.42% GD s 2 2.94 0.85%
A-FL s 1 2.72 2.99% A-FL s 2 3.00 2.77%
ZI b 1 2.69 1.88% ZI b 2 2.92 0%
FM b 1 2.72 2.89% FM b 2 2.98 1.92%
CP b 1 2.73 3.22% CP b 2 3.00 2.64%
GD b 1 2.60 -1.56% GD b 2 2.82 -3.51%
A-FL b 1 2.58 -2.19% A-FL b 2 2.81 -3.77%
(b) Transaction prices of each agent when supply<demand.
P0 = 2.36, Q0 = 25 P0 = 2.12, Q0 = 29
Agent P CR Agent P CR
ZI s 1 2.35 -0.57% ZI s 2 2.15 1.28%
FM s 1 2.36 0% FM s 2 2.13 0.67%
CP s 1 2.33 -1.12% CP s 2 2.12 -0.11%
GD s 1 2.43 2.93% GD s 2 2.22 4.79%
A-FL s 1 2.46 4.06% A-FL s 2 2.24 5.79%
ZI b 1 2.44 3.43% ZI b 2 2.26 6.56%
FM b 1 2.44 3.43% FM b 2 2.23 5.37%
CP b 1 2.45 3.63% CP b 2 2.25 6.02%
GD b 1 2.36 -0.14% GD b 2 2.15 1.49%
A-FL b 1 2.32 -1.50% A-FL b 2 2.12 -0.23%
(c) Transaction prices of each agent when supply>demand.
We test the collective behaviour of A-FL-agents in situations where the quantity of
demand is (i) greater than, (ii) equal to, and (iii) less than the quantity of supply, re-
spectively. For each situation, the experiment is composed of multiple sessions. Figure
3.11 shows the results of the profits of A-FL-agents in different sessions under different
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situations.12 The horizontal axes represent the session numbers, and the vertical axes rep-
resent the sum of the profits in 1,000 runs of each agent. The curves show each agent’s
profit in different sessions.
In different sessions, we only change the strategy of one agent. Actually, we increase
the number of agents that employ the A-FL strategy by one in each session. Take Figure
3.11(a) as an example. In this situation, the demand is greater than supply, thus the
competition among A-FL b-agents is highlighted. There are 10 b-agents and 8 s-agents
and each agent has three units of goods to buy (sell). In session 1, only b-agent b1 uses
the A-FL strategy; in session 2, we change the strategy of b-agent b2 to the A-FL strategy,
while fixing all the other parameters; in session 3, the strategy that b3 uses is changed;
and finally in session 10, all the b-agents use the A-FL strategy.
As shown in Figure 3.11(a), (b) and (c), the profit of A-FL b-agent b1 decreases
initially and then increases steadily. The trend of the change of the profit of agent b2 and
agent b3 is similar. This phenomenon can be explained as follows. For agent b1, with
an increasing number of A-FL-agents, more A-FL-agents compete with b1, and thus the
profit of b1 decreases. When the number of A-FL-agents is sufficiently large,13 A-FL-
agents make the transaction prices of the market low. The same explanation holds for
A-FL s-agents. Thus, the reference prices of each agent decrease from session to session
and all the A-FL-agents make greater profits.
Since A-FL-agents make more profits in the long term, another question arises. How
will the CDA market as a whole be affected with an increasing population of A-FL-
agents? We evaluate the profit obtained by all agents in the market divided by the surplus
when agents trade their goods at the equilibrium price to determine the efficiency of the
market.14 Tables 3.5 to 3.7 summarise this efficiency data of the collective profit of all
the agents and the market efficiency from experiments of different sessions. As can be
seen, for CDA markets with varying numbers of A-FL b-agents,15 both the total profit
and efficiency of the market increase initially and then decrease little by little. For a
CDA market with varying numbers of A-FL s-agents, the trend is not so obvious. The
market becomes less efficient due to the increase in strategic reasoning of the A-FL-
agents. However, we can see that from the session when no agent uses the A-FL strategy
to the session when all the b-agents and s-agents use the A-FL strategy, the efficiency of
12In order to investigate the performance of A-FL-agents, the profit of non-A-FL agents is not shown in
Figure 3.11. These agents use various randomly selected strategies from our set of benchmarks.
13In the experiment, this number is 50% of the total number of b-agents or s-agents.
14The efficiency of the market is obtained by the following formula (based on the intuitions described in
[Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998]): Efficiency= ∑i p(i)a
∑i p(i)e
, where p(i)a is the actual profit of the agent i in a session
(1,000 runs); p(i)e is the profit of the agent if the agent i trades its goods according to the equilibrium price
given their costs and valuations of the goods in a session.
15Note that the total number of agents in each set-up is fixed; that is, in Table 3.5, there are 8 b-agents
and 8 s-agents; in Table 3.6, there are 8 b-agents and 10 s-agents; in Table 3.7, there are 10 b-agents and 8
s-agents.
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Figure 3.11: Profits for A-FL-agents in different sessions.
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the market does not decrease significantly. That is, even in the worst case the efficiency
is still reasonably high. The market with all A-FL-agents is also investigated. In this
market, all the agents use the A-FL strategy, and the efficiency is 85.45% for a market
with 5 s-agents and 5 b-agents. This figure is still reasonable with respect to experiments
shown in Tables 3.5 to 3.7. Thus we can conclude that widespread adoption of the A-
FL strategy does not lead to a significant deterioration in the effectiveness of the overall
market.
Table 3.5: Efficiency statistics when demand=supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Profit Effici of A-FL Profit Effici
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 29,463 96.92% 0 29,463 96.92%
1 29,267 96.27% 1 29,280 96.32%
2 29,560 97.24% 2 29,155 95.91%
3 29,575 97.29% 3 29,283 96.33%
4 29,446 96.86% 4 29,136 95.84%
5 29,103 95.73% 5 28,781 94.67%
6 29,086 95.68% 6 28,332 93.20%
7 29,028 95.49% 7 27,510 90.49%
8 28,449 93.58% 8 26,045 85.67%
Table 3.6: Efficiency statistics when demand<supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Profit Effici of A-FL Profit Effici
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 31,972 94.04% 0 31,972 94.04%
1 32,592 95.86% 1 31,776 93.46%
2 32,971 96.97% 2 31,751 93.39%
3 33,071 97.11% 3 32,140 94.53%
4 32,994 97.04% 4 32,020 94.18%
5 32,909 96.79% 5 32,201 94.71%
6 32,899 96.76% 6 32,081 94.36%
7 32,941 96.89% 7 31,971 94.03%
8 32,860 96.65% 8 30,843 90.71%
9 29,454 86.63%
10 28,267 83.14%
3.5 Related Work
There are a number of strands of work that are related to what we have described in this
chapter. Firstly, the work on bidding strategies for various forms of auctions. Secondly,
the work on using fuzzy techniques to manage an agent’s interactions (see Section 2.2.5
for the discussion of bilateral negotiations). Finally, alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for
coping with the uncertainties in bidding.
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Table 3.7: Efficiency statistics when demand>supply.
Number Number
of A-FL Profit Effici of A-FL Profit Effici
b-agent -ency s-agent -ency
0 31,444 86.86% 0 31,444 86.86%
1 31,504 87.03% 1 31,345 86.59%
2 31,480 86.96% 2 31,334 86.56%
3 31,448 86.87% 3 31,285 86.42%
4 31,448 86.87% 4 31,195 86.17%
5 31,316 86.51% 5 31,045 85.76%
6 31,029 85.72% 6 30,808 85.10%
7 30,998 85.63% 7 30,487 84.22%
8 30,961 85.53% 8 29,041 80.22%
9 30,598 84.52%
10 30,332 83.79%
Non-cooperative game theory is an important tool for analysing strategic interactions
between agents [Kreps, 1990]. However, one of its weaknesses is that the theory is only
suitable for highly stylised, simple settings [Jennings et al., 2001], thus a clear game-
theoretic solution to the CDA problem is not possible. The Recursive Modelling Method
[Vidal and Durfee, 1996] has been proposed as an approach for an agent to reason about
other agents and generate an appropriate strategy for negotiation. However, in most prac-
tical cases, the agent can only build finite nesting models due to the limitation of acquiring
knowledge. Thus with this approach, not all the information in the recursive model may
be relevant to the agent and it is possible that little or no information may be available for
the agent to use. Park, Durfee and Birmingham [Park et al., 1999] propose the adaptive
agent bidding strategy (called the p-strategy) based on stochastic modelling for a CDA.
The idea of the p-strategy is to model the auction process using a Markov Chain (MC).
However, in many cases, it is hard to obtain the probability values required for the MC
model, such as the transition probabilities and the probabilities of success and failure for
particular trading actions. Moreover, the computation involved in this approach is large.
Badea [Badea, 2000] applied Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) to induce trading rules
for a CDA. He first identified buy (sell) opportunities from historical market data. Then,
these buy (sell) opportunities are input as examples to an ILP learner to produce under-
standable rules. However, this learning strategy relies heavily on historical data which is
often not available in the contexts we consider.
Finally, we consider the alternatives to fuzzy reasoning for handling uncertainty in
agent interactions (see [Luo et al., 2001] for a comprehensive survey about handling un-
certainty in agent systems). As stated, we chose fuzzy logic based methods because
they have proven to be a practicable solution in solving decision making problems under
uncertainty (e.g., [Fraichard and Garnier, 2001, Yao and Yao, 2001, Tan and Tang, 2001,
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Mohammadi et al., 2000]). Fuzzy rules are the most visible manifestation of this ap-
proach and have been successfully used in industrial applications, manufacturing, pro-
cess control, automotive control, and financial trading [Yen, 1999]. There are, however,
alternative techniques for handling uncertainties. For example, the possibility based ap-
proach [Gime´nez-Funes et al., 1998, Matos and Sierra, 1998] has been used to perform
multi-agent reasoning under uncertainty for bilateral negotiation. In this work, uncer-
tainties due to the lack of knowledge about other agents’ behaviours are modelled by
possibility distributions. Based on information from a case base of previous negotiation
behaviours, the possibility distributions are generated by choosing the most similar situ-
ation to the current context and the most similar price from the case base. Since this
approach relies on a case base, it is unclear what would happen if no highly similar
situations were available. Moreover, even if a similar case exists, it is possible that the
strategy used successfully in that situation does not work in the current environment due
to the variety of competitors. The Bayesian learning method [Zeng and Sycara, 1998] has
also been used to explicitly model multi-issue negotiation in a sequential decision making
model. In this work, a Bayesian network is used to update the knowledge and belief each
agent has about the environment and other agents, and offers and counter-offers between
agents during bilateral negotiations are generated based on Bayesian probabilities. How-
ever, this method is inappropriate in our context because assigning prior probabilities of
a bid (ask) being accepted is difficult given the dynamism and uncertainty of the CDA
context.
3.6 Summary
This chapter developed new algorithms that guide an agent’s buying and selling beha-
viour in a CDA. The FL-strategy uses heuristic fuzzy rules and a fuzzy reasoning mech-
anism to decide what bids or asks to place. We then extended this strategy so that the
agent could adapt its bidding behaviour to its prevailing market context. In both cases
we benchmarked the performance of our algorithm against the most prominent alternat-
ives available in the literature. This evaluation showed the superior performance of our
method. This result is especially promising since the benchmark strategies have been
shown to outperform human bidders in experimental settings [Kephart, 2002]. Speak-
ing more generally, we also believe that the development of efficient and practicable al-
gorithms for bidding behaviour increase the opportunities of using CDAs as the auction
protocol for on-line marketplaces. We, therefore, view our contribution as an important
step in this direction.
In more detail, the experiments in Section 3.3.2 show how to select the appropriate
risk attitude for an agent in different situations. The result is consistent with our conjec-
ture: if supply (demand) quantity is greater than demand (supply) quantity, an s-agent
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(b-agent) with an averse attitude towards risk can make more profit. This is also con-
sistent with our discussions of the risk attitude in Section 1.2. Based on this selection
principle, the experiment in Section 3.3.3 shows that the FL-strategy outperforms some
of the most commonly used bidding strategies in a range of situations. Since agents often
have no prior knowledge of the relation between supply and demand, it is not always
possible to tell in advance what kind of attitude an agent should have. Thus adaptive FL-
agents are introduced (recall that we discussed adaptation in Section 3.3.3) which can
tailor their strategy to the supply (demand) of the market. Through the experiments in
Section 3.4.1, we find that the learning rate which is adjusted in small steps behaves best
in an environment in which the supply and demand do not change abruptly. The exper-
iments in Section 3.4.2 show that A-FL-agents always outperform other benchmarking
strategy agents in various situations. The transaction price distribution of agents using
different strategies shows that an A-FL-agent always sells (buys) goods at higher (lower)
prices than agents using other strategies. Finally, in Section 3.4.3 we investigate to what
extent the behaviour of A-FL-agents and the efficiency of the CDA market are affected
by the increasing use of A-FL-agents. This investigation reveals that the profit of an indi-
vidual A-FL-agent decreases at first and then increases steadily. We also show that with
an increase in the number of A-FL-agents, the efficiency of the market is not significantly
affected.
As well as being effective, we believe the FL strategy is practical for building autonom-
ous agents for CDAs. The strategy we employ is intuitive and its embodiment in fuzzy
rules means that it should be readily comprehensible to the agent’s owner (as have other
similar applications of fuzzy rules [Sosnowski, 2000, Yam and Koczy, 2000]). Moreover,
the information required by the strategy can be readily obtained by monitoring market
activities, such as the outstanding ask, the outstanding bid, and the accepted bids or asks
in past transactions. In particular, this procedure does not require any information of the
cost or valuation of other agents (cf. some of the approaches discussed in Section 3.2).
Having shown that agents can be developed for a particular auction setting, we now
turn to the more complex problem of an agent bidding across multiple, concurrent auc-
tions. However, this CDA work brings forward a number of important intuitions and
insights (as well as specific technologies) to the multiple auction setting. Firstly, and
most directly, the idea of using a reference price and of fuzzifying the relation with this
reference price is used in the entertainment auctions of the trading agent competition
(which are a CDA). Secondly, the idea of exploiting fuzzy reasoning techniques is also
adopted in the hotel auctions of the competition, where there is a need for an efficient
reasoning procedure. Finally, there is the importance of adapting bidding behaviour to
the prevailing context in order to cope with dynamics and unpredictability.
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Chapter 4
An Adaptive Trading Agent for
Multiple Interrelated Auctions
Given the potential and the importance of using agents in on-line auction settings, there
has been considered research endeavour in developing bidding strategies for different
types of agents in different types of auctions (see Sections 3.5 and 2.2.5 for more details).
Therefore, in order to develop a means of comparing and evaluating this work, it was de-
cided to establish an International Trading Agent Competition (TAC) (similar in spirit to
other initiatives such as RoboCup,1 RoboCupRescue2 and the Planning competition3). In
this competition, software agents compete against one another in 28 simultaneous auc-
tions in order to procure travel packages (flights, hotels and entertainment) for a number
of customers (see Section 4.1 for more details of the roles).
The TAC has been set up so that there is no optimal bidding strategy that is guar-
anteed to always win. This is because an agent’s decision making in the TAC involves
uncertainty caused by the random features of the game, the opponents’ strategies and the
particular combination of opponents. Against this background, this chapter reports upon
the design and implementation of our particular trading agent (called SouthamptonTAC)
which participated in both the competition in 2001 (TAC-01) and in 2002 (TAC-02).
SouthamptonTAC was one of the most successful agents in both competitions (see
Section 4.3) and this chapter details its design and implementation and evaluates when
and why it is successful. In more detail, SouthamptonTAC is an adaptive agent that var-
ies its bidding strategy according to its perception of the prevailing market conditions.
Building upon the success of the FL strategy in Chapter 4, it uses fuzzy reasoning tech-
niques to predict closing prices of the auctions, fuzzy recognition to assess the degree
1An international project that uses soccer as a central topic, see http://www.robocup.org for more details.
2RoboCupRescue is a new research domain which targets search and rescue in large scale disasters
(such as earthquakes), see http://www.r.cs.kobe-u.ac.jp/robocup-rescue/index.html for more details.
3The International Planning Competition aims to provide a forum for empirical comparison of planning
systems, see http://www.dur.ac.uk/d.p.long/competition.html for more details.
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of competitiveness in the prevailing market context, and fuzzy set technique to control
bidding behaviour.
This work advances the state of the art in two main ways. In terms of the TAC itself,
we developed novel reasoning models and prediction methods that enable an agent to
bid across multiple heterogeneous auctions that have inter-dependencies. Through the
competition and our systematic evaluation this reasoning mechanism is shown to be both
highly effective and practical (it has to operate in a time-constrained environment and has
to cope with the uncertainty of operating over the Internet with its concomitant latency
problems). In more general terms, we believe that a number of the technologies we
developed can be used in other complex auction settings and our insights and experiences
about building a successful trading agent will also transfer (see the discussion in Section
4.5 for more details). SouthamptonTAC addresses all the common issues discussed in
Section 1.2: price prediction (Section 4.2.7), adaptation (Section 4.2.8), flexible bidding
(Section 4.2.6), risk attitude adjusting (Section 4.2.8), and trade-off attributes (Section
4.2.5).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 describes the trad-
ing agent competition. Section 4.2 presents the details of the SouthamptonTAC agent.
Section 4.3 evaluates the performance of SouthamptonTAC. Section 4.4 discusses the
related work. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1 The Trading Agent Competition
TAC-01 and TAC-02 involved 27 and 26 agents respectively, developed by universities
and research labs from around the world [Wellman et al., 2002, Greenwald, 2002]. In
each TAC trading game, there are 8 software agents (entrants to the competition) that
compete against each other in a variety of auctions to assemble travel packages for their
individual customers according to their preferences for the trip.4 A valid travel pack-
age for an individual customer consists of (i) a round trip flight during a 5-day period
(between TACtown and Tampa) and (ii) a stay at the same hotel5 for every night between
their arrival and departure dates. Moreover, arranging appropriate entertainment events
during the trip increases the utility for the customers. The objective of each agent is to
maximise the total satisfaction of its 8 customers (i.e., the sum of the customers’ utilit-
ies). Customers have individual preferences over which days they want to be in Tampa,
the type of hotel they stay in, and which entertainment they want to attend. This data is
randomly generated by the TAC server in each game (see Table 4.1 for an example).
4These packages are assembled by the agent bidding in a number of auctions in which the other bidders
are other competition entrants.
5Customers are not allowed to change their hotels during the stay.
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Table 4.1: SouthamptonTAC’s customer preferences for game tac-5722.
PAD and PDD stand for preferred arrival and preferred departure date. HV stands for the
reservation value of staying in the Tampa Tower hotel, and WV, PV and MV stand for the utility
associated with attending Alligator Wrestling, the Amusement Park and the Museum.
Customer PAD PDD HV WV PV MV
1 Day 3 Day 5 80 178 183 136
2 Day 3 Day 4 129 165 134 36
3 Day 1 Day 3 104 131 110 109
4 Day 4 Day 5 146 27 22 28
5 Day 3 Day 4 80 126 33 81
6 Day 2 Day 5 136 191 143 24
7 Day 3 Day 4 92 180 63 154
8 Day 1 Day 4 148 31 7 177
Each agent communicates with the TAC server through a TCP-based agent program-
ming interface in order to get current market information and to place its bids. An indi-
vidual game lasts 12 minutes and involves 28 auctions. Each of the three good types are
traded in an auction with different rules:6
• Flights. TACAIR is the only airline selling flights (placing asks). Tickets for these
flights are unlimited and are sold in single seller auctions. There are 8 such auc-
tions (TACtown to Tampa (day 1 to 4) and back (day 2 to 5)). Flight ask prices
update randomly, every 24 to 32 seconds, by a value drawn from a range determ-
ined by the elapsed auction time and a randomly drawn value. Flight auctions clear
continuously during the game. Thus, any buy bid an agent makes that is not less
than the current ask price will match immediately at the ask price. Those bids not
matching immediately remain in the auction as standing bids.
• Hotels. There are two hotels: Tampa Towers (T) and Shoreline Shanties (S). T
is nicer than S. Hotel rooms are traded in 16th price multi-unit English auctions7.
Overall, there are 8 hotel auctions (for each combination of hotel and night apart
from the last one), that close randomly one by one at the end of every minute after
the 4th. A hotel auction clears and matches bids when it closes (i.e., 16 rooms are
sold at the 16th highest price). While a given auction is open, its ask price is the
current 16th highest price and this price is updated immediately in response to new
bids. The price of other bids, such as the highest bid, is not known by agents. No
withdrawal of hotel bids is allowed. Suppose the current ask price is a, when an
agent submits a new bid, two conditions must be satisfied for it to be accepted: (i)
it must offer to buy at least one unit at a price of a+1 or greater; (ii) if the agent’s
current bid would have resulted in the purchase of q units in the current state, the
new bid must offer to buy at least q units at a+1 or greater.
6For full details, see http://www.sics.se/tac.
7This differs from a standard English auction where 16 units of goods are sold at the 16th highest price
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Table 4.2: Market state of all auctions in game tac-5722.
The remaining time in the game is 6 minutes 42 seconds.
Auction Bid Quote Ask Quote Status
Alligator Wrestling on day 1 1.1 86 running
Alligator Wrestling on day 2 70 150 running
Alligator Wrestling on day 3 65 139.38 running
Alligator Wrestling on day 4 66 107.51 running
Amusement Park on day 1 66 70 running
Amusement Park on day 2 66 90 running
Amusement Park on day 3 84 119 running
Amusement Park on day 4 50 89.74 running
Museum on day 1 50 99 running
Museum on day 2 50 146.73 running
Museum on day 3 50 175 running
Museum on day 4 50 80 running
Inflight day 1 – 328 running
Inflight day 2 – 337 running
Inflight day 3 – 381 running
Inflight day 4 – 299 running
Outflight day 2 – 400 running
Outflight day 3 – 370 running
Outflight day 4 – 434 running
Outflight day 5 – 270 running
Tampa Towers Hotel day 1 0 22.35 closed
Tampa Towers Hotel day 2 0 59.49 running
Tampa Towers Hotel day 3 0 33.60 running
Tampa Towers Hotel day 4 101 101.5 running
Shoreline Shanty day 1 0 0 running
Shoreline Shanty day 2 33 42 running
Shoreline Shanty day 3 22.2 29 running
Shoreline Shanty day 4 1 1 closed
• Entertainment. Each agent is randomly endowed with 12 entertainment tickets at
the beginning of the game. All agents can trade their tickets in CDAs. Overall,
there are 12 CDAs (for each kind of entertainment for each of days 1 to 4). Bids
match at the price of the standing bid in the CDA. An entertainment package is
feasible if none of the tickets are for events on the same day and all the tickets
coincide with the nights the customer is in town. No additional utility is obtained
for a customer attending the same type of entertainment more than once during the
trip.
By means of illustration, Table 4.2 gives the market running state of all the auctions
at a single moment in time of the game in tac-5722. A customer’s utility from a valid
travel and entertainment package8 is given by:
Utility = 1000−TravelPenalty+HotelBonus+FunBonus,
8An invalid travel package receives zero utility.
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Table 4.3: SouthamptonTAC’s customer allocation from game tac-5722.
P, M, W stand for Alligator Wrestling, Amusement Park and Museum and the following number
indicates the date of the entertainment.
Customer AD DD Hotel Entertainment Utility
1 Day 3 Day 5 S P3, M4 1319
2 Day 3 Day 4 T P3 1263
3 Day 1 Day 3 T W2, M1 1344
4 Day 4 Day 5 S None 1000
5 Day 3 Day 4 T W3 1206
6 Day 2 Day 5 S W4, P2 1334
7 Day 3 Day 5 S W3, M4 1234
8 Day 1 Day 4 T M1 1325
Total utility: 10025
where TravelPenalty = 100∗ (|AD−PAD|+ |DD−PDD|) (here AD and DD are the cus-
tomer’s actual arrival and departure dates), HotelBonus is the bonus if the customer stays
in T, and FunBonus is the sum of the reservation values of all the entertainment a cus-
tomer receives. To illustrate this, the allocations and scores for SouthamptonTAC, given
the preferences in Table 4.1, are shown in Table 4.3. For example, the utility of customer
3 is obtained by the following:
TravelPenalty = 100∗ (|AD−PAD|+ |DD−PDD|) = 0,
HotelBonus = 104,
FunBonus = 131+0+109 = 240,
Utility = 1000−0+104+240 = 1344.
At the end of each game, the TAC scorer (on the TAC server) allocates the agent’s
travel goods to its individual customers optimally. The value for a particular allocation
is the sum of the individual customer utilities (e.g. 10025). The agent’s final score is
then the value of this allocation minus the cost of procuring the goods. For example, the
agent’s cost of obtaining the goods in game tac-5722 is shown in Table 4.4. Thus the
score in this game is 10025−5767.30 = 4257.70.
Designing a bidding strategy for the TAC auction context is a challenging problem.
• There are inter-dependencies between auctions. That is, what goods to buy and
how many to buy in one auction are relative to the progress of other auctions.
These inter-dependencies exist between different kinds of auctions. For example,
flights will be useless if the hotel rooms are not available and if no customer stays
in Tampa on a particular day, the entertainment ticket on that day will be useless.
The inter-dependence also exists between different dates within the same kind of
auction. For example, customers must stay in the same hotel during their stay.
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Table 4.4: Expenditure for SouthamptonTAC in tac-5722.
A negative number means the agent obtains the indicated amount of utility by selling the good.
Good Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Total
1 at 108.9
AlligatorWrestling 0 1 at 91.9 1 at 100.5 1 at 120.5 0 421.80
-2 at 80
AmusementPark 0
-1 at 139.5 0 0 0 -299.5
Museum -1 at 89 0 0 0 0 -89
1 at 282 3 at 341
Inflight 1 at 340 1 at 314 1 at 381 1 at 277 0 2617
2 at 345 2 at 272
Outflight 0 0 1 at 390 1 at 415 1 at 273 2585
TampaTowers Hotel 2 at 22.35 2 at 120 3 at 33.6 0 0 385.5
ShorelineShanty Hotel 4 at 1 1 at 47.5 3 at 30 5 at 1 0 146.5
Total cost: 5767.3
Thus if a customer stays in T1,9 the agent will also need to bid in the auctions of
other days for T. Finally, inter-dependencies exist between the auctions of the same
day, same kind counterpart auctions.10 For example, if the price of T1 is high, the
customer can change to S1.
• The bidding involves uncertainty. For example, flight prices start randomly and
change continuously in a random fashion and one randomly selected hotel auction
closes from the 4th to 11th minute.
• The bidding involves trade-offs. For example, in flight auctions, if an agent buys
all the flight tickets very early, it may fail to buy the necessary hotel rooms that the
flights require, while the flight prices may be quite high if it buys the flights later.
4.2 SouthamptonTAC
Our agent design for TAC-01 and TAC-02 is broadly similar. However we describe in
this section SouthamptonTAC-02 since this is the agent built upon our experiences in
TAC-01. The main differences between the two are as follows:
• SouthamptonTAC-02 is an adaptive agent that varies its bidding strategy according
to its perception of the prevailing market conditions (see Section 4.2.3 for details).
SouthamptonTAC-01 had a fixed strategy that it used in all contexts.
• SouthamptonTAC-02 does hotel closing price prediction differently. Although they
both use the same basic technique, SouthamptonTAC-02 has two rule bases for
predicting prices when the counterpart auction has closed (one for when it has
just closed and one for when it has been closed for a longer period of time).
9We will use the abbreviation Tn and Sn (1 ≤ n ≤ 4) for staying in the indicated hotel on a particular
day n.
10For the auction of the same day, T and S are called their counterpart auctions. For example, the
counterpart auction of T1 is S1 and the counterpart of S1 is T1.
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SouthamptonTAC-01 only had one such rule base (see Section 4.2.7 for more de-
tails).
We now deal, in turn, with each of the main components of our agent.
4.2.1 Classifying TAC Environments
Our post hoc analysis of the TAC-01 [He and Jennings, 2002, He and Jennings, 2003]
shows that an agent’s performance depends heavily on the risk attitude of its opponents.
Here a risk-averse agent is one that buys a small number of flight tickets at the beginning
of the game and that bids for hotels according to the situation as the game progresses.
This kind of agent is highly flexible and copes well when there is a significant degree
of competition and the hotel prices are high (see below). In contrast, a risk-seeking
agent buys a large number of flight tickets at the beginning of the game and seldomly
changes the travel plan of its customers during the game. This kind of agent does well in
environments in which hotels are cheap. For example, when a hotel price goes up sharply,
a risk-averse agent would stop bidding on that hotel (changing the stay to a counterpart
hotel or reducing the trip period) (see Section 4.3.2). In contrast, a risk seeking agent
will insist on bidding for that hotel, although the price is very high. In so doing it hopes
that the price will eventually stabilise (hence the risk). The consequence of this variety
is that for broadly the same situation, different agents can bring about widely varying
final prices. Based on the analysis reported in [He and Jennings, 2002], we identify the
following types of TAC environment:
• Competitive environments where the prices of the hotels are (very) high. This is
caused by (a) the high bid prices that agents place; (b) the fact that some agents
insist on bidding for hotels even when their ask price becomes high; and (c) the fact
that some agents increase their bids sharply rather than gradually. For example, in
game 4594, the prices of T (S) are (in the increasing order of day): 5 (6), 238
(557), 155 (102) and 40 (11). For most customers in this game, it is beneficial for
an agent to reduce the stay to a single day (either day 1 or day 4). To achieve this,
however, the agent needs to be flexible. Specifically, it cannot buy all the flights
at the very beginning of the game, otherwise, when the hotel prices rise to high
values, it has to give up the travel package for some customers or pay these high
prices for hotels. Being predictive is also important. By predicting the price of the
hotels, the agent can make alternative plans to cope with the very high prices.
• Non-competitive environments where there is very little competition for hotels and
an agent can obtain the rooms it wants at low prices. For example, in game 6341,
there is very little competition and the closing prices for T (S) are 7 (12), 92 (27),
70 (53) and 62 (7). In this situation, the best strategy is to buy all flights earlier;
since the agents can always get the hotels they want.
76
• Semi-competitive environments where prices are medium. There is competition,
but it is not very severe. For example, in game 444, the clearing prices for T (S)
are 5 (2), 128 (71), 128 (60) and 116 (3).
4.2.2 The Agent Architecture
Given the uncertainty and unpredictability involved in the TAC, it is desirable for the
agents to be responsive to their prevailing situation during the course of bidding. To this
end, Figure 4.1 overviews the SouthamptonTAC agent. The time period from when the
agent polls the TAC server to get the most up to date asks/bids of all auctions to when
it submits its bids to the TAC server is called a round. SouthamptonTAC connects to
the server in a continuous series of such rounds (the length of a round depends on the
location of the TAC server as well as the server load, but it typically varies between 2
and 30 seconds). In each round, the agent first processes this ask or bid information
in Bids Preprocessor to get the prices of different goods, number of goods it actually
owns and may possibly own (only for hotel rooms) and its current active bids. Then,
Hotel Price Predictor is used to predict the likely clearing price of each hotel auction (see
Section 4.2.7). All of this information is then input to the Allocator which calculates the
optimal distribution of goods to customers given the current situation (see Section 4.2.4
for more details). Given this assignment, the agent then determines its subsequent bid-
ding actions. Flight Categoriser uses updated flight prices to classify each flight auction
according to its expected change of price and takes the output of Allocator to determine
how many trips to bid for (see Section 4.2.5). For example, it may delay buying the flight
tickets if it believes the price change will be small, so that it has flexibility in choosing the
hotel rooms. Hotel Bid Adjustor takes the Allocator’s output, the agent’s current active
bids, the hotel auction’s ask prices, as well as the predicted prices and decides whether to
increase the price of its bids or to “withdraw” (see Section 4.2.7) the current bids and turn
to other auctions (see Section 4.2.7). Entertainment Bid Processor determines the type
and the amount of entertainment tickets to bid for (see Section 4.2.6). Where Southamp-
tonTAC differs from its predecessor is in having the Environment Sensor in the architec-
ture. This component (described in more detail in Section 4.2.3) aims to determine what
type of environment the agent is presently situated in (as detailed in Section 4.2.1). The
reason for doing this is so that the agent can adapt its bidding strategy accordingly (see
Section 4.2.8).
Among these components, the most important ones are the Environment Sensor, Hotel
Price Predictor, and Allocator. The Environment Sensor aims to determine the degree of
competitiveness in the environment both before a game starts and during the course of a
game. It does this because the agent will use different bidding strategies in the different
situations. The Hotel Price Predictor is important because it lets the agent forward plan
about how best to draw up travel plans for the customers. The Allocator is important
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the SouthamptonTAC agent.
because it can allocate the goods the agent has bought to its customers in an optimal way
and because it highlights what goods still need to be bought.
SouthamptonTAC divides a game into three stages: the probing stage (up to minute
4), the decisive stage (from minutes 5 to 11) and the finalisation stage (minute 12). Hotel
auctions are the most uncertain part of the game. This uncertainty stems both from the
random nature of the customers’ preferences and from the way opponents deal with their
hotel bidding. Nevertheless, a rational agent should have submitted all its hotel bids be-
fore the end of the 4th minute (otherwise a hotel auction may close and the agent will
miss out on those rooms). Thus, during the first 4 minutes the demand of the hotel market
is unpredictable. Given this, SouthamptonTAC uses the probing stage to buy some flights
which it has a high possibility of needing, to place buy and sell bids in the entertainment
auctions, and to place initial hotel bids. The agent bids for not only what it needs, but also
for extra rooms in the hotels with low ask prices (since the additional outlay is comparat-
ively small and gives the agent greater flexibility). As the decisive stage progresses, the
demand of the various auctions becomes clearer and rooms are actually allocated which
means the agent can more accurately decide which hotels to go for. The finalisation stage
represents the agent’s last chance to transact on entertainment tickets and to buy any re-
maining flights that are needed. There is no longer any uncertainty in this stage and so
Allocator can find the optimal allocation and the appropriate bids are generated.
4.2.3 TAC Environment Recognition
We treat the environment recognition problem as one of fuzzy pattern recognition since
it is impossible to precisely determine the type while the game is running. To this end,
we apply the maximum similarity principle [Pedrycz, 1990] in the Environment Sensor
component of the agent architecture. This recognition process is used in two cases: be-
fore a game starts and during a game. Before a game starts, the agent calculates the
average hotel closing prices of the previous 10 games11 from the price history and uses
11We chose ten (based on experience of playing the game) as a suitable indicator that is sufficiently stable
to not be influenced by atypical game outcomes, but sufficiently adaptive to respond to genuine changes in
the patterns of games.
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the maximum average price as a reference price to classify the environment in a given
game. We use the maximum price in this fashion since if one price is high it is likely that
others will also be high and so the environment is competitive (mutatis mutandis when
the reference price is low or medium). During a game, the agent continuously monitors
the current hotel prices and records the current maximum price to see if the environment
type changes from its initial prediction. More formally, let Ti (Si) represent T (S) on day
i, and PTi (PSi) represent the current price if the agent is monitoring a running auction or
the average history price if it is making its initial assessment of the environment of Ti
(Si). Suppose the prices of T1, · · · , T4, S1, · · · , S4, are PT1 , · · · , PT4 , PS1 , · · · , PS4 . Then,
Pmax (the maximum hotel price) is simply:
Pmax = max(PT1,PT2,PT3,PT4,PS1,PS2,PS3 ,PS4).
Let Ec, Es, and En correspond to the fuzzy sets that represent competitive, semi-
competitive and non-competitive environments respectively (see Figure 4.2). Now the
type of environment (ε) can be determined by ascertaining which of the fuzzy sets the
reference price has the strongest membership to. Thus if:
Ex(Pmax) = argmax{Ec(Pmax),Es(Pmax),En(Pmax)},
then ε is of environment type Ex, where x ∈ {c,s,n} and Ec(x), Es(x), and En(x) are the
similarity functions for the fuzzy sets Ec, Es, and En. These similarity functions (denoted
µ) capture how much the hotel price belongs to each of the different environments and
they are defined as follows:
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Figure 4.2: Fuzzy sets of the three environment types.
µEN(x) =


1 x < 50,
0 x > 120,
120−x
70 50 ≤ x ≤ 120.
µES(x) =


1 100 < x < 150,
0 x > 200 or x < 50,
x−50
50 50 ≤ x ≤ 100,
200−x
50 150 ≤ x ≤ 200.
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µEC(x) =


1 x > 200,
0 x < 150,
x−150
50 150≤ x ≤ 200.
4.2.4 Allocator
The Allocator component of our agent operates in two different modes: Allocator-1 deals
with the allocation of available and unavailable goods and outputs what flights and hotels
to buy during the first 11 minutes of a game and Allocator-2 does the same for flights and
entertainment tickets in the final minute when the hotel situation is finalised. By means
of illustration, a sample output from the Allocator is:
buy inflight: (1, 3, 2, 2) buy outflight: (0, 2, 3, 3)
buy good hotel: (0, 3, 3, 3) buy bad hotel: (1, 1, 1, 0)
customer 1: (4, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0) customer 2: (1, 4, 0, 3, 2, 1)
customer 3: (3, 5, 1, 3, 0, 0) customer 4: (3, 4, 1, 3, 0, 0)
customer 5: (4, 5, 1, 0, 0, 0) customer 6: (2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0)
customer 7: (2, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0) customer 8: (2, 4, 1, 3, 2, 0)
This indicates the agent needs to buy 1 inflight ticket on day 1, 3 on day 2 and 2 on days 3
and 4; buy 2 outflight tickets on day 3, and 3 on days 4 and 5; that good hotels are needed
for day 2 (3 rooms), day 3 (3 rooms) and day 4 (3 rooms); that bad hotels are needed for
day 1 (1 room), day 2 (1 room) and day 3 (1 room); and that the plans for the individual
customers are currently as follows: customer 1 goes on day 4, returns on day 5 and will
stay in the good hotel (1 in third element of tuple), customer 2 will go on day 1, return
on day 4, stay in the bad hotel (0 in third element of tuple), go to wrestling on day 3, the
amusement park on day 2 and the museum on day 1; and so on for each of the remaining
customers.
Both Allocator-1 and Allocator-2 use the linear programming package LPsolver12 to
generate their solutions. The solution found is optimal and never took more than 1 second
to generate on a 1.33 GHz Pentium during all games played.
Dealing first with Allocator-1, in total this has 92 constraints and 272 variables.13 In
more detail, each customer can choose from inflight day (1 to 4) and outflight day (2
to 5) and hotel type (T or S). This means that in total there are 20 valid packages for
each customer (see Appendix A for more details). Given 8 customers, this leaves 160
combinations (160 variables in allocators). For each customer, the agent can choose one
from 12 entertainment tickets (3 types for 4 days). Thus there are 96 variables for 8
customers. Moreover, there are 8 variables to denote the number of flight tickets needed
for each flight auction and 8 variables to denote the hotel rooms needed for each hotel
12LPsolver is based on lp solve, a simplex-based code for linear and integer programming problems by
M. Berkelaar. The source is available at ftp://ftp.es.ele.tue.nl/pub/lp solve/lp solve.tar.gz.
13Our approach is based on that used in ATTac-2000 [Stone et al., 2001] but we improve upon their
method. We use only 92 constraints while ATTAC-2000 has 188 constraints. Thus our Allocator greatly
improves the speed of finding a solution.
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auction. Since from the 4th minute, one hotel auction closes, the number of variables de-
creases from 272 to 264 at the end of the 11th minute. The 92 constraints come from the
fact that: each customer only gets one valid package (8 constraints), flight tickets/hotel
rooms/entertainment tickets allocated must be less than the number the agent has or is go-
ing to buy (28 constraints), each customer can only use each type of entertainment ticket
once (24 constraints), and each customer must use its entertainment tickets between the
days he stays in TACtown (32 constraints).
The Allocator-2 deals with the allocation of available and unavailable goods and out-
puts what flights and entertainments to buy in the last minute (this solver has 276 vari-
ables and 92 constraints). The first 264 variables are the same as the above, except that
the last 12 variables denote the entertainment ticket numbers for each type each day (12
variables). The constraints are the same as those above.
4.2.5 Flight Auctions
The flight price is perturbed every 24 to 32 seconds by a value drawn uniformly from -10
to x(t). The final upper bound x (called the flight’s determinant factor) on perturbations
is a random variable chosen independently from [10,90] for each flight for each game.
The upper bound on perturbations at time t is a linear interpolation between 10 and the
determinant factor x:
x(t) = 10+ t× (x−10)
tmax
, (4.1)
where tmax is the time period of a game (720 seconds) and x is not known to the parti-
cipants. Figure 4.3 shows four different categories of flights in game tac2-7011 and leads
to a number of observations. Firstly, during the first 4 minutes of the game, the distri-
bution of the prices vary in a small range. This is because the current time is early and
time is the dominant factor determining the range of prices according to formula (4.1).
Secondly, the price changes increase or decrease gradually during the game since time
is continuously changing. Thirdly, at the end of each game, some flight prices are lower
than their initial price (Category 0), some rise slowly (Category 1), some rise quickly
(Category 2) and some rise very rapidly (Category 3). Here the differences are mainly
due to the different final bound values of x.
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Given these observations, we believe it is important to try and classify the various
flight auctions at run-time since this categorisation should lead to different bidding beha-
viour. To this end, our agent observes the changes in prices and puts each flight auction
into one of four categories:
F j = { f | f ′s determinant factor x ∈ [L j,U j]} ( j = 0,1,2,3), (4.2)
where f represents a flight auction: L j and U j represent the lower and upper limits of the
flight’s determinant factor respectively: when j = 0, L0 = 10 and U0 = 15; when j = 1,
L1 = 15 and U1 = 30; when j = 2, L2 = 30 and U2 = 60; and when j = 3, L3 = 60 and
U3 = 90.14 We found that although the increase or decrease is randomly drawn, if x is
small, the price does not rise quickly; conversely, if x is high, the price will rise rapidly.
The agent computes its increase or decrease so far and classifies each flight. We believe
it is unnecessary to find the precise x, because even though the increase or decrease is
randomly drawn, an x that is close to the real ‘x’ is sufficient to approximate the expected
range of change. This categorisation is computed as follows:
arg min
0≤ j≤3
∣∣∣∣∣1n
n
∑
i=1
δi−M j
∣∣∣∣∣ , (4.3)
where n is the number of times the price changed in the auction; δi is the ith price change;
and M j, called the centre of F j, is given by
M j =
1
U j−L j +1
( U j
∑
x=L j
(
1
n
n
∑
k=1
(x−10)tk
2tmax
))
, (4.4)
where tk is the time at which the kth price change is quoted and tmax is the time period of
a game (720 seconds).
Formula (4.3) computes the average price change of the flight and classifies it into the
closest category. However, since the price change δ is drawn from a range, whenever δ is
larger than the upper limit of the range, the flight must belong to a category with a bigger
x. For each F j, the upper limit of the range that random changes are drawn from rises
with time. Thus, U j = guj(t) where guj(t) is the upper limit of the determinant factor of
F j at time t. Then, suppose a flight k is currently categorised as F j and the current price
change is δ, if δ > guj(t) and δ ≤ guj+1(t), then flight k should be reclassified as F j+1.
The flight categorisation is updated in each round. Clearly, as the game progresses the
categorisation becomes more accurate (see Section 4.3.3). However, for most flights the
prices rise during the game. However, if the agent buys flight tickets very early, it may
14These values were first picked based on our experience with the games. Then, they were tested by a
large number of games and shown to produce reasonable classifications.
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fail to buy the necessary hotel rooms (leading to some invalid travel packages). Thus,
what we need is a good trade-off (recall the importance of trade-offs noted in Section 1.2)
between buying flights earlier at lower prices and buying them later to ensure they fit with
the hotels that have been bought. To achieve this, our agent first needs to decide what type
of TAC environment it is situated in (see Section 4.2.3). For non-competitive games, the
agent will buy all the flight tickets once when the game starts. For competitive or semi-
competitive environments, the agent buys a number of flight tickets at the beginning of
the game (8-10 for competitive and 12-14 for semi-competitive games) because it knows
it will need some flights. Then, when and how many of the remaining ones to buy of a
particular flight is based on the flight categorisation. This delay in buying flight tickets
ensures there is a degree of flexibility. Then, whenever an F3 auction is sensed, the agent
will buy flights immediately. However, for an F0 auction, it will buy the tickets in the
last minute since the price at the end of the game will be similar or less than the initial
price. An F1 flight will be bought when the corresponding hotel rooms are guaranteed
or the demand of the hotels involved with the flight is not very high. An F2 flight is
bought immediately after the probing stage. This is because during the probing stage
the expected price change is quite small (recall guj(t) rises with time). However after the
probing stage, the increase is more significant (see discussion in Section 4.2.8 for the
rationale).
4.2.6 Entertainment Auctions
The entertainment CDAs involve two kinds of bids: buys and sells. That is, an agent
can place both bids to buy and asks to sell. It determines the amount of bids or asks
to place as well as the price of bids or asks. The Entertainment Bid Processor handles
entertainment bidding. A buy (sell) bid will immediately match the lowest price standing
sell (highest price standing buy) bid that has a price at or below (above) the price of the
buy (sell) bid. Bids match at the price of the standing bid in the auction.
• Number of buy bids. Place buy bids for a particular customer so that the alloca-
tion of the entertainment tickets for that customer is maximally satisfactory. For
example, if a customer will stay for one day, the agent will buy the tickets with
the highest preference value for that day; if the customer stays for two days, buy
tickets with the two highest preference values for each day, and so on. Here the
agent places extra bids to increase the chance of obtaining a ticket. Whenever an
agent is successful in buying a particular ticket for a given day, it withdraws its buy
bids for that entertainment on the other days.
• Buy bid reservation price. Let vi, j be the preference valuation of customer i for
entertainment j. The agent only buys a good if it can make a profit from it, i.e., vi, j
must be larger than the price of buying that good. Thus, the buy bid reservation
price bid is given by: bid = vi, j−ψ(t) (ψ(t)> 0), where ψ(t) is the profit the agent
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can obtain if the good is transacted at bid. Here ψ(t) is a decreasing function with
time meaning that the later it is, the lower the profit the agent is willing to accept.
• Number of sell bids. Sell any unallocated entertainment tickets15 and any allocated
tickets that the agent can get more profit for by selling rather than by allocating to
a customer.
• Sell bid reservation price. The reservation price ask is given by ask = cost +φ(t)
(φ(t) > 0), where φ(t) is a decreasing function of time and cost is the preference
value for an allocated ticket and a predefined value for unallocated ones. The latter
value varies according to the agent’s context. If it has n unallocated tickets, the cost
will be at descending prices (from 80 to 50) meaning that the more goods the agent
has, the quicker it wants to sell them (thus, the sell price is lower). φ(t) decreases
with time meaning the later it is, the lower the price the agent is willing to sell the
good for (since selling for a small profit is better than not selling at all).
SouthamptonTAC does not wait until the ask price decreases to or the bid price rises
to exactly its reservation buy or sell price. Rather, the agent continuously observes the
market and when it finds an ask or bid price very close to its reservation price it will
decrease or increase its ask or bid to match it. For example, if a bid is 79.5 and the ask
price of our agent is 80, it evaluates the bid and decides to decrease the ask to 79.5 so
as to accept the bid. This strategy is achieved using fuzzy sets (the idea comes from the
FL-strategy in Chapter 3). The strategy is simple but effective since it avoids missing
transactions where the bid and ask are quite close. Figure 4.4 shows the fuzzy sets used
to decide when to accept the current asks or bids, where θb and θs are the thresholds of
the degree that an agent would like to relax its constraints on buy or sell bids. Suppose
two fuzzy sets B and S are characterised by the membership function µB : X → [0,1] and
µS : Y → [0,1]. µB(x) and µS(y) are interpreted as the degree of membership of x, (i.e.,
current asks placed by sellers) in fuzzy set B for each x ∈ X and y, (i.e., current bids
placed by buyers) in fuzzy set S for each y ∈Y respectively. Formulae (4.5) and (4.6) are
the similarity membership functions for bids and asks.
µB(x) =


1 if x < br,
0 if x > b0,
b0−x
b0−br if br ≤ x ≤ b0;
(4.5)
µS(y) =


1 if y > ar,
0 if y < a0,
y−a0
ar−a0 if a0 ≤ y ≤ ar.
(4.6)
15Unallocated tickets are caused by having multiple tickets for the same event or the same day for a
given customer or by having no customer staying on the night of the entertainment.
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(a) Fuzzy set for a buyer agent                     (b) Fuzzy set for a seller agent  
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Figure 4.4: Fuzzy sets used in entertainment CDAs.
Here b0/a0 is the current highest bid/lowest ask; br/ar is the agent’s reservation price
and θb/θs is the agent’s threshold of accepting the ask/bid. The region with vertical lines
represents the original price acceptance range. Using fuzzy sets, the acceptance range
also includes the region with horizontal lines.
4.2.7 Hotel Auctions
Hotel auctions are the most important, uncertain and difficult part in TAC. Since cus-
tomers can have no entertainment and flights tickets are available throughout the game,
only hotel auctions are uncertain. Moreover, failure in a single hotel auction can cause
the failure of an entire travel package. To deal with this complexity, several strategies
are used: (i) fuzzy reasoning to predict the likely clearing prices (see Section 4.3.3 for
an evaluation of the prediction method);16 (ii) “withdraw” non-profitable hotel bids; and
(iii) reasoning to determine when to switch between bidding for the different hotels. Each
of them are dealt with in turn.
Fuzzy reasoning about hotel closing prices
According to the basic laws of supply and demand theory [Perloff, 1998], the higher
demand there is in a market, the higher the price of the goods. Thus the competition
among the agents on a particular hotel auction leads to a rise in the price of the hotels.
For example, T2 and T3 are in greatest demand, since staying in the good hotel gets the
higher utility and day 2 and day 3 are part of most customers’ stays. Therefore their prices
are always the highest. This information, as well as the price changes, are factored into
the agent’s reasoning about price prediction. The reasoning utilises fuzzy rules to predict
the clearing prices of hotels. The motivation for using fuzzy rules is as per Section 1.2.
Through observation, we find that the factors that effect the price of hotels are: the price
of the hotel (P), the price of the counterpart hotel (CP), the price change in the previous
minute (C) and the previous price change of the counterpart hotel (when it closed) (CC).
Figure 4.5 shows the relation between the closing of several hotels in game tac2-5960.
Here S3 closes first (at the fourth minute). Then the price for T3 rises very quickly
because S3’s closure means some agents fail to get S3 and so they have to bid in T3.
Usually, the price of S2 is high, but since S2 closes early, its price is relatively low. Also,
the rooms of day 2 have a close relationship with those of day 3 because many customers
stay for successive days. Thus, the price of T2 also rises quickly.
16Note that the same type of controller for the reasoning is used as was used in in Section 3.1.2.
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Figure 4.5: Hotel prices changes in game tac2-5960.
To capture reasoning of this kind, we use the Sugeno controller17 [Sugeno, 1985,
Zimmermann, 1996], since it is easy to use and has already been shown to be effective
(Chapter 3). In more detail, the fuzzy reasoning inference mechanism employed here
adheres to the following fuzzy reasoning pattern:
R1 : if x1 is A11 and · · · and xm is A1m then ∆1 = c1
also
R2 : if x2 is A21 and · · · and xm is A2m then ∆2 = c2
also
.
.
.
also
Rn : if x1 is An1 and · · · and xm is Anm then ∆n = cn
fact: x1 is x
′
1 and · · · and xm is x
′
m
consequence: ∆′
where A11, · · · , Anm are fuzzy sets, and ∆1, · · · , ∆n are variables indicating the predicted
price increase. The output of the individual rule is denoted as ∆i and ci∈{small, medium,
big, very-big} (i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}) are fuzzy parameters predefined by the designer.
The firing level αi of the rules Ri is computed by the Min operator. That is,
αi = min{Ai1(x′1), · · · ,Aim(x
′
m)}, (4.7)
where Ai1(x
′
1), · · · , Aim(x
′
m) are the membership functions of the corresponding fuzzy sets
Ai1 and Aim, respectively. According to the Sugeno controller’s definition, the crisp con-
trol action (i.e., the predicted increase of hotel closing price) of the rule base is obtained
by:
∆′ = ∑
n
i=1 αi∆i
∑ni=1 αi
. (4.8)
17The use of other fuzzy logic controllers, such as the conventional Mamdani controller
[Zimmermann, 1996] is also possible. However we chose Sugeno because it is shown to be effective
in the CDA (Chapter 3 and empirical results show that it is also effective in the TAC environment.
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When predicting the closing price of a hotel auction, three cases are considered:18 (i)
when the good and bad hotels are open; (ii) when the counterpart hotel auction had just
closed (within the previous minute) and (iii) when it had been closed for a longer period
of time. The corresponding rule bases are shown in Tables 4.5 to 4.7.
In these tables, the hotel ask prices (P and CP) are expressed in the fuzzy linguistic
terms: very-high, high, medium, and low (Figure 4.6 and Table 4.8) and the price changes
(C and CC) in the fuzzy linguistic terms quick, medium, and slow (Figure 4.7 and Table
4.9). The output of the rule base is the prediction ∆′ of how much the price of the given
hotel is likely to increase, thus ∆′ ∈ {small,medium,big,very-big} is the increase that is
added to the current price to obtain the predicted clearing price.
Table 4.5: Fuzzy rule base when counterpart auction is open.
IF P is high and C is quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is high and CP is high and C is not-quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is high and CP is not-high and C is not-quick THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is low and CP is high THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is low and CP is not-high THEN ∆ is small.
IF P is medium and CP is high THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and CP is not-high and C is not-slow THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and CP is not-high and C is slow THEN ∆ is small.
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Figure 4.6: Fuzzy sets for price state of Tampa Towers/Shoreline Shanties.
18SouthamptonTAC-01 used two rule bases to make its predictions: (i) for when both the good and
bad hotels are open and (ii) for when the counterpart auction was closed. However, we found that our
predictions in the latter case could be improved if we separated out the cases in which the counterpart
auction had just closed (within the last minute) and when it had been closed for a longer period of time.
This difference occurs because hotel prices change more rapidly and with a different pattern when the
counterpart has just closed. When the counterpart auction has been closed for a longer period, the changes
are smaller.
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Table 4.6: Fuzzy rule base when counterpart auction just closed.
IF P is high and C is not-slow and CC is quick THEN ∆ is very-big.
IF P is high and C is not-slow and CC is not-quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is high and C is slow and CC is quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is high and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and C is quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium and CC is quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium and CC is not-quick THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and C is slow and CC is quick THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN ∆ is small.
IF P is low and C is slow and CC is quick THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is low and C is not-slow THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is low and C is slow and CC is not-quick THEN ∆ is small.
Table 4.7: Fuzzy rule base when counterpart auction has closed for more than one minute.
IF P is high and C is not-slow THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is high and C is slow THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is medium and C is quick THEN ∆ is big.
IF P is medium and C is medium THEN ∆ is medium.
IF P is not-high and C is slow THEN ∆ is small.
IF P is low and C is not-slow THEN ∆ is medium.
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Table 4.8: Similarity functions of fuzzy sets for price of T/S.
µlow(x) =


1 if x < 20
0 if x > 60
60−x
40 if 20 ≤ x ≤ 60
µmedium(x) =


1 if 60 ≤ x ≤ 70
0 if x < 20 or x > 110
x−20
40 if 20 ≤ x ≤ 60
110−x
40 if 70 ≤ x ≤ 110
µhigh(x) =


0 if x < 50
1 if x > 150
x−50
100 if 50 ≤ x ≤ 150
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Figure 4.7: Fuzzy sets for price change.
Table 4.9: Similarity functions for fuzzy sets of price change.
µslow(x) =


1 if x < 10
0 if x > 30
30−x
20 if 10 ≤ x ≤ 30
µmedium(x) =


1 if 30 ≤ x ≤ 40
0 if x > 60 or x < 10
x−10
20 if 10 ≤ x ≤ 30
60−x
20 if 40 ≤ x ≤ 60
µquick(x) =


0 if x < 20
1 if x > 80
x−20
60 if 20 ≤ x ≤ 80
Hotel bid withdrawal
Turning now to the notion of withdrawing bids. TAC does not allow hotel bid with-
drawal during a game (as described in Section 4.1). Nevertheless our agent can effectively
achieve withdrawal by the following means. The agent decides which bids to continue
with, which bids to withdraw and where new bids are needed based on the output of the
Allocator and Hotel Bid Adjustor. The agent decides to withdraw a bid either because
the hotel rooms cannot be used or because the hotel price is predicted to rise sharply.
Suppose the current ask price of a hotel auction is a and our agent has already placed a
bid higher than a. The agent calculates the predicted clearing price of each hotel auction
(from Equation 4.8). The idea is that the agent submits a bid (for the appropriate quant-
ity) at the price of a+1. In so doing, the agent believes that new bids from other agents
will top its withdraw bid and thus will remove its commitment to those rooms. This does
not violate the rules of the TAC auction, but avoids getting high price hotels. This method
proved very effective and meant our agent could withdraw bids before the ask price rose
too high. This ability to withdraw bids make it possible to consider switching the bidding
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between the different hotel types (to be discussed below) and so increased the flexibility
of our bidding strategy.
Switching between hotels
SouthamptonTAC’s initial allocation of hotel rooms starts early in the game, while the
ask prices of all the hotels are very low. At this time, the agent uses the reference hotel
prices as input to the Allocator. This reference price comes from the average prices of the
various hotels in the previous 10 games. While during the game, it is sometimes useful
for an agent to change from trying to buy one sort of hotel to going for another, there are
risks associated with this: (i) it may fail to get rid of its existing bids for its original hotels
(thus it may double bid); and (ii) it is possible that the price of the hotel that is changed
to rises very quickly while the price of the old type remains unchanged (thus the agent
may want to switch its bidding back to its original hotel).
To manage the process of determining when to change the type of hotel to bid for,
our agent employs the following process. The output of the Allocator is an optimised
solution which means that if a new allocation (involving a different hotel) produces one
more unit of profit than the current one, it will be suggested. However, blindly following
this recommendation may cause the agent to oscillate in its behaviour and lead it to having
unwanted hotel rooms at the end of the process. To avoid this, our agent makes sure that
any change in behaviour is likely to have a worthwhile effect on its score. In more detail,
given a change threshold θ, suppose a customer is currently allocated to stay in Hotel
A giving it a utility of UA. Now assume the Allocator suggests placing this customer in
Hotel B giving a utility of UB (where UB >UA). The rule for enacting this decision is:
IF UB−UA−qA× pA > θ THEN change to B ELSE stay in A,
where qA × pA indicates the loss if the agent cannot withdraw its existing bids in hotel
auction A. Here qA is the quote price of auction A and pA is the possibility of not with-
drawing the bid (this can be approximated from the speed with which bids have changed
in the last minute). Adhering to this rule means we only withdraw those bids that have a
continuously changing bid history in the past minute and those where much more profit
can be obtained by changing the hotel type.
4.2.8 Varying the Bidding Strategy
After our experiences in TAC-01, we came to believe that there is no single best strategy
that can deal with all the different types of TAC environment (see Section 4.3 for more de-
tails). For example, a risk-seeking agent that always allocates the optimal travel package
for its customers and buys flights earlier is highly effective in non-competitive environ-
ments. This is because there is little competition in hotel bidding and the agent can always
obtain what it wants. On the other hand, delaying buying flights and shortening the stay
of customers works well in competitive games. For this reason, SouthamptonTAC dy-
namically varies its bidding strategy according to its assessment of the environment type
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(see Section 4.3.4 for an evaluation of the effectiveness of being able to do this). In games
it deems non-competitive, SouthamptonTAC buys all of its flight tickets at the beginning
of the game (the number of flight tickets to buy is a parameter which can be adjusted
according to the agent’s attitude to risk, see as per Section 1.2) at the beginning of the
game and never changes the travel plan of its clients (unless it senses a change in the en-
vironment). In this way, it avoids buying extra hotels which cost extra money. Also, the
agent can receive optimal utility by not shortening the stay of its customers. In compet-
itive games, our agent buys flights according to its assessment of the flight category (as
discussed in Section 4.2.5). In these games the agent may alter its customers’ travel plans
in order to avoid staying in expensive hotels for long periods. In semi-competitive games,
the agent behaves inbetween these two strategies; it buys most of the flights earlier and
will only change travel plans if a significant improvement can be obtained.
4.3 Evaluation
Our evaluation of SouthamptonTAC is composed of two components: (i) the results from
the TAC-01 and TAC-02 competitions and (ii) our post-hoc systematic analysis in a range
of controlled environments.
4.3.1 TAC Results
TAC consisted of a preliminary round (mainly used for practice and fine tuning), a seed-
ing round, the semi-finals and the final round. The seeding round determined groupings
for the semi-finals. The top 16 agents were organised into two “heats” for the semi-finals
based on their position in the seeding round and the first four teams in both heats entered
into the final round.
In TAC-01, SouthamptonTAC-01 obtained the highest score in the seeding round (see
Table 4.10). Table 4.11 shows the result of the final round, here SouthamptonTAC-01 had
the 3rd highest score.19 Overall, during the course of the competition some 600 games
were played and SouthamptonTAC-01 had the highest mean score and lowest standard
deviation.
For TAC-02, Table 4.12 shows the seeding round result of each agent’s relative score
to SouthamptonTAC. Note there is less than 2 points difference between ATTac and
SouthamptonTAC and given the random features of the game their performance should be
considered as broadly similar. Table 4.13 shows the scores (again relative to our agent) of
all the agents in this final round. Again the difference between SouthamptonTAC and the
top agent is small, less than 0.8% (when all the games in the competition are considered,
SouthamptonTAC is 2.2% better than whitebear).
When both competitions are considered, there are 12 agents that participated in both
TACs (some of the agents are designed by the same group but with different agent
19This score was calculated without game 7315, where there was a crash due to the network platform
failure for SouthamptonTAC. Details can be found in http://auction2.eecs.umich.edu/tac01-scores-finals/.
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Table 4.10: Result of TAC-01 seeding round.
Rank Agent Avg(-10 worst) Std Dev Games played
1 SouthamptonTAC 3163.8 855.3 315
2 whitebear 3163.8-43 881.4 318
3 Urlaub01 3163.8-88.3 1197.8 319
4 livingagents 3163.8-151.6 1251.7 305
5 TacsMan 3163.8-180 1065.7 315
6 CaiserSose 3163.8-294 1219.7 315
7 polimi bot 3163.8-306.2 980.8 316
8 umbctac 3163.8-399 1288.4 313
Table 4.11: Result of TAC-01 final round.
Rank Agent Avg Std Dev Games played
1 livingagents 3530.6+139.4 622.3 24
2 ATTac 3530.6+91 691.6 24
3 SouthamptonTAC 3530.6 568.8 23
4 whitebear 3530.6-17.4 700.1 24
5 Urlaub01 3530.6-109.4 698.3 24
6 Retsina 3530.6-178.8 668.2 24
7 CaiserSose 3530.6-456.5 656.2 24
8 TacsMan 3530.6-671.3 1054.3 24
Table 4.12: Result of TAC-02 seeding round (440 games).
Rank Agent Avg(-10 worst) Avg
1 ATTac 3129.5+1.8 3033.5+4.2
2 SouthamptonTAC 3129.5 3033.5
3 UMBCTAC 3129.5-11.1 3033.5-16.6
4 livingagents 3129.5-38.1 3033.5-24.9
5 cuhk 3129.5-74 3033.5-62.1
6 Thalis 3129.5-129.8 3033.5-131.9
7 whitebear 3129.5-163.9 3033.5-158.2
8 RoxyBot 3129.5-274.2 3033.5-300.8
names). Four of these twelve qualified for the final rounds in both competitions. For
these four agents, their average scores over both competitions (some 1200 games) are:
SouthamptonTAC (3229), whitebear (3119), livingagents (3016) and Thalis/CaiserSose
(2863). Thus, our agent is the most successful of these.
Through both competitions, we believe that this large number of games and the very
nature of the competition mean that the difference in the trader’s scores reflect true dif-
ferences in the performance of the agents’ strategies. Thus we believe SouthamptonTAC
performs successfully in a wide range of TAC situations.
4.3.2 Controlled Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our agent in a more systematic fashion than is possible
in the competition, we decided to run a series of controlled experiments. To do this we
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Table 4.13: Result of TAC-02 final round (32 games).
Rank Agent Avg(-worst) Avg
1 whitebear 3492+64.4 3385.5+27.3
2 SouthamptonTAC 3492 3385.5
3 Thalis 3492-140.8 3385.5-139.2
4 UMBCTAC 3492-171.4 3385.5-149.9
5 Walverine 3492-176.4 3385.5-175.9
6 livingagents 3492-182.2 3385.5-204.6
7 kavayaH 3492-242.2 3385.5-286.0
8 cuhk 3492-244.2 3385.5-316.7
devised two competitor agents that adopt strategies consistent with the broad classes of
behaviour that were observed in the competition:
• Risk-seeking agent (RS-agent) This is based on the behaviour of the livingagents,
UMBCTAC, and Walverine agents (see Section 4.4 for more details). This agent
buys all the flights tickets at the beginning of the game, bids aggressively in hotel
auctions and never changes the plans for its customers.
• Risk-averse agent (RA-agent) This is based on the behaviour of SouthamptonTAC-
01, Retsina, and sics agents (see Section 4.4 for more details). This agent buys a
small number of flight tickets at the beginning of the game to leave some flexibility
and it will change the customers’ travel plans according to how the game unfolds.
For both these types of agents, as well as for SouthamptonTAC, a record is kept of
the closing price history and the initial travel plans for the customers are calculated based
on the average price of this history.
The set-up of the experiment is shown in Table 4.14 where it can be seen that there
are 36 different cases which cover all possible combinations of SouthamptonTAC, RA-
agents and RS-agents given that there can only be eight agents in one game. For example,
in the case where the number of RA-agents is 2 and the number of RS-agents is 1, there
will be 5 SouthamptonTAC agents. For each case, between 50–100 games20 were played
to test the performance of each kind of agent. In this way, it is possible to produce a wide
range of environments, from competitive to non-competitive, and to evaluate the corres-
ponding performance of the different types of agents and the broad behaviour trends. The
following conjectures were used as an approximate guide for designing the experiments.
Conjecture 1: The more RS-agents there are in the game, the more competitive (see
Section 4.2.1) it will be and the more RA-agents there are, the less competitive it will be.
Conjecture 2: RS-agents will do well in non-competitive environments and RA-
agents will do well in competitive ones.
20This number differs from game to game. The experiment for a single case stops when the relative
scores of the agents become stable.
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Table 4.14: Experiment set-up for controlled experiments.
The light grey area indicates competitive environments and dark grey non-competitive
ones.
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In terms of Conjecture 1, the average hotel clearing price for those environments
marked as competitive (in Table 4.14) is 240 and for those marked as non-competitive it
is 67 and for the remainder it is 125. Thus Conjecture 1 can be seen to hold.
We now start to analyse the performance in the different environments. Figure 4.8
shows the performance surface of SouthamptonTAC in the different cases. The x-axis and
y-axis represent the number of RS-agents (NRS) and RA-agents (NRA), thus, the number
of SouthamptonTAC agents is 8−NRS −NRA. The z-axis shows the average score21 of
SouthamptonTAC. The higher the score, the better the agent performs. Figures 4.9 and
4.10 show the performance of the RS-agents and RA-agents on similar graphs.
Figure 4.8: Performance of SouthamptonTAC in different environments.
As shown in Figure 4.8, SouthamptonTAC does best, obtains the highest score, in
competitive games (i.e., where the number of RS-agents is big). This is due to the adapt-
ive nature of its strategy. When it finds the game competitive, it alters its strategy in the
direction of being risk-averse. In non-competitive environments, SouthamptonTAC also
does well since it adapts its strategy to bid aggressively because it can always obtain the
goods it wants. Both of these observations are consistent with Conjecture 2. The worst
21Suppose there are m SouthamptonTAC agents, and the average scores of these agents are s1, s2, · · · ,
sm. Then the average score shown on the z-axis is ∑
m
i=1 si
m
.
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situation for SouthamptonTAC is when all the players are like itself. This is because the
competitive tendency of the agents causes the hotel prices to rise to moderate levels and
then many of the agents change their customers’ travel plans at approximately the same
time. This switching behaviour causes the counterpart hotel prices to rise (because of
increased competition) and the agents to have unused flights or hotel rooms bought on
account of their previous travel plans. For RS-agents, as shown in Figure 4.9, the results
also support Conjecture 2. RS-agents behave very well in non-competitive games and
their performance decreases rapidly as the number of RS-agents increases. This happens
because as more agents bid aggressively, the hotel closing prices get higher. RA-agents
behave best in competitive environments when there are many RS-agents, perform ad-
equately in non-competitive games and worst in semi-competitive games when there are
a few RS-agents and SouthamptonTAC agents (see Figure 4.10). In the latter two cases,
RA-agents change their customers’ travel packages reasonably often and this causes them
to buy extra hotels and flights that they cannot subsequently use.
Figure 4.9: Performance of risk-seeking agents in different environments.
Figure 4.10: Performance of risk-averse agents in different environments.
Moreover, from Figures 4.8 to 4.10, we find that the range of scores for each kind of
agent are different; for SouthamptonTAC it is [1372,3737], for RS-agents it is [−2742,2374]
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and for RA-agents it is [1709,3445]. Thus the RA-agent has the narrowest score range
and is the most stable agent. The RS-agent has the widest score range since its per-
formance depends heavily on the environment it is situated in. SouthamptonTAC is in
between, less stable than RA-agents (but able to obtain higher scores) but with a better
worst performance than RS-agents.
While Figures 4.8 to 4.10 show the performance of a single type of agent in various
environments, Figure 4.11 compares their scores. There are 8 subfigures and each of them
represents several cases of the above experiments.22 We found that when the number of
SouthamptonTAC agents is small (less than 4), they can always outperform both RS-
agents and RA-agents (as shown in (e) to (h) and some cases in (a) to (d)). This is
because SouthamptonTAC can successfully adapt itself in competitive games and become
aggressive in non-competitive ones. However, as we discussed previously, when the
number of SouthamptonTAC agents is above 4, the agents exhibit similar behaviour and
make the market less efficient. Generally, from (a) to (h), it can also be seen that profits
for all agent types increase as the number of RA-agents increases (because these agents
keep the hotel prices low).
4.3.3 Predicting Hotel Prices
Most of the agents in TAC engage in some form of hotel price prediction (see Section
4.4). Since, generally speaking, the more accurately the agent can predict these prices
the more easily it can identify profitable actions. To this end, Table 4.15 shows the
accuracy of SouthamptonTAC’s predictions on a minute by minute basis for a single
game (randomly chosen) in the final. The figures in the table are the difference between
the predicted price and the actual price. Thus, a positive number means over prediction
and a negative one means under prediction. As we can see, the trend is that the further
into the game the predictions are made the more accurate they are. This is because at
the beginning the agent can only work based on the price history of previous games.
However as the game progresses, more information is revealed (such as the closing order
of the hotels, the current hotel prices and the relation between the hotels). This, in turn,
means more accurate predictions can be made. This is important for our agent since it
enables its flexible decision making to be based on more or less accurate information.
In most cases, our agent tends to over predict the hotel closing prices. If the hotel
prices are not very high, the agent will not suffer since it will not change the plan for its
customers; whereas if the prices are very high, the agents may change the travel plans
for its customers and therefore obtain a lower score (since it may have bought flights or
rooms that it cannot now use). However, when hotel prices rise very quickly, our agent
tends to under predict which can cause it to buy highly priced hotels (so reducing its
profit).
22For example, in figure (c), there are 2 RS-agents, thus the horizontal axis represents the number of
RA-agents and the vertical axis is the average score of the different agent types.
96
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(a) 0 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(b) 1 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(c) 2 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(d) 3 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(e) 4 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(f) 5 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(g) 6 RS−agents
0 2 4 6
−3000
−2000
−1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of RA−agents
Sco
re
(h) 7 RS−agents
SouthamptonTAC * + oRA−agent RS−agent
Figure 4.11: Relative performance of the agents in different environments.
Furthermore, Table 4.16 shows the difference between the predicted and actual hotel
closing prices for the order in which they closed in the final. For example, for the hotel
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Table 4.15: Actual vs. predicted hotel prices.
Positive figure means over prediction and negative figure means under prediction.
Hotel 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
T3 86
T2 40 23
S3 76 -62 50
S4 39 9 9 9
S2 83 11 -32 -53 -17
S1 45 9 8 9 9 9
T1 79 9 8 8 8 8 8
T4 87 10 10 10 10 10 10 -17
Table 4.16: Hotel closing price prediction in final round.
Closing order Avg difference Max difference Min difference
1 64 174 8
2 30 103 2
3 29 144 8
4 38 149 1
5 32 115 8
6 30 111 3
7 27 87 8
8 20 62 9
that closed first (whatever that happened to be in a particular game), the average dif-
ference is 64, the maximum difference is 17423 and the minimum is 8. These results
are consistent with those of Table 4.15 and show that the later a hotel closes, the more
accurate our agent’s prediction is.
4.3.4 Strategy Adaptation
To test the value of the agent being able to adapt its strategy during the course of a
game, we compare the performance of our agent with a non-adaptive variant (called na-
SouthamptonTAC) that is identical apart from the fact that it cannot change its strategy
once a game has started running. In each game, there was one SouthamptonTAC, one
na-SouthamptonTAC and the remaining agents were drawn randomly from a pool of
RS-agents and RA-agents. We ran this configuration for 164 games and computed the
average score of each agent type. Our results were that the adaptive agent received an
average score of 3138, the non-adaptive one an average of 2937 and the other agents an
average of 1657 (RS-agents) and 2649 (RA-agents). This shows that being adaptive does
indeed improve the agents’ performance.24
23This number is large and it occurred at the beginning of the final where the price history data was
based upon the seeding round (which had very different outcomes from the final round).
24A t-test showed that the adaptive agent’s performance is significantly better than the non-adaptive one,
where p < 0.05.
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4.4 Related Work
There are a number of strands of work that are related to what we have described in this
chapter. Firstly, there is the work on agents bidding in multiple simultaneous auctions.
Secondly, the work using fuzzy techniques to manage an agent’s interactions, especially
in bilateral auctions (however this is dealt with in Section 2.2.5). Finally, other agents
developed for the TAC.
First we consider bidding in multiple simultaneous auctions. Preist designed an al-
gorithm for agents that participate in multiple English auctions [Preist et al., 2001]. The
algorithm proposes a co-ordination mechanism that can be used in cases where all the
auctions terminate simultaneously, and a learning method to tackle auctions that are ter-
minating at different times. However, their strategy is targeted at a single auction pro-
tocol (English) and the goods are not inter-dependent. Byde also describes a dynamic
programming approach for agents that participate in multiple English auctions to buy a
single item [Byde, 2001b]. Moreover, in [Byde, 2001a], the dynamic programming ap-
proach is compared with other algorithms in order to determine its quality. As a result,
the dynamic programming approach is shown to be effective. However this method is
only for one kind of auction (English) and it only deals with purchasing one item. We
also believe it is difficult to extend this approach to a time constrained environment, such
as the TAC, because of the heavy computational demands of this technique.
The framework presented in [Byde et al., 2002] enables an agent to make rational
decisions across multiple heterogeneous auctions (English, Dutch, First-price sealed-bid
and Vickrey auctions). It uses a fixed-auction strategy and a fixed threshold strategy to es-
timate the expected utility of a bid and then use a heuristic algorithm to approximate this
decision making behaviour. However again there is no notion of purchasing interrelated
goods.
Anthony et al. [Anthony and Jennings, 2002] also propose an approach for agents to
bid for a single item in English, Dutch, and Vickrey auctions. The agent decides what
to bid based on four parameters: (i) the remaining time; (ii) the number of remaining
auctions; (iii) the desire for bargain; and (iv) the desperateness of the agent. The overall
strategy is to combine these four tactics using a set of relative weights provided by the
user. The agent also has a deadline for obtaining the good, but only one item is purchased.
In an extension to this model [Anthony and Jennings, 2003], a genetic algorithm is used
to search the effective strategies so that an agent can behave appropriately according to
its assessment of its prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, it still does not deal with
interrelated goods.
Combinatorial auctions (discussed in Section 2.2) do deal with interrelated goods
in that they allow bidders to bid for combinations of items. In contrast with the mul-
tiple auctions scenarios above, however, combinatrial auctions place the complexity on
dealing with the interrelated aspect of the bidding on the auctioneer rather than on the
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Table 4.17: Comparison among agents.
RS means risk seeking, RA risk averse and RN risk neutral (between RS and RA), — means
information unavailable.
Agent Price Prediction Allocator Attitude
ATTac machine learning ILP RN
cuhk average prices heuristic search RN
livingagents average prices search RS
PainInNEC — Genetic algorithm RA
Retsina price matrix Markov chain RA
RoxyBot price distribution heuristic search RA
sics price distribution branch-and-bound search RA
SouthamptonTAC Fuzzy reasoning ILP RN
UMBCTAC average price heuristic search RS
Walverine Walrasian compe- ILP RS
titive equilibrium
whitebear average price greedy search RN
bidding agent. Thus the auctioneer needs a winner determination algorithm to select
a set of non-conflicting bids that maximise its revenue. This problem has been shown
to be NP-complete [Fujishima et al., 1999] and, accordingly, a number of algorithms
have been developed to achieve this according to various criteria (e.g., anytime solu-
tions [Fujishima et al., 1999], polynomial solutions [Dang and Jennings, 2002] and op-
timal solutions [Sandholm, 2002]).
In terms of other agents developed for the TAC, Table 4.17 compares the most suc-
cessful agents from both competitions. ATTac uses machine learning techniques to obtain
a model of the price dynamics based on the past data (e.g., the data in the seeding round)
to predict the closing prices of the hotels in the future. It also uses mixed-integer linear
programming (ILP) to find the optimal allocation of the goods [Stone et al., 2001]. cuhk
agent is composed of a cost estimator, an allocation and acquisition solver and bidders.
It uses a greedy, heuristic search to find the travel packages for customers. livingagents
[Fritschi and Dorer, 2002] bases its decisions on closing price data for the various hotels
in past games and it buys all the flights needed at the beginning of the game. It also
buys/sells entertainment tickets at a fixed price of 80. It makes bids for the needed ho-
tels only once during the game again at a fixed price (of 1001). PainInNEC’s strategy is
a combination of heuristics and a genetic algorithm based optimisation method, which
outputs the goods to buy and sell given the predicted auction clearing prices and cus-
tomers’ preferences. Retsina uses a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to allocate the
goods to its customers and it uses a matrix learned from past games to predict the hotel’s
future prices. RoxyBot [Greenwald and Boyan, 2001] decides the goods to bid for based
on heuristic search techniques and applies a marginal utility calculator to determine the
value of the goods. sics uses pricelines for price prediction and the optimiser performs
branch-and-bound search for the best solutions. UMBCTAC balances the minimal risk
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and the maximum return to find the best travel plan for its customers. Walverine predicts
the hotel closing prices by calculating the Walrasian competitive equilibrium of the game.
whitebear uses a randomised greedy algorithm to calculate the price of each commodity
bought or sold and uses Bayesian analysis to compute the minimum and average value of
the flight’s determinant factor.
As can be seen from the above discussion, there are a number of commonalities
between the designs. Firstly, a variety of AI techniques including fuzzy reasoning, ma-
chine learning, planning, Markov decision making and heuristic search are used for mak-
ing predictions about the likely future state of affairs. Thus most agents keep a record of
the hotel closing prices and use a variety of methods to predict subsequent hotel closing
prices in order to allocate travel packages to customers. Secondly, a number of the agents
adapt their bidding behaviour in response to environmental changes. Such adaptation in-
cludes our agent varying its bidding behaviours (as described in Section 4.2.8), ATTac
which varies the number of flights it buys at the beginning of the game, and whitebear
which postpones some flight ticket purchases until after it learns the hotel prices.
4.5 Summary
This chapter details the design, implementation and evaluation of SouthamptonTAC, an
agent that successfully participated in both the TAC-01 and the TAC-02 competitions and
that employs a range of fuzzy techniques at its core. Specifically, it uses fuzzy pattern
recognition to determine the type of environment it is situated in and then uses an adaptive
bidding strategy to change its strategy depending on this assessment. In entertainment
auctions, the agent continuously observes the current market asks/bids and uses fuzzy set
techniques to extend the asks/bids it will accept by decreasing the similarity degree of
the fuzzy sets. Moreover, the agent uses a fuzzy reasoning technique (Sugeno controller)
to predict the hotel closing prices given the prevailing market conditions.
SouthamptonTAC has been shown to be successful across a wide range of TAC en-
vironments (in both competitions, as well as in our controlled experiments). Naturally
the strategies that have been employed are tailored to the specific auction context of the
competition (as is any agent strategy for any other auction context!). Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that the TAC domain exhibits a number of characteristics that are common to many
real-world, on-line trading environments. These attributes include a time constrained
environment, network latency, unpredictable opponents, multiple heterogeneous auction
types and the need to purchase interrelated goods. Given this, we believe that a number
of technologies and insights from our work are applicable in a broader agent-mediated
e-commerce context.
In more detail, we believe the following methods can also be used in other areas of
agent mediated e-commerce. Firstly, our fuzzy reasoning methods for predicting hotel
closing prices can be reused in other multiple auction applications (as we demonstrate in
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Chapter 5). Secondly, our method for an agent assessing its environment is applicable
in more general settings. We believe that when agents have to use heuristic strategies
it is likely that no one heuristic is likely to be best for all cases. Therefore such agents
need the ability to tailor their strategy according to their assessment of the prevailing
situation. To do this they need to be able to determine what environment they are in so
that they can best respond. For example, in the general case of multiple auctions, the en-
vironment sensor can work based on the previous clearing prices, the type of participants
in the auctions, the number of participants in the auctions and so on. Thirdly, through
adaptation the agent can adjust its behaviour between three kinds of environments: com-
petitive, non-competitive and semi-competitive. While attempting to settle these things
in advance and not responding to the prevailing context may sometimes work (even in
repeated encounters), it can produce brittle behaviour that is not robust in a wide variety
of circumstances. Nevertheless some degree of prior analysis is essential to set the ba-
sic parameters to approximately correct values otherwise the agent may take a long time
before it starts to perform effectively. Thus, our agent was tuned between rounds based
on past performance and the risk attitude of its opponents in the competition. This was
possible because the opponents were known in advance for the semi-finals and finals and
because the opponents’ behaviours can be studied in previous rounds. Fourthly, while
an agent should certainly be responsive to its prevailing context; it should not respond to
each and every minor perturbation in the environment. For example, in hotel bidding, the
current ask prices of each auction change on a minute by minute basis. Now it may be
that the agent believes it can obtain an improvement in utility by switching its customers
between the good and the bad hotels. However if this improvement is only small then
the agent should not switch because its estimation is based on uncertain predictions and
if these predictions are slightly out then there may not be a real improvement. Moreover,
by making such a switch the agent is taking a risk because it may not be able to off-load
those hotels that it has already bought and so it may have to pay for hotels that it cannot
use.
TAC has certainly shown itself to be an interesting challenge problem, however one
of its major shortcomings is that it does not incorporate the standard English auction and
this is by far the most widely used auction type on the Internet today. To rectify this, we
decided to generalise TAC to the case where an agent has to buy multiple goods for mul-
tiple English auctions. Another limitation of TAC is that the preferences of the customers
are specific numbers (e.g., staying in a good hotel has a utility of 150). However in many
real life scenarios a user often has a more flexible preference structure. For example, a
user may want to buy a laptop for about 1,500 pounds. This flexibility can be achieved by
fuzzifying the preferences of the customer. To deal with these issues we need to extend
our agent design by allowing it to be more adaptive to its prevailing circumstances. This
we detail in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
A Neuro-Fuzzy Bidding Strategy for
Buying Multiple Goods in Multiple
English Auctions
Having designed the strategy for the TAC, we now move to a more general multiple
auction context in which an agent seeks to buy multiple good for multiple English auc-
tions. The ensuing agent designs build upon SouthamptonTAC but introduce still greater
adaptability into the agents strategy so that it can respond effectively to changes in the
marketplace.
5.1 Overview
We focus on English auctions because they are by far the most common protocol for
agent-mediated e-commerce. In our particular case, each such English auction sells a
single unit of the desired good and this good may be described by multiple attributes1
(e.g., in auctions selling flights, the goods may be described by their dates of departure
and return, by their carrier, and the class of ticket being bought). Also we assume the
goods are independent; thus the failure to obtain one of the goods does not influence the
availability of other goods.2 Bids for these goods must be at least h(a) pounds larger
than the previous price to be valid, where h(a) is the increment of bids decided by the
auctioneer. If an agent bids successfully, it becomes the active agent which is holding the
bid. It may, of course, be subsequently out-bid. Auctions respond to any bid before they
close and their good is allocated to the active bid holder when the auction closes.
In a stand-alone English auction, the bidding strategy is simple. The agent’s dom-
inant strategy is to bid a small amount more than the current highest bid and stop when
1The goods have multiple attributes, but the buyer agents only bids on price. Thus, our work differs
from the case where agents bid on multiple attributes (as discussed in section 5.6).
2Dealing with inter-dependent goods (as per the TAC) involves significant amount of domain know-
ledge (e.g., the relationship between the auctions, some are replacements and some are compensate) and
thus it is more difficult to generate generic strategies and results.
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the user’s valuation is reached (Section 2.2.5). By adhering to this dominant strategy, the
good is always allocated to the bidder who values it most highly. However, when there are
multiple auctions running at the same time, bidding is much more complex and has much
greater uncertainty. This is because: (i) the auctions have varying start and end times
(thus comparisons need to be made between auctions that are nearing completion (and
probably have a high ask price) and auctions that are near the beginning (and probably
have a low ask price); (ii) the participating agents are likely to adopt a variety of different
strategies (e.g., some may bid aggressively in the earlier auctions in order to ensure they
get the desired goods, while others may wait until later auctions to see if they can obtain
bargains), and (iii) the agents are likely to have different sets of auctions that they con-
sider bidding in (driven by their own deadlines), thus the set of agents in a given auction
will vary and so, consequently, will the supply/demand. In some variants of the English
auction, there is a strict deadline for when the auction will finish and this promotes a
strategy of trying to place a bid at the last moment so that no other agent has a chance to
place a higher bid (this is called “sniping” [Rust et al., 1991]). To counteract such end ef-
fects, our auctions have a soft deadline; that is, they do not close until a fixed period after
the last bid is placed (as per Yahoo!Auctions (http://auctions.shopping.yahoo.com) and
Auction Universe [Miller, 1999]). This means sniping is not effective and the auctions
are akin to the standard English one.
Moreover, we consider the case where the agent has to purchase multiple goods from
the ongoing auctions which, we believe, is more realistic than just having to purchase a
single good from this set. Finally, and again for maximum generality in our solution, we
assume the agent may be acting on behalf of multiple customers. This means it needs
to allocate the goods it has purchased or is currently holding to the various customers in
order to maxmise its return (as per TAC).
Given this context, we developed (for the first time) a bidding algorithm that buys
multiple units of the desired good from the available auctions. This algorithm operates
in the following way. It calculates what it believes is the best set of auctions to bid in (it
does this by predicting the auctions’ closing prices, using a fuzzy neural network, alloc-
ating the goods to its various customers and then calculating the satisfaction degree of
the allocation). However the prediction of this optimal set of auctions is highly uncertain
because it depends on the strategies, profiles and reservation prices of an arbitrary set of
agents. Therefore rather than just bidding in this set, an agent could also decide to bid
in other auctions that are likely to have broadly the same outcome because by doing so
its chances of obtaining the goods are increased (more places to buy from) and the satis-
faction degree compared with what is believed to be the optimal is still reasonably high.
Specifically, our algorithm adopts the heuristic of bidding in this expanded set of auctions
(the best set, plus those that have a similar satisfaction degree) in the order of increasing
auction end time. Thus we term it an Earliest Closest First (ECF) algorithm. Moreover,
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as the goods are composed of multiple attributes, the agent may have to make trade-offs
between them in its bidding in order to best satisfy the users’ preferences (as discussed in
Section 1.2). Thus, for example, a user may ideally wish to fly out on a Saturday, return
the following Wednesday and fly with British Airways, but would be willing to accept
(for a lower price) flight dates of Friday and Wednesday with Quantas (a BA partner).
To allow such flexibility (or imprecision), we choose to model preferences using fuzzy
sets (for the reasons outlined previously). Specifically, the agent’s preferences are private
information that include: (i) valuations v for the good (expressed as fuzzy sets); (ii) the
ratings for different values of the good’s attributes (expressed as fuzzy sets); and (iii) the
weights which balance the valuation and the other attributes. By means of an example,
consider the case of a student who wants to buy a flight ticket to New York. She prefers
to buy a cheap ticket (“cheap” is a fuzzy term). Thus the lower the price, the higher
her degree of satisfaction. Ideally she wants to depart on Saturday, but it is acceptable
to go on Friday or Sunday. Here, the date can be denoted as a triangular fuzzy number
(Section 3.1.2), where “Saturday” has the highest satisfaction degree, and “Friday” and
“Sunday” have lower ones. Also, the airlines she likes can also be a fuzzy number where
the memberships of the fuzzy set “like” are given by her satisfaction on the airlines. Fi-
nally, she can express the relative importance of the attributes of price, date and airline,
by assigning them the appropriate weights.
To cope with the uncertainty inherent in the multi-auction context and to make trade-
offs between the different variants of the goods available is a complex decision making
problem. Ideally the closing price of the auctions would be known first in order to cal-
culate the satisfaction degree of a bid. However, since the closing price is only known
after the auction is closed, it is important for the agent to make predictions about the
likely closing prices. By so doing, the agent can determine whether it should place a bid
at the current moment or it should delay because better deals may subsequently become
available. In our previous work, we successfully used adaptive fuzzy inference methods
for this task in continuous double auctions (CDAs) (Chapter 3) and the TAC (Chapter
4). However, in both cases, the parameter adaptation of the fuzzy rules was limited.
For example, our agent for the CDA can only adapt its parameters in a single direction
of change (e.g., all the parameters are bigger in a competitive environment, see Section
3.4 for more details). However this is inappropriate for the multi-auction context be-
cause each parameter in the strategy should be adjusted according to its actual direction
of change (e.g., the centre of the membership function for the fuzzy set “medium” may
need to go up and the corresponding width may need to go down to reflect the fact that
this fuzzy set should cover a smaller range of higher values). To rectify this, we exploit
fuzzy neural networks (FNNs) [Jang, 1993] since these can do the fuzzy reasoning and,
through learning (both off-line and on-line), can adjust the parameters of the fuzzy terms
and the consequent output as the auctions progress. This adaptation enables the agent’s
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bidding behaviour to better reflect the current state of its environment (hereafter we call
this strategy FNN, and the agent the FNN Agent).
The work described in this chapter advances the state of the art in the following
ways. First, we develop, for the first time, a practical agent bidding algorithm (ECF)
for obtaining multiple goods in multiple overlapping English auctions. Second, fuzzy
neural networks are developed that can make predictions about the closing prices and
adapt the parameters in the neural network through off-line and on-line learning to suit
the environment the agent is situated in. Through empirical evaluation the agent which
uses ECF combined with the FNN is shown to be effective in a wide range of situations.
Finally, by exploiting a fuzzy set representation of the user’s preferences, the strategy is
able to make effective trade-offs between the various attributes of the goods the agent
purchases and can cope with the inherent imprecision/flexibility that often characterises
a user’s preferences. All the common issues discussed in Section 1.2 are addressed here:
price prediction (Section 5.3.1), adaptation (Section 5.3.2), flexible bidding (Section 5.2),
risk attitude adjusting (Section 5.2), and trade-off attributes (Section 5.3.3).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the ECF bidding
algorithm and Section 5.3 describes how the bidding strategy operates. Section 5.4 gives
an example of a flight auction scenario in which the operational effectiveness of our
algorithm is evaluated. Section 5.5 actually provides the systematic empirical evaluation
and benchmarks our strategy against a number of others that have been proposed in the
literature. Section 5.6 discusses the related work in multiple auction bidding, multi-
attribute auctions, and fuzzy-based bidding methods. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The Earliest Closest First Bidding Algorithm
This section details the ECF algorithm. First, we introduce some specific terms in our
auction context and then the algorithm is described.
There are multiple auctions in the market, each selling one unit of good. There are
three states for each auction: (i) waiting: before its start time, nothing happens in this
auction; (ii) running: the auction is open for bids; and (iii) closed: the auction finishes
when the market time is bigger than the auction’s closing time and there have been no
active bids in the auction for a fixed period.
Each agent aims to buy multiple goods, thus it considers bidding if and only if the
sum of the bids it holds (i.e., those auctions in which it is the active bidder) and owns
(closed auctions in which the agent won) is less than the number of good it desires.3 If
it decides to bid, the agent needs to determine which auctions it should bid in. To do so,
it first determines the auctions that it believes best satisfy the user’s preferences (calcula-
tion detailed in section 5.3.1) given its expectation about the closing prices (calculation
3The case where the agent bids in more auctions than the number of goods it wants is not considered
here.
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detailed in section 5.3) of each auction. Then, rather than placing a bid in the selected
auctions immediately, it bids in auctions that close earlier than the selected auctions and
have an evaluation “close” (a fuzzy term) to that of the selected auctions. The intuition
here is that given the significant degrees of uncertainty that exist, precise calculations
about the closing prices are simply not reliable and an auction that appears slightly less
promising may well turn out to be better. Given this, the agent should consider bidding in
auctions that have broadly similar expected returns so as to increase its chances of obtain-
ing the item (by participating in more auctions), while ensuring the likely return is one
of the highest. Thus, for each good it desires, if there are such close auctions, the agent
will bid in the selected auctions in order of increasing closing time (i.e., bid first in the
one that is going to close first, then in the one that will close next, and so on) (hence the
name Earliest Closest First). The degree of closeness that is required to trigger bidding
is captured by the threshold (λ ∈ [0,1]). Then if the difference is within λ, the agent will
bid in the auction. In this sense, the choice of λ represents the risk attitude of the user
(Section 3.3.2). If λ is high, the agent can be viewed as being risk averse because it bids
in many more auctions in order to maximise its chance of getting the good (although it is
likely to get a less satisfactory set of goods because it may accept a higher ask price). If λ
is low, the agent is taking a greater risk because it is trying to obtain a high degree of sat-
isfaction (but by not bidding in as many auctions it has a lower chance of actually being
successful). If λ is inbetween, the agent is striking a balance between the two positions
(which is here termed risk neutral).
In more detail, the decision making algorithm ECF is given in Figure 5.1. In this
algorithm, nactive, nown, and ndemand are the number of goods the agent holds, owns and
desires respectively. An explanation of the algorithm’s key functions are as follows:
• The function AuctionRunning() (line 1) returns true if there are still available auc-
tions to bid in, f alse otherwise.
• The function update() (line 2) returns changes in the auctions since they were last
monitored. Such changes include whether the agent is holding an active bid or has
obtained the good, the updated ask price of each auction, the transaction price for
any auctions that recently closed, and the number of auctions left to bid in.
• The function predict() (line 3) predicts all auction’s closing prices given the cur-
rent market situation and the history transaction prices. The agent uses a FNN to
predict the closing prices in this chapter (see section 5.3.1).
• The function allocate() (line 4) allocates all the goods the agent owns and possibly
owns to its user according to their preferences. The later includes the goods the
agent holds in waiting or running auctions. The way that we assign the auction to
the user is through an assignment algorithm discussed in section 5.3.4.
• The function toBid(g) (lines 6, 7 and 16) returns the id of the auction in which
good g is believed to have the highest degree of satisfaction given the prediction
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PROCEDURE ECFbid()
1: while nactive +nown < ndemand or AuctionRunning() do
2: update() //get updated market information
3: predict() //predict auctions’ closing prices
4: allocate() //allocate goods to user
5: for all g ∈ G do
6: if toBid(g)≥ 0 then
7: sbest(g)← evaluate(toBid(g),g)
8: else
9: sbest(g)← 0
10: end if
11: end for
12: L ← RunningAuctions() //order the auctions by their closing time
13: for all a ∈ L do
14: for all g ∈ G do
15: s← evaluate(a,g)
16: if toBid(g)≥ 0 then
17: λ ← chkThreshold() //determine the risk attitude
18: if (s ≥ sbest(g)) or (sbest(g)− s≤ λ) then
19: bid(a) //submit a bid in auction a
20: break
21: end if
22: else if s > 0 then
23: bid(a)
24: break
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: end while
Figure 5.1: The Earliest Closest First bidding algorithm.
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of the closing prices. This is the output of the allocation in allocate(). If there is
a best auction for buying good g given the allocation, the returned value will be
the auction id; otherwise, the agent will bid in any auction in which the current
satisfaction degree is positive.
• The function RunningAuctions() (line 12) returns a list L of all the currently run-
ning auctions in ascending order of their end times.
• The function evaluate(a,g) (lines 7 and 15) returns the evaluation of auction a
given the agents’ preference for good g at its current ask price. This evaluation
balances both price and the other attributes of the goods using a fuzzy aggregation
method (see section 5.3.3).
• The function chkThreshold() (line 17) returns the threshold parameter for the agent
given the current situation of the auction market. The threshold λ is determined
by the number of auctions that have a positive satisfaction for the agent at that
particular moment in time. Here the general rule for choosing λ is: the fmore such
auctions there are, the smaller λ should be. This captures the intuition that if there
are many chances for the agent to win the good, it can have a higher threshold
so that it will have a higher satisfaction degree for the purchased goods (and vice
versa). The experiments in 5.5.4 shows the effect of different λs on the performance
of the agent.
• The function of bid(a) (lines 19 and 23) places a bid in auction a. The price to
place is the ask current ask price of the auction plus the bid step h(a).
To realise this algorithm, a number of prediction techniques are needed (line 3). Here
we use fuzzy neural networks and their application is discussed in sections 5.3.1 and
5.3.2. Moreover, an evaluation method is needed for ranking the various auctions (sec-
tion 5.3.3), and a good allocation method is needed to decide which auctions should be
assigned to which user (section 5.3.4).
5.3 The FNN Strategy
This section details the FNN strategy. First, we describe how the FNN is structured and
how it operates to obtain the predicted closing price. Second, the learning algorithm of
the FNN is described. Third, the way of evaluating auctions are introduced. Finally, the
allocation method that allocates the goods to the user is given.
5.3.1 FNN Prediction
To reason about the expected closing price of each auction, the FNN agent considers
a per auction reference price (pre f ), the order in which the auctions are due to close
(oauction), and the auction’s current ask price (pnow). Here the reference price represents
a likely value at which the auction will close for that particular variant of the good. It is
computed by considering the transaction prices of auctions that have previously sold the
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FUNCTION getRe f Price(i)
1: if getRelPrice(i)≥ 0 then
2: Return getRelPrice(i) //return the average price in a single game
3: else
4: Return getAvgPrice(i) //return the historical average price in past games
5: end if
Figure 5.2: Reference price (pre f ) calculation for the FNN.
getRelPrice(i) returns the average transaction price of all the auctions (with the same
attributes as auction i) that have closed since the agent started bidding. getAvgPrice(i)
returns the historical average transaction price in the history for auctions (with the same
attributes as auction i).
specified good and the average transaction price in the history records for the specified
good (see function getRe f Price(i) in Figure 5.2). The FNN agent records such data
examples and removes some of the oldest data to ensure it only learns based on the latest
data. Every time the FNN agent detects that an auction has closed, it will re-train the
neural network on the updated set of data (the online updating takes less than one second
on a standard PC) which involves adjusting the parameters to better reflect the prevailing
circumstances (see section 5.3.2).
R1: If pre f is high and oauction is early then pclose is very high.
R2: If pre f is high and oauction is medium then pclose is high.
R3: If pre f is high and oauction is late then pclose is medium.
R4: If pre f is medium and oauction is early then pclose is high.
R5: If pre f is medium and pnow is high then pclose is high.
R6: If pre f is medium and oauction is medium and pnow is medium then pclose is medium.
R7: If pre f is medium and oauction is medium and pnow is low then pclose is medium.
R8: If pre f is medium and oauction is late and pnow is medium then pclose is medium.
R9: If pre f is medium and oauction is late and pnow is low then pclose is low.
R10: If pre f is low and pnow is high then pclose is high.
R11: If pre f is low and pnow is medium then pclose is medium.
R12: If pre f is low and oauction is early and pnow is low then pclose is low.
R13: If pre f is low and oauction is medium and pnow is low then pclose is low.
R14: If pre f is low and oauction is late and pnow is low then pclose is low.
Table 5.1: The FNN agent’s rule base.
To predict the closing prices of the auctions, fuzzy reasoning is used (as per Sections
3.2 and 4.2.7). Through analysing our experimental data, we found that the reference
price, auction’s closing order and current price are closely correlated with the actual
closing prices. Thus, fuzzy rules (defined in table 5.1) are designed to capture the relation
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among these factors. In particular, pre f is expressed using the fuzzy linguistic terms:
high, medium and low; oauction is expressed by early, medium and late; and pnow is
expressed by high, medium and low. The consequent output is expressed as the integer
numbers very high, high, medium and low.
Thus, the FNN agent takes three inputs (pre f , oauction, pnow) and has one output (the
expected auction closing price pclose). According to the rule base above, we developed a
FNN with 5 layers (as shown in Figure 5.3). The input variables correspond to the nodes
in layer 1. The nodes in layer 2 correspond to individual rules for reasoning about the
closing prices of the auctions. Nodes in layer 3 calculate the relative importance (weight)
of each of these rules. The nodes in layer 4 combine the output of each rule into the
overall output. Finally, the node in layer 5 sums up all the outputs in layer 4 and gives
the predicted auction closing price. In more detail:
• Layer 1: each node in this layer generates the membership degrees of a linguistic
label for each input variable (e.g., reference price is low or there are a big number
of auctions left). Specifically, the ith node performs the following (fuzzification)
operation:
O(1)i = µAi(x) = e
− (x−ci)2
2δ2i + γ, (5.1)
where O(1) is the output of layer 1 (i.e., the membership degree with respect to the
corresponding fuzzy sets), x is the input to the ith node, and Ai is the linguistic
value (high, medium, low, etc.) associated with this node. The set of parameters
(ci, δi) determines the shape of the membership function.4 These parameters can be
adapted by learning (as we will explain in section 5.3.2). γ is a very small number
(here we choose 0.00001) that avoids the output in layer 1 becoming zero.
• Layer 2: each node in this layer calculates the firing strength (the product of all the
inputs, and it is in the range of [0,1]) of each rule (in table 5.1) via the multiplication
operation:
O(2)i = wi = Π j∈S(1)i
{µA j}, (5.2)
where S(1)i is the set of nodes in layer 1 which feed into node i in layer 2, and wi is
the output of this node (i.e., the strength of the corresponding rule).
• Layer 3: the ith node of this layer calculates the ratio of the ith rule’s firing strength
to the sum of all rules’ firing strengths:
O(3)i = w
′
i =
wi
∑ j∈S(2) w j
, (5.3)
4Here we assume that this is a Gaussian function. This is because it has non-zero derivatives throughout
the universe of discourse and is therefore easy to implement. Also, the derivatives of a Gaussian function
are continuous and smooth, thus, it can produce good training performance.
111
where S(2) is the set of nodes in layer 2. This ratio indicates the relative importance
of each rule.
• Layer 4: the ith output of the node is calculated by:
O(4)i = ri ∑
j∈S(3)i
w′j, (5.4)
where j ∈ S(3)i is the set of nodes in layer 3 that feed into node i. The output of this
layer combines all the outputs of the rules that have the same consequent output.
• Layer 5: the single node in this layer aggregates the overall output of the FNN
(i.e., pclose) as the summation of all incoming signals:
O(5) = ∑
i∈S(4)

ri ∑
j∈S(3)i
w′j

 , (5.5)
where j ∈ S(4) is the set of nodes in layer 4.
Given the nature of this decision making task, it is important that the various para-
meters of the FNN algorithm fit the prevailing context as accurately as possible. This
is achieved via off-line and on-line learning (see section 5.3.2 for more details). In the
former case, a number of simulated games5 are used to set the initial parameters of the
FNN. After this, the agent can be used in an operational setting to actually purchase
goods. In the latter case, the agent keeps track of the various auctions and when changes
occur (e.g., when an auction has closed or the ask prices change) they are fed into the
FNN as new training examples. These examples are weighted more highly than older
ones and so enable the agent to better reflect prevailing circumstances (but without being
completely reactionary to the last set of changes).
To illustrate the operation of this architecture consider the following example. Let
the reference price be pre f = 20, the current price be pnow = 15, and assume the auction
is the fourth one to close (i.e., oauction = 4). Thus (20,4,15) is fed into the FNN. Let
these values be assigned the following membership degrees of the following fuzzy set:
medium(20) = 0.8, late(4) = 0.7 and low(15) = 1. These values are then the respective
outputs of nodes 2, 6 and 9 in layer 1. Then, taking R9 as an example, the output of node
R9 in layer 2, by equation (5.2), is 0.8×0.7×1 = 0.56. Then, suppose the sum of all the
5The initial parameters of the FNN can either be set directly by the user or can be set by
playing simulated games. A simulated game is played by strategies or humans in a test envir-
onment where the various agents compete but money does not actually change hands. In the
cases where such games are not available, users can monitor real multiple auction websites and
collect relevant data (since the trading history of most auction sites is readily available). How-
ever, if the user is confident about their parameter settings, the agent can be put directly into
practice without going through the simulated games. For example, on Yahoo!Auctions, the final
outcomes of the auctions are stored. Thus the prices paid for digital cameras can be found at:
http://csearch.auctions.shopping.yahoo.com/csearch?sb=desc&alocale=0us&acc=us&desc=digital+camera.
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Figure 5.3: Overview of the FNN architecture.
firing strengths in layer 2 is 3. The weight of R9 (output of w9) will be 0.56/3 = 0.187.
Thus, R9 contributes 0.187 among all the rules. After this, in layer 4, there are 3 rules that
have the same consequent output, which is “low” (i.e., R9, R13, and R14). Let rlow = 18,
w13 = 0.3, and w14 = 0.5, in which case the output of node “low” is, by equation (5.4),
18×(0.187+0.3+0.5)= 17.7. Finally, the output of layer 5 is the sum of all the outputs
of layer 4 (one of which will be the 17.7 coming from the “low” node).
Finally, to guarantee the predicted closing price is alway higher than current ask price,
the predicted auction closing price will be
P∗close = max{pclose, pnow}, (5.6)
where pclose is the output of the FNN and pnow is the current ask price of the auction.
5.3.2 FNN Learning
The FNN agent involves two types of learning: off-line and on-line. In either case,
however, the same basic method is used. Given the training data xi (i = 1,2,3), the
desired output value Y , and the fuzzy logic rules (from table 5.1), the parameters of the
membership functions for the FNN’s input variables are adjusted by supervised learning.
Here the goal is to minimise the error (E) function for all the training patterns:
E = ∑
j
1
2
(Yj −O(5)j )2, (5.7)
where Yj is the actual closing price of pattern6 j and O(5)j is the predicted closing price of
the FNN for pattern j. For each set of training data, starting at the input nodes, a forward
pass is used to compute the activity levels of all the nodes in the network. Then starting at
6Here a pattern is a training example (e.g., for the previous example, a pattern might be
{{20,4,15},17.7}, where given the inputs {20,4,15} the actual output is a price of 17.7).
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the output nodes, a backward pass is used to compute ∂E∂O for all the hidden nodes. In our
FNN agent, the parameters that get adjusted during learning are the consequent output of
each rule (ri in layer 4) and the centre and width of the Gaussian membership functions
for each of the fuzzy terms (ci and δi in layer 1). For the parameters of r, the learning
rule of the FNN agent is based on gradient descent optimisation [Rumelhart et al., 1986]:
r(t +1) = r(t)+η
(
−∂E∂r
)
, (5.8)
where η is the learning rate (η ∈ [0.001,0.01]).
Thus, the learning rule for adjusting the parameters of ri in layer 4 and (ci, δi) in layer
1:
∂E
∂ri
=
∂E
∂O(5)
∂O(5)
∂O(4)i
∂O(4)i
∂ri
= (O(5)−Y ) ∑
j∈S(3)i
w′j, (5.9)
Hence ri is updated by:
ri(t +1) = ri(t)−η(O(5)−Y ) ∑
j∈S(3)i
w′j. (5.10)
For parameters ci and si, the conjugate gradient algorithm [Johansson et al., 1990] is
used since it is faster than the gradient descent optimisation. Suppose α is the parameter
we are interested in and the gradient of the tth iteration of the learning is gt (t > 1),
then the new search direction is to combine the new steepest descent direction with the
previous one, that is,
pt =−gt +βt pt−1, (5.11)
where by using Fletcher-Reeves [Fletcher and Reeves, 1964] update,
βt = g
T
t gt
gTt−1gt−1
. (5.12)
Thus, the adaptive rule of ci in layer 1 is as follows (where S(2)−i means the set of nodes
in layer 2 that are connected with node i in layer 1):
∂E
∂ci
= ∑
m∈S(2)−i
(
∂E
∂O(2)m
∂O(2)m
∂O(1)i
∂O(1)i
∂ci
)
= ∑
m∈S(2)−i

 ∑
k∈S(3)−m
(
∂E
∂O(3)k
∂O(3)k
∂O(2)m
)
∂O(2)m
∂O(1)i
∂O(1)i
∂ci

 , (5.13)
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where
∂E
∂O(3)k
= (O(5)1 −Y )rk; (5.14)
∂O(3)k
∂O(2)m
=
{ ∑k wk−wm
(∑k wk)2 if k=m,
−wm
(∑k wk)2 otherwise;
(5.15)
∂O(2)m
∂O(1)i
=
wm
O(1)i
; (5.16)
∂O(1)i
∂ci
= e
− (xi−ci)2
2δ2i
(xi− ci)
δ2i
. (5.17)
So the adaptive rule of ci is:
ci(t +1) = ci(t)+ηpt, (5.18)
where pt =−gt +βt pt−1 and gt = ∂E∂ci .
Similarly, from (5.14), (5.15), and (5.16) the adaptive rule of δi is derived as:
∂E
∂δi
= ∑
m∈S(2)−i

 ∑
k∈S(2)−m
(
∂E
∂O(3)k
∂O(3)k
∂O(2)m
)
∂O(2)m
∂O(1)i
∂O(1)i
∂δi

 , (5.19)
where
∂O(1)i
∂δi
= e
− (xi−ci)2
2δ2i
(xi− ci)2
δ3i
. (5.20)
Hence the adaptive rule of δi becomes:
δi(t +1) = δi(t)−ηpt, (5.21)
where pt =−gt +βt pt−1 and gt = ∂E∂δi .
5.3.3 Evaluating the Auctions
Given the expected auction closing prices, the agent needs to make a decision about
which auctions to bid in. For ease of expression, we present this evaluation function7
for the case where only price and one other attribute of the good are considered (but
the concepts are equally applicable for arbitrary numbers of attributes). Given the user’s
preference on price and other attributes (as defined in section 5.4.1), the evaluations of
the various factors need to be integrated. In fuzzy theory, the process of combining such
individual ratings for an alternative into an overall rating is referred to as aggregation
7Such an evaluation function is used to evaluate the bidding strategy that considers more than one of the
good’s attributes in making its bidding choice. Thus, for example, all the benchmark strategies in section
5.5 exploit such a function.
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[Yager, 1994]. Let wp and wq be, respectively, the weight of price and the other attribute
that the agent is concerned with and up be the evaluation with respect to price and uq
the evaluation with respect to the other attribute. Intuitively, the role of the aggregation
operator is to balance up and uq and obtain an overall evaluation up,q somewhere between
the two values. There are three main aggregation operators that are commonly used and
each of them has different semantics (conforming to different user objectives):
• Weighted average operator:
up,q = upwp +uqwq. (5.22)
Using this operator means that even if one of the evaluations is very low, the overall
output can still be reasonably high. For example, if the user does not like the time
of the flight but it is very cheap, the overall evaluation can still be high.
• Weighted Einstein operator [Luo et al., 2003c, Luo et al., 2003d]:
up,q =
u
′
puq
′
1+(1−u′p)(1−u′q)
(5.23)
where u′p = (up−1)wp and u
′
q = (uq−1)wq. The above equation satisfies the char-
acteristics of T-norms operators [Yager and Filev, 1994]. That is, if one evaluation
is not satisfied (i.e., up = 0 or uq=0), the overall evaluation is 0. Intuitively, this
corresponds to the situation where both evaluations must be more or less satisfied.
For example, even if the flight ticket is free, the user cannot accept it since travel-
ing after a specific date is totally useless (e.g., he has very import meeting at that
specific date).
• Weighted uninorm operator [Yager and Rybalov, 1996]:
up,q =
(1− τ)u′pu
′
q
(1− τ)u′pu′q + τ(1−u′p)(1−u′q)
, (5.24)
where u′p =
(up−1)wp
max{wp,wq} + 1 and u
′
q =
(uq−1)wq
max{wp,wq} + 1, τ ∈ (0,1) is the unit element
of this operator. The unit element can be regarded as a threshold: if both the
evaluations are above the threshold, the overall evaluation is enhanced; if both are
less than the threshold, the overall evaluation is weakened by each other; if there is
a conflict between the two evaluations, the overall evaluation is a compromise. For
example, if the user likes the date and price, the overall evaluation is very high; if
the user hates the date and price, the overall evaluation is even lower; if the user
likes the date but hates the price, then some intermediate value is chosen.
Since these operators are all plausible means of aggregating price and the other at-
tributes, and none is necessarily superior in all cases, we need to empirically evaluate the
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impact of these operators on the performance of the agents. This we do in section 5.5.2.
5.3.4 Goods Allocation
The agent needs to allocate the goods it owns and potentially owns to its various cus-
tomers in order to maximise the overall satisfaction degree. Thus good allocation takes
place each time the agent accesses the market and when the market information has
been updated. The goods are allocated to the agent’s users optimally so as to max-
imise the sum of the users’ satisfaction. Here this allocation process is regarded as
an assignment problem which we solve using a shortest augmenting path algorithm8
[Jonker and Volgenant, 1987].
In more detail, suppose D is a d×d square,9
D =


s11 · · · s1d
· · ·
sd1 · · · sdd


where d is the number of auctions, and si j is the satisfaction degree of the user’s jth
requirement for auction ai:10
si j =


−evaluate(ai,g j) if i ≤ ndemand ,
99 if owns or holds a good in ai and j > ndemand
0 otherwise,
where 99 is used to avoid the owned goods being allocated to the dummy nodes.
Given this input, suppose an allocation X is:
X =


x11 · · · x1d
· · ·
xd1 · · · xdd


where each row and each column has only a single 1 (i.e., each auction is only allocated
to one user). Thus,
d
∑
j=1
xi j = 1,
8There are many ways to solve linear assignment (http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/burkard98linear.html). By
experience, however, we found this one is among the best. The important observation is that choosing how
to assign goods to customers is an assignment problem and so can be solved efficiently (in O(n3) time)
[Jonker and Volgenant, 1987].
9Here a square is needed in order to use the algorithm. The row represents the auction and the column
represents the goods the agent desires. To use the algorithm, some dummy nodes may need to be added to
make a square so that row number is equal to the column number.
10Our problem here is a maximisation problem, but in order to use the shortest augmenting path al-
gorithm, we need put a minus before the evaluation value.
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d
∑
i=1
xi j = 1,
and the objective function to minimise is:
d
∑
j=1
d
∑
i=1
(si jxi j),
where xi j = 0 or 1.
Using this method, the agent can decide how to allocate the goods it owns and holds
to its users optimally given the ask price or the predicted price of the auctions. This
assignment method is also used to calculate the performance of the agents at the end of
the game. Compared with the allocators used in the TAC (Section 4.2.4), this one is a
linear assignment problem where the allocating problem in TAC is a NP problem. Thus,
the solution we used here is much faster than that in TAC.
5.4 Flight Auction Scenario
This section provides an intuitive scenario11 in which the operation of our algorithm
can be exemplified and its performance empirically assessed (see section 5.5). Here we
consider how to model the user’s preferences as fuzzy sets, outline the environmental
setting for realising the scenario, and present the training results for the FNN agent.
In more detail, there are a number of airlines selling flight tickets through auctions.
Each auction is selling one flight ticket. Each software agent is acting on behalf of one
user who has multiple requirements and they are informed of the user’s preferences about
prices and travel dates.12 The aim of the agent is to obtain the goods that maximise the
sum of its users’ satisfaction.
5.4.1 Users’ Preference Settings
We describe the valuation v of a user for a ticket as a trapezoid shape fuzzy number
(lbottom, ltop,rtop,rbottom), where lbottom = 0 and ltop = 0, and rtop and rbottom are the values
where the satisfaction starts to decrease and where it becomes 0. In this case, the higher
the price of the good, the lower the satisfaction degree. When the price increases to the
valuation of the agent, the satisfaction degree is 0. The travel date q is represented as a
triangular fuzzy number13 (lq,cq,rq), where cq is the preferred date and lq and rq are the
11We choose (for reasons of familiarity) a flight auction scenario where an agent is trying to buy multiple
flight tickets on behalf of a user. This is a real problem that we often meet in real life and it builds upon the
TAC scenario.
12For reasons of simplicity, we focus on the two attribute case. However, the principle is similar with
more attributes.
13Any kind of fuzzy number can be used here, e.g., trapezoid or bell-shaped fuzzy number. We choose
a triangular fuzzy number simply because it is the most commonly used.
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Figure 5.5: Customer’s preference about travel date.
left and right limits respectively.14 Using fuzzy numbers to express the preferences is
more flexible than the fixed preference value as used in TAC (Section 4.1).
By way of illustration, suppose a customer’s valuation about the ticket is about 300
pounds and she wants to travel on about the 15th of December. These preferences are
expressed as fuzzy sets by the respective membership functions µP and µQ given in (5.25)
and (5.26) and are shown graphically in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
µP(x) =


1 if x ≤ 200,
300−x
100 if 200 < x < 300,
0 if x ≥ 300.
(5.25)
µQ(y) =


y−12
3 if 12≤ y ≤ 15,
18−y
3 if 15≤ y ≤ 18,
0 if y ≤ 12 or y ≥ 18.
(5.26)
5.4.2 Experimental Settings
The experiments aim to cover a broad range of scenarios. All the parameters about the
environment are assigned at the beginning of the game. Here we suppose that all auctions
start at a price of 0 and all have a bid increment of 10 pounds. Also:
14If a user has a crisp preference, for example, he has to travel on the 15th of Dec, the similarity degree
of 15th is 1 and 0 otherwise.
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• A day in the game equals ζ = 20 seconds of real time.15
• An auction i’s starting time tstarti is randomly chosen from a uniformly distributed
range (0,(qi−5)ζ). This ensures all the auctions start at least five days before the
travel date.16
• Auction i’s end time is randomly chosen from a uniformly distributed range (tstarti +
2ζ,qi− 3ζ). This guarantees that the auctions close at least three days before the
travel date.17
• Each agent is randomly assigned to a customer which has n requirements, n∈ [1,5];
• All the agents start bidding at the beginning of the game.18
• Auction i’s flight date qi is chosen randomly from a uniformly distributed range
(11,19).
• The valuation of the goods for a customer are randomly chosen from a uniformly
distributed range (170,370).
• A customer’s preferred travel date is randomly chosen from a uniformly distributed
range (12,18).19
5.4.3 The FNN Agent’s Learning Algorithm
As discussed in section 5.3.2, the agent engages in a period of off-line learning in order to
provide initial parameters for the FNN agent. In more detail, Figure 5.6 shows the curve
of the root mean square error with respect to the number of training epochs.20 After 200
training epochs, it can be seen that the error between the target output and the actual
output reaches its lowest point and so the parameter settings of this point are those used
when the agent is made operational. Specifically, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show, respectively,
the comparison of the FNN parameters before and after training. As can be seen, the
parameters for each of the three inputs are adjusted from the original settings defined by
the field experts.
5.4.4 Parameter Adaptation in Different Environments
This section compares the parameter adaptation in two environments where the supply
is high (25 auctions) and low (15 auctions). Specifically, Figures 5.9 to 5.12 show how
the parameters are adjusted differently in different environments. In Figure 5.10, when
supply is high, the closing prices tend to be low and, thus, the consequent parameters
15The length of one day can be shorter if it can be guaranteed that all the agents have time to respond in
the market.
16We choose five to ensure the agent has a reasonable time to transact the ticket before the travel date.
17We choose three to ensure the start time of the auction is before the end time and there is a reasonably
long time for the auction.
18This is because we want to evaluate all types of agents fairly. If some agents start bidding late, they
will be at a disadvantage compared with those that start early.
19This range is smaller than the range of the auctions’ flight dates because this preferred travel date is a
fuzzy number. Thus when defuzzified it will actually cover the full range of the flight’s dates.
20The reference price and ask price are scaled by dividing by 10 during learning. However, this does not
affect the result in any way. In the real world scenario, the price can be any number.
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Figure 5.7: Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and
after (solid line) off-line learning.
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Figure 5.8: Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after
(solid line) off-line learning.
are lower than the initial ones. In contrast, in Figure 5.12, when supply is low, the
closing prices tend to be high, and the consequent parameters are higher than the initial
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after (solid line) off-line learning in high supply environment.
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Figure 5.10: Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after
(solid line) off-line learning in high supply environment.
5.5 Empirical Evaluation
This section evaluates the FNN agent by comparing it in a variety of environments, with
other agents that use bidding strategies proposed in the literature. In particular we are
interested in assessing the performance of each kind of agent in different environments.
There are three main groups of experiments and there are a number of sessions which
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and after (solid line) off-line learning in low supply environment.
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Figure 5.12: Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after
(solid line) off-line learning in low supply environment.
correspond to experiments with different settings (as per section 5.4.2). For each session,
at least 200 games21 are played among the agents.
Since the number of agents in each experiment varies, the performance ρK of a par-
ticular type K of agent (e.g., FNN) is calculated as the average satisfaction degree per
agent of the kind K, that is:
ρK =
∑nKi ∑mij u(i)j
nK
, (5.27)
21A t-test showed that 200 games are sufficient to give a significant ranking among the agents. A p value
of p < 0.05 is reported for all the experiments.
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where nK is the number of type K agents in the same game, u(i)j means the evaluation of
customer j and mi is the number of customers of agent i. Since most of the extant multi-
auction bidding strategies are concerned solely with price (see section 5.6), we had to
extend them to deal with bidding for goods that are characterised by multiple attributes.
Thus, in all cases, the agents used the aggregation operators specified in section 5.3.3 in
order to make trade-offs between price and travel date. To deal with multiple goods, the
allocation function can decide which user bids in which auction. The specific benchmark
strategies we used are:
• Greedy (GRD) strategy (adapted from [Byde, 2001a]): while the sum of the num-
ber of goods held and owned is less than what the agent needs, bid in auctions
where the auction’s current satisfaction has the highest evaluation (as defined in
section 5.3.3);
• Fixed Auction (FIX) strategy (adapted from [Byde et al., 2002]): select at the be-
ginning of the game the auctions in which bids will be placed and then only bid
in these auctions. The auctions chosen here are those where the sum of the users’
satisfaction is highest for date (at this time none of them have a value for price).
The agent continues bidding in its selected auction until the price satisfaction de-
gree equals zero in which case it will switch to another auction (until all those in
the fixed set have been tried).
• Average (AVG) strategy: AVG also uses the ECF algorithm, but it uses a much
simpler prediction function based on the past history transaction prices to predict
the closing prices. In more detail, it calculates the average closing prices of all
the auctions for each kind of good from the recent games. Suppose in the latest N
games, there are m auctions with attribute i, then the predicted closing price of an
auction with attribute i is:
p˜(i)close =
∑mj p(i)j
m
,
where p(i)j is the real closing price of auction j with attribute i.
5.5.1 Varying Agent Populations
This experiment aims to compare the performance of the different types of agents when
there are varying numbers of the other agent types in the population (here the population
size is fixed). In this experiment, we studied three environments: when supply is low
(15 auctions), medium (20 auctions) and high (25 auctions). When the weighted average
operator is used and the weight ratio is wp : wq = 1 : 1, Figure 5.13 shows the results
when there are a fixed number of each type of agent in a session (a), and when one type
dominates numerically (b) to (e).22
22In (a), there are equal numbers of each agent and we have 4 kinds of agents, thus there are 8 agents.
In (b) to (e), there are 4 of one kind of agent and 2 of other three kinds. Thus, there are 10 agents in total.
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Figure 5.13: Performance of agent with various agent populations.
The horizontal axis shows the total auction number in the market. The vertical axis
represents the performance of the kind of agents in that session. The number on top of
each bar is the number of transactions made per agent by that kind of agents in the
session. In (a) there are 8 agents in total and 10 for (b) to (e).
From this, it can be seen that the FNN agents perform better than AVG agents in
most cases considered. We attribute this success to their ability to be able to select the
auctions to bid in according to the relatively correct prediction on the closing prices of
the auctions. The FNN agent is better than GRD agents in most cases except in (e) where
there is a high supply and 40% AVG agents. This is because in this case there are many
agents that use the ECF strategy. Thus, it is likely to be the case that a number of FNN
agents and AVG agents are waiting for specific auctions to bid and some of them failed
to obtain the goods. The GRD agent endeavours to make a transaction whenever it can.
Its main shortcoming is that it only considers ongoing auctions (it ignores those that have
not yet started and so fails to consider the full set of potential purchasing opportunities
when making bidding decisions). Thus, it sometimes buys a good at the user’s valuation
price, when, if it waited, it may well find subsequent auctions with lower closing prices.
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The FIX agent performs worst because it only bids in auctions where it knows, a priori,
that it can get high satisfaction on the flight date. This leads to a poor overall performance
because it misses auctions that have a high evaluation on price but a lower one on date.
As is shown in the figure, FIX agents also have the smallest transaction numbers, because
they only bid in small number of auctions. This shows the advantage of our heuristic of
wanting to bid in more than just the n most promising ones.
It can also be seen from all the subfigures in Figure 5.13 that when the supply is high,
all the agents have a higher performance value than when there is a low supply. This is
because, in general, the auctions close at a lower price when the supply is high (because
there is less competition). In Figure 5.13(b), GRD agents dominate the market. This is
because these agents are greedy which means they often make the transaction price of
some auctions very high because they will top up the ask price whenever it is lower than
their reserve prices. It can be seen from the relative performance in Figure 5.13(b) that
GRD agents do indeed have the lowest performance value in this case. When FIX agents
dominate the market (see Figure 5.13(d)), all the other agents have a higher performance
value compared to other cases in Figure 5.13. This is because the FIX agents only bid in a
small number of auctions. Thus other auctions have less competition and, consequently,
lower prices.
From Figure 5.13, we can also see the number of transactions made by each kind of
agent. Generally, the greater the number of agents, the larger the number of transactions
made (e.g., more GRD in (b), more FNN in (c), more FIX in (d), and more AVG in (e)).
When the agent numbers are the same and when the performance of one kind of agent
is better than the others, but the number of transactions is smaller, this means the agent
made some good deals (e.g., it had some transactions at low prices). For example, in (a)
when there are only 15 auctions, the FNN agent had the highest performance, but the
average number of transaction is only 3.9 which is smaller than the corresponding value
for the GRD agents (4.2).
5.5.2 Varying Aggregation Operators
This experiment studies the impact on the different types of agents of the different ways
of trading-off the price and travel date (see Figure 5.14). To do this, the number of
auctions is generated randomly in the range of [15,25] and the number of agents is set
to 8. We also fix the weight of wp : wq = 1 : 1 for each operator (see section 5.5.3 for
experiments with differently weighted attributes). This time, the numbers of each agent
type in a given game are randomly generated.
As can be seen, the FNN agents behave the best and AVG agents behave second in
all cases above. In fact, the order of performance of the four kinds of agent does not
change for different aggregators. This shows that our FNN agent performs best whatever
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Figure 5.14: Performance of various agents using different aggregation operators.
aggregation operator is used. Again, we attribute this success of FNN agents to the ef-
ficiency of the ECF algorithm and its ability to predict the auction closing price and
the parameter adaptation through learning. It is also shown that the performance of
agents using the Einstein operator is, relatively speaking, lower than that of using aver-
age and uninorm operators. This is because the Einstein operator uses T-norm operators
[Yager and Filev, 1994] which means the overall evaluation is less than the value of each
of the constituent attributes.
5.5.3 Varying Preference Weights
This experiment evaluates the performance of the different agents when they use varying
weights for the different attributes of the goods. This is an important issue to consider be-
cause, again, various weightings may lead to a different ranking of the strategies. Thus,
for each operator, we conducted experiments to test the impact of the weights on the
performance of various strategies. In this case, the number of auctions is generated ran-
domly from [15,25] and Figure 5.15 shows the performance of the agents with the three
representative weights we consider. As can be seen, the order of each kind of agent does
not change for the different weight ratios. Again, in all cases, FNN agents perform the
best followed by AVG agents. This superior performance is again due to the efficiency
of ECF algorithm.
However, in Figures 5.15(a) and (b), we see that the GRD agents also perform well
when wp : wq = 1 : 3. This is because such agents always choose the currently best
candidate and the one with a high satisfaction on “date” is usually chosen. Note that
GRD agents accept any price within their budget line, thus the satisfaction degree on
price is not always high. Thus, when “date” is valued more, GRD agents tend to perform
well. However, this advantage disappears when price is valued more. This feature is
less apparent when we use the uninorm operator (see Figure 5.15(c)), since even when
the satisfaction for one attribute is high, the overall evaluation is not always high. For
FNN and AVG agents, when the attribute of “price” is valued more, the agents perform
better and have a larger number of transactions. Again, this shows that the ECF algorithm
enables the agents to make more transactions. The FIX agents also perform better when
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Figure 5.15: Using weighted operators with varying weights.
“price” is valued more, because the behaviour of the FNN and AVG agents make the
transaction price low in this situation.
5.5.4 Varying Attitude to Risk
This experiment aims to study the influence of the risk attitude on the performance of
the FNN agent given the same aggregation operators (because for the same operators,
different thresholds for the risk attitudes may lead to different performance characteristics
for the agents). In particular, we aim to find the best configuration of risk attitude for
an agent to adopt. Thus, for each kind of aggregation operator, three risk attitudes are
compared: risk-seeking, risk-neutral and risk-averse. For example, when the weighted
average operator is used, the threshold (λ in Figure 5.1) is 0.1 for a risk-seeking agent,
0.2 for a risk-neutral agent and 0.3 for a risk-averse agent.
From Figure 5.16, we can see that in general terms the higher the supply there is, the
better the agent performs (as was shown in the experiment in section 5.5.1). However,
the general trend is that risk-seeking agents perform better when supply is high and risk-
averse agents behave better when supply is low. This is because when supply is high,
there is little competition among the agents and a risk-seeking agent which has a big
threshold can almost always win in the auction it selects. This, in turn, leads to high
profit per transaction. In contrast, when supply is low, the game is very competitive
and a risk-averse agent with a small threshold can win a good whenever it is within the
threshold. However it cannot make much profit per transaction.
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Figure 5.16: Performance of FNN agents with different risk attitudes.
5.6 Related Work
There are several strands of work that are directly related to what we have described
in this chapter. There is work on agents bidding in multiple overlapping auctions (which
has already been discussed in Section 4.4) and work on using fuzzy techniques to manage
agent interactions (which has also been discussed previously (in Section 3.5). The related
work which has not yet been considered is that on multi-attribute auctions [Che, 1993,
Bichler et al., 1999, Jennings et al., 2000a, David et al., 2002] (Section 2.3.3). However,
in these works, the buyer is the auctioneer who calls for bids along multiple attributes
from sellers, while in our work the sellers are the auctioneers. There are multiple auctions
in our context where they have one auction. Our agent bids on price only although it needs
to consider multiple attributes while the agents in these works needs bid on multiple
attributes.
5.7 Summary
This chapter developed a new algorithm that guides an agent’s bidding behaviour in mul-
tiple overlapping English auctions for multiple items characterised by multiple attributes.
The Earliest Closest First algorithm we developed first calculates the auctions that best
fit the users’ preferences and then bids in order of increasing end time in any auctions
that have a satisfaction degree that is reasonably close to the best ones. Specifically, the
FNN strategy uses neuro-fuzzy techniques to predict the expected closing prices of the
English auctions and to determine which auction the agent should bid in at what time.
The use of a fuzzy neural network also allows the decision making criteria of our agent to
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be adapted to the situation in which it finds itself. The adaptation is based on the learning
of the neural network where the parameters in the fuzzy sets and consequent output can
be adjusted. Moreover, we benchmarked our algorithm against two common alternatives
available in the literature and the strategy which also uses ECF but with a different pre-
diction function. In most cases we considered, the FNN strategy is superior to the others.
This shows the effectiveness of the ECF and the adaptation ability of the FNN agent.
Our algorithm can also make trade-offs in its bidding behaviour between the different
attributes that characterise the desired good in order to maximise the user’s satisfaction.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
With the increasing automation of e-commerce, we believe ever greater amounts of trad-
ing will be conducted in on-line auctions by software agents. However, to make progress
in this area one of the key problems that needs to be addressed is that of developing
effective and efficient bidding strategies that agents can use to achieve their negotiation
objectives. This is exactly the aim of this work and, to this end, we have developed such
strategies for continuous double auctions (Chapter 3), for multiple inter-related auctions
with multiple protocols (Chapter 4), and for a general multiple English auction market
(Chapter 5). In all cases, these strategies have been benchmarked against the leading
other strategies that have been proposed in the literature and our strategies have been
shown to be effective in a wide variety of circumstances.
In more detail, we first developed a strategy that guides an agent’s buying and selling
behaviour in a continuous double auction. Our strategy, the FL-strategy, uses heuristic
fuzzy rules and a fuzzy reasoning mechanism to decide what bids or asks to place. We
then enhanced the basic strategy so that it can adapt its behaviour to the supply (demand)
in the market (this revised strategy is called the adaptive FL-strategy). Our strategies
were then shown to outperform the main strategies that have previously been proposed
for CDAs. This result is especially promising since the benchmark strategies we eval-
uate against have been shown to outperform human bidders in experimental settings
[Das et al., 2001].
Based on the success of our work in CDAs, we then used fuzzy logic techniques in
the multiple auctions context. In particular, we developed a trading agent, Southamp-
tonTAC, that participated in the International Trading Agent Competition in 2001 and
2002. This agent uses several of the techniques devised in the CDA work and can ad-
apt its bidding behaviour according to its assessment of situation in which it finds itself.
SouthamptonTAC has been shown to be successful across a wide range of TAC envir-
onments in both competitions, as well as in our controlled experiments. In more detail,
SouthamptonTAC does best, obtains the highest score, in competitive games (i.e., where
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the number of risk seeking agents is large). It also performs well in non-competitive
environments because it can adapt its strategy to bid aggressively for the goods it wants.
To build a more general multiple auction model and improve the preference repres-
entation of the customer, we focused on the problem of an agent bidding across multiple,
simultaneous English auctions. For this case, an Earliest Closest First algorithm was
proposed that bids in the auctions which have a close satisfaction degree with what are
believed to be the optimal set. To realise this algorithm, we designed an agent that uses
neuro-fuzzy techniques to predict the expected closing prices of the auctions. The para-
meters involved in the strategy can be adapted according to standard learning algorithms
in neural networks. Thus, our agent is able to adapt its bidding strategy to reflect the type
of environment in which it is situated. As before, we compared our agent with a range of
other strategies from the literature (in a flight auction scenario). The result shows that, in
most cases, the FNN agents outperform other strategies.
Looking back at the research aims outlined in Section 1.2, the research objectives that
were laid out have been met:
• We successfully used fuzzy reasoning methods (Sections 4.2.7 and 5.3.1) to pre-
dict the auctions’ likely closing prices in a dynamic market. The effectiveness of
both agents show that the prediction is sufficiently accurate to make reasonable
decisions.
• All the agents’ strategies were adaptive to some degree. The CDA agent (Section
3.4) adapts its bidding behaviour according to the transaction frequency, Southamp-
tonTAC (Section 4.2.8) adapts its behaviour between three different kinds of TAC
environments, and the FNN agent (Section 5.3.2), which exhibits the greatest de-
gree of adaptivity, can vary the parameters involved in the bidding strategy to reflect
the environment in which it is situated.
• The agents bid flexibly and relax their constraints where appropriate. Both the
CDA agent and SouthamptonTAC realised this in the bidding in a continuous
double auction (Sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.6). Flexible bidding was shown in the earli-
est closest first strategy of the FNN Agent (Section 5.2) by the fact that it chooses
the closest auctions to the optimal set to bid in.
• The attitudes towards risk are varied in all the agents (Sections 3.3.2, 4.2.8 and 5.2)
and we found it had a significant beneficial impact on their performance.
• Both SouthamptonTAC (Section 4.2.5) and the FNN agent (Section 5.3.3) were
able to make trade-offs when bidding in auctions.
In addition to developing the strategies themselves, we also believe that our work
is significant both for the areas of agent-mediated e-commerce and fuzzy logic. In the
former case, we developed novel bidding strategies for a number of auction contexts.
In the latter case, we showed how fuzzy logic can be employed in agent-mediated e-
commerce settings. Specifically, fuzzy logic theory and fuzzy neuro-network techniques
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are shown to be suitable ways to design a strategy for a bidding agent. Thus we suc-
cessfully used fuzzy reasoning to predict the likely closing price of an auction; adaptive
bidding behaviour is achieved through neuro-fuzzy techniques, where the parameters in
the membership function of the fuzzy sets are adapted through error propagation; and
flexible bidding enables the agent to relax constraints when bidding in order to make
more transactions.
When taken together, these contributions make an important step towards realising
the full potential of agent mediated e-commerce. Specifically, we have extended the
state-of-the-art in strategies for continuous double auctions, developed robust bidding
strategies for the trading agent competition, and developed and implemented, for the first
time, algorithms that can purchase multiple goods from multiple English auctions.
Undertaking this work, we identified a number of commonalities between the meth-
ods of approach in the various contexts. These steps, outlined below, can be viewed as
an embryonic version of a methodology for building trading agents using soft computing
techniques.
1. Determine what to reason about in the auction setting. The chosen issues are usu-
ally the key determinant of what to bid in the auction. For example, it is the pre-
dicted closing price in the TAC (Chapter 4) and the bid price in the CDA (Chapter
3). These issues vary in different auctions and they are typically difficult to predict
because of the uncertainty of the game.
2. Choose the factors that should be used in the fuzzy rules. If there is no history
data available, these factors need to be chosen by the experience and intuition of
the designers. If there is history data, the most relevant factors can be chosen by
analysing the data set.
3. Structure the fuzzy rules. This is the key part of the fuzzy reasoning. There are two
ways to sort out the rules. First, if there is a lot of history data, unsupervised learn-
ing can be used to abstract of the rules automatically [Lin, 1994]. The second way
is to design the rules according to the relationship of the factors to the reasoning
value. This, again, requires the designer to have rich experience and intuition in the
environment. In some cases, if the problem is too complicated, more than one rule
base can be used to deal with different situations (see the fuzzy rules in Chapter
4). In either case, however, the designer needs to decide which controller to use.
In many cases, Sugeno and Mamdani [Mamdani, 1974] are commonly used: if the
output of each rule clearly corresponds to some constants, the Sugeno controller is
used; otherwise if the output is described as fuzzy sets, the Mamdani controller is
more appropriate.
4. Decide how to adapt the parameters in the fuzzy rules. The initial parameters in
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the fuzzy rules are usually set by the domain experts. In the case where neuro-
fuzzy techniques are used, the adaptation can easily be achieved through super-
vised learning [Rumelhart et al., 1986]. However, for the fuzzy reasoning itself,
the adaptation is more complicated because it often involves the adaptation of the
parameters in the output of the fuzzy rules. These parameters can be adapted ac-
cording to the risk attitudes of the agent, whether the auction is competitive or not,
or whether it is urgent to obtain the goods.
Despite these achievements, more work is needed. In particular, there are six prom-
ising directions for further research based on this thesis:
• In both the CDA and TAC, we used the Sugeno controller, but it may be the case
that other fuzzy logic controllers, such as the conventional Mamdani controller
[Mamdani, 1974, Zimmermann, 1996], could also be used. This is a challenge
since we need to determine if our fuzzy reasoning methods are suitable for control-
lers besides the Sugeno and it may be the case that another type of controller could
improve the performance of our algorithms still further.
• In TAC, the pattern recognition procedure used to classify the degree of compet-
itiveness of the environment could be enhanced by incorporating into the decision
process further variables that are indicative of the trading evolution. Relevant ex-
amples include the prices of the hotel auctions in TAC the rate of change of the
increase of the prices and the bidding behaviour of other agents. We believe that
by incorporating such additional factors we may be able to develop a more robust
knowledge base because this will lead to a more accurate classification result.
• For the FNN agent, we only consider the case where the multiple goods are in-
dependent. However, it is increasingly the case that people will buy multiple in-
terdependent goods (as per the TAC). To deal with this case, the fuzzy rule base
will need to be expanded to deal with the relation among attributes. Moreover,
other related factors which are significant to the auction closing prices need to be
considered because there are constraints among the goods.
• The FNN structure of the FNN agent (e.g., the size of the linguistic terms and
the fuzzy rules) is currently designed by domain experts. Ideally, however, this
structure should be obtained by self-organised learning [Lin, 1994]. This is an
important extension because it means that our method could more easily be used
because it would be free from human involvement.
• The basic ideas of the ECF algorithm can be extended to other auction protocols
(e.g., Continuous Double Auctions or Dutch auctions). To achieve this, the optimal
asks and bids can be calculated first and then, according to the current ask or bids,
the agent can decide whether to accept the ask/bid or submit a fuzzified ask/bid.
• Based on our work on multiple auctions, it is a challenge to further generalise
the neuro-fuzzy based prediction method so that it can be used in other auction
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types (including Vickrey, Dutch and First-Price Sealed Bid auctions). In this case,
the decision problem is more complicated since each auction protocol has its own
price updates rules and it will involve more fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules.
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Appendix A
Allocators’ Setup for SouthamptonTAC
This appendix describes the setup for allocators (see Section 4.2.4) of our agent, Southamp-
tonTAC.
The Allocator-1 deals with the allocation of available and unavailable goods and out-
puts what flights and hotels to buy during the first 11 minutes of a game. The setup for
this allocator is as follows.
• Notation
(i) Let the 20 travel packages be described in the following way: (outdate indate
hotel-type), where outdate ∈ {1, · · · ,4} indicating date out to Tampa; indate
∈ {2, · · · ,5} indicating the date back to TACtown; hotel-type ∈ {0,1} where
0 stands for S hotel and 1 for T hotel. The 20 valid travel packages can be
expressed as: (1 2 1), (1 3 1), (1 4 1), (1 5 1), (2 3 1), (2 4 1), (2 5 1), (3 4 1),
(3 5 1), (4 5 1), (1 2 0), (1 3 0), (1 4 0), (1 5 0), (2 3 0), (2 4 0), (2 5 0),
(3 4 0), (3 5 0), and (4 5 0).
(ii) The entertainment tickets have 3 types for 4 days. Let (type day) denote
a ticket, where type ∈ {1,2,3} and day ∈ {1,2,3,4}. For each customer,
various tickets can be expressed as: (1 1), (1 2), (1 3), (1 4), (2 1), (2 2), (2
3), (2 4), (3 1), (3 2), (3 3) and (3 4).
• Variables
(i) For customer i ∈ {1, · · · ,8}, there are 20 variables fi, j ∈ {0,1} where j ∈
{1, · · · ,20}, each representing the jth travel package. Customer i is allocated
to package j when fi, j = 1. Thus, there are 160 variables for 8 customers.
(ii) BUY [0], · · · ,BUY [3] represent the inflight tickets to buy; BUY [4], · · · ,BUY [7]
represent the outflight tickets to buy; BUY [8], · · · ,BUY [11] represent the T
rooms to bid for; BUY [12], · · · ,BUY [15] represent the S rooms to bid for.
(iii) For each customer i ∈ {1, · · · ,8}, there are 12 variables ei, j ∈ {0,1} where
j ∈ {1, · · · ,12}, each representing the jth entertainment ticket. Customer i is
allocated ticket j when ei, j = 1.
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• Constants
Let OWN[0], · · · ,OWN[3] be the inflight tickets owned by the agent; OWN[4], · · · ,
OWN[7] be the outflight tickets owned by the agent; OWN[8], · · · ,OWN[11] rep-
resent the T rooms owned by the agent; OWN[12], · · · ,OWN[15] represent the S
rooms owned by the agent; and OW N[16], · · · ,OWN[27] denote each kind of en-
tertainment ticket owned by the agent.
• Constraints
(i) Each customer i ∈ {1, · · · ,8} has only one valid package (8 constraints),
20
∑
j=1
fi, j ≤ 1.
(ii) The flights tickets that can be used must be less than the number the agent
owns or that it will buy (8 constraints):
8
∑
i=1
( fi,1 + fi,2 + fi,3 + fi,4 + fi,11 + fi,12 + fi,13 + fi,14)≤ OWN[0]+BUY [0],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,5 + fi,6 + fi,7 + fi,15 + fi,16 + fi,17)≤OWN[1]+BUY [1],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,8 + fi,9 + fi,18 + fi,19)≤OW N[2]+BUY [2],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,10 + fi,20)≤OWN[3]+BUY [3],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,1 + fi,11)≤ OWN[4]+BUY [4],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,2 + fi,5 + fi,12 + fi,15)≤OW N[5]+BUY [5],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,3 + fi,6 + fi,8 + fi,13 + fi,16 + fi,18)≤OWN[6]+BUY [6],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,4 + fi,7 + fi,9 + fi,10 + fi,14 + fi,17 + fi,19 + fi,20)≤OWN[7]+BUY [7].
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(iii) For customer i ∈ {1, · · · ,8} entertainment tickets must be used between the
days in Tampa (32 constraints):
fi,1 + fi,2 + fi,3 + fi,4 + fi,11 + fi,12 + fi,13 + fi,14 ≥ ei,1 + ei,5 + ei,9,
fi,2 + · · ·+ fi,7 + fi,12 + · · ·+ fi,17 ≥ ei,2 + ei,6 + ei,10,
fi,3 + fi,4 + fi,6 + · · ·+ fi,9 + fi,13 + fi,14 + fi,16 + · · ·+ fi,19 ≥ ei,3 + ei,7 + ei,11,
fi,4 + fi,7 + fi,9 + fi,10 + fi,14 + fi,17 + fi,19 + fi,20 ≥ ei,4 + ei,8 + ei,12.
(iv) The number of hotel rooms must be less than the number of rooms the agent
owns and that it will bid for (8 constraints):
8
∑
i=1
( fi,1+ fi,2 + fi,3 + fi,4)≤ OWN[8]+BUY [8],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,2+ fi,3 + fi,4 + fi,5 + fi,6 + fi,7)≤ OWN[9]+BUY [9],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,3+ fi,4 + fi,6 + fi,7 + fi,8 + fi,9)≤ OWN[10]+BUY [10],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,4+ fi,7 + fi,9 + fi,10)≤ OWN[11]+BUY [11],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,11 + fi,12 + fi,13 + fi,14)≤ OWN[12]+BUY [12],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,12 + fi,13 + fi,14 + fi,15 + fi,16 + fi,17)≤OWN[13]+BUY [13],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,13 + fi,14 + fi,16 + fi,17 + fi,18 + fi,19)≤OWN[14]+BUY [14],
8
∑
i=1
( fi,14 + fi,17 + fi,19 + fi,20)≤ OWN[15]+BUY [15].
(v) For entertainment ticket j ∈ {1, · · · ,12} the number of tickets used must be
less than the number the agent owns (12 constraints):
8
∑
i=1
ei, j ≤ OWN[ j+15],
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(vi) For customer i∈ {1, · · · ,8} each type of entertainment ticket can only be used
once (24 constraints):
4
∑
j=1
ei, j ≤ 1,
8
∑
j=5
ei, j ≤ 1,
12
∑
j=9
ei, j ≤ 1.
• Objective function
The objective function is to maximise the following formula:
8
∑
i=1
20
∑
j=1
( fi, j×ui, j)+
8
∑
i=1
12
∑
j=1
(ei, j×Ei, j)−
15
∑
p=0
(BUY [i]×Price[i]),
where ui, j is the utility if customer i chooses package j; Ei, j is the preference value
if customer i enjoys entertainment ticket j; and Price[i] is the updated ask price of
the corresponding auctions.
The Allocator-2 deals with the allocation of available and unavailable goods and out-
puts what flights and entertainment tickets to buy for the final minute of a game when the
hotel rooms are finialised. The setup for this allocator is as follows.
• Variables (276 variables). The difference with allocator-1 is that there are no
variables BUY[8],· · · ,BUY[15], since all the hotel auctions have closed. However,
BUY[16],· · · ,BUY[27], indicating the number of entertainment tickets to buy for
each of the 12 tickets, are added.
• Constraints (92 constraints). All but the following are the same as those of
allocator-1: the constraints (v) above are changed to
8
∑
i=1
ei, j ≤ OWN[ j+15]+BUY [ j+15],
where j ∈ {1, · · · ,12}. This means the allocator can also calculate which entertain-
ment tickets to bid for in order to get the optimal utility. All the other constraints
are the same as allocator-1.
• Objective function. The objective function is to maximise the following formula:
8
∑
i=1
20
∑
j=1
( fi, j×ui, j)+
8
∑
i=1
12
∑
j=1
(ei, j×Ei, j)−
7
∑
p=0
(BUY [i]×Price[i])−
27
∑
p=16
(BUY [i]×Price[i]),
where ui, j is the utility if customer i chooses package j; Ei, j is the preference value
if customer i enjoys entertainment ticket j; and Price[i] (0 ≤ i ≤ 7) is the updated
ask price of the flight auctions and Price[i] (16≤ i≤ 27) is the entertainment ticket
price in the corresponding auctions.
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